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Abstract 
Over the past decades a growing number of developing countries have opened their 
Electricity (Power) industry to the private sector participation in view of the need to expand the 
capacity or increase the reliability of systems, or both. There is a global opinion that in view of 
the public sector budget constraints and the positive results of the early experiments with 
private sector participation as realized, the condition is encouraging throughout the world. 
Indian reform legislation has been more on impffoyihg financial viability of power 
sector than on improving access to electricity. These attempts are not addressing core issues 
like consumer interest, supply of reas'qftable power and quality--of-power. Despite substantial 
refonns and incentives, due to uncertain .prtrspecjs of getting paid for their supplies private 
investors held back from investing in the sector, hi view of inadequate cost recovery and the 
limiting factors one of which is essentially a single-buyer market, the reforms turned out to be 
unsustainable. It may further be seen that momentum for sustainability is derived from people. 
The solutions proposed are not limited to the provision of products and services to cater to the 
unmet needs of Indians, from the viewpoint of consumers, but to think of them as partners and 
allies in the fight for sustainability. In the perspective of its socio-economic realities, role of 
government becomes important. 
Unbundling of state power entities combined with deregulation has been very 
successful in significantly improving the efficiency of the power sector in those countries that 
have done it. Primary advantage of this method is that, by deregulating to open competition, 
the industry functions at much higher levels of efficiency. 
The refonns are hindered by problems such as litigation, financial arrangements and 
obtaining clearances and fiiel supply agreements. With the tariffs reflecting high capital costs 
and returns on equity, additions to the generation capacity without corresponding improvement 
of the transmission and distribution facilities are likely to further undermine the system 
efficiency. 
Introduction of Power sector 
The Power Sector is striving to meet the challenge of providing adequate power needed 
to fiiel the growing economy of the country. However, this growth of the Power Sector has to 
be within the realms of the principles of sustainable development. Thrust is also accorded to 
maximizing efficiency in the entire electricity chain, which has the duel advantage of 
conserving scarce resources and minimizing the effect on the environment. 
Power generation costs are the key to detemiining the best generation mix for a reliable 
supply of electricity while making it available for use economically. With an increasing 
demand for power for economic development, countries around the world need to evaluate the 
present and future costs of generating electricity using the presently available and expected 
power generation technologies of future. Evaluating the cost of power generation depends on 
various factors that are responsible for driving the prices of electricity. The most important 
factors driving the power generation costs are government policies and incentives, capital 
(investment cost), fuel costs and Operations & Maintenance cost. 
In the 12* five year plan there is going to be a larger role of private sector in further 
capacity addition. Government of India has tried to reform the Power sector since very 
beginning as per the changed requirements and as per the need of the hour. This has made 
significant impact on the scenario of power generation in the country. It becomes more 
encouraging for private sector participation in view of the potential to grow and with the 
advent of new technologies and changing economic scenario across globe, the sector may lead 
towards a market driven mechanism of tariff fixation. This will not only make the Government 
free from the burden of subsidy but explore the potentials of market driven economics in the 
country. 
Although many countries have expressed some dissatisfaction with the operation of 
their state-owned power sector, there has been a wide range of responses to the problems 
perceived. Some countries have felt it impossible or undesirable to embark on any refonn 
strategy that requires opening electricity production or sales to private participants, whereas 
other countries, although willing to engage private participation, have chosen very different 
strategies for doing so. 
Survey of literature 
The literature review conducted here has been taken in the above perspective and thus the 
papers relating to that are mostly of post 1991 era for Indian context, however the case of other 
developing countries have been accordingly taken as per their respective years of sectoral 
reforms and private sector participation in those countries. The literature review focuses upon 
the following aspects in the context of the Research work. 
1) Need of private sector participation in power generation 
2) Drivers of private sector participation in power generation 
3) Sustainability of private sector power projects 
4) Availability of resources for capacity addition 
5) Privatization in various developed and developing countries 
1) Need for Private Sector Participation in Power Generation 
Various authors like Puneet Chitkara, et.al. , (2001) have stated that there is a general 
opinion that the refonns should start with privatization of Power generation. Others 
believe that the government has started at the wrong end by not beginning the reform 
process with privatization of distribution. Tongia Rahul (2003)has described the political 
aspects of the Indian economy with special reference to power sector. After independence 
the Indian economy followed a socialist path, with the state assuming an ever-larger role 
in economic activity. Balachandra (2006) has discussed the implications of such private 
sector participation in power generation on various stakeholders, viz., public utilities, 
consumers and private sector and the study attempts to analyze issues like planned 
rationing, guarantees to private sector, backing down of existing capacity. Waquar Ahmed 
(2007) has examined the evolution of electric-power policy in India adopting a political-
economy approach by drawing linkages between global and local/national discourses, of 
development. Dubash Navroz K. and Sudhir Chella Raj an (2001), have provided an 
analysis of the social and political context in which power sector reforms have taken 
place in India. They have focused on the character and effects of those reforms and the 
roles and responses of different players. Woods Laura (2011) has highlighted the major 
opportunities present in Power Sector. The Indian Power Sector has been undergoing a 
rapid growth phase with a vision to provide reliable, affordable and quality power for all 
by 2012. In view of the above authors the main role of the government is to form policies 
and appoint regulators to provide a level playing field for all the player of power sector 
who are involved in the value chain of power generation upto distribution to end 
consumers. 
2) Drivers of Private Sector Participation in Power Generation 
Antonette D'Sa, et. al. (1999) have critically examined the various aspects of private 
sector participation in India's Power Sector .They report that Independent power 
producers (IPPs) claim that their progress has been hindered by problems such as 
litigation, financial arrangements and obtaining clearances and fuel supply agreements. On 
the other hand they found that, the State Electricity Boards have been burdened by power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) that favor the IPPs with such clauses as availability payment 
irrespective of plant utilization, tariffs refiecting high capital costs and returns on equity 
etc. Desai Vishvanath V. (2004) has reviewed the obstacles to private sector participation 
in India in power generation Industry. Desai has identified that there are several factors 
that have acted upon as obstacles to private investment in the power sector. Niranjan 
Swain, et al. (2004), have discussed the various inhibitors to growth in power sector but 
the major roadblock in the growth path, which made it difficult or rather impossible for a 
private player to enter is the Government Policy. Niranjan Swain (2004) further stated that 
the primary lesson in keeping the power sector under tight government regime was to have 
proper access, equity and distribution of power to various sections of society. The socialist 
dream did not materialize as the above benefits have not reached the general population. 
The most important aspect of sectoral refomi is that, the various refomis as mentioned 
were not introduced all at one time, but in bits and pieces over a period of time, which 
should have been introduced in a single ambit to get the desired results. 
3) Sustainability of Private Sector Power Projects 
Saraswata Mohapatra (2010) has discussed as to how the private sector can contribute to 
realizing the purpose of these reform initiatives. The common thread across all the people-
centric solutions is a strong understanding of the root cause of the troubles and challenges 
faced by Indians, as the momentum for sustainability is derived from people. According to 
Desai Vishvanath V. (2004) the dominant sector entities, namely the SEBs, are technically 
insolvent. They are unable to recover the costs of power supplied and remain burdened 
with ever-growing commercial losses. The power market in India is essentially a single-
buyer market and the SEBs are the single buyer. Private power producers are therefore 
required to sell power to SEBs, who lack financial resources to pay for it. Santhakumar V. 
et. al. (2003) have concluded that factors that facilitate/discourage power sector reforms, 
are very important also in the context of assessing Indian economic reforms. It is 
emphasized that the proposed solutions are not limited to the provision of making products 
and services to cater to the unmet needs of Indians from the viewpoint of consumers but to 
think of them as partners and allies in the fight for sustainability. 
4) Availability of Resources for Capacity Addition 
Ravi Krishnan et. al., (2012) have stated that, India's long-term annual economic growth 
rate is projected at over 7%, and the country is investing in its hydroelectric, nuclear, and 
renewable resources. However, the primary fuel used to produce electricity remains coal, 
and the government has ambitious plans to significantly increase coal-fired capacity. 
Though the projected capacity additions are an impressive objective, in reality there have 
been and will continue to be shortfalls in capacity additions due to a variety of factors, 
including fuel constraints, regulatory and tariff issues, shortages of skilled manpower and 
construction equipment, infrastructure issues, and bureaucratic delays in obtaining 
clearances and permits. Ghosh Sukanya, et al. (2001), have reviewed the future prospects 
of Indian theraial power sector in the perspective of the depleting coal reserves of India 
and the deteriorating quality of the coal. As an alternative to the critical demand for 
power, country planners have concentrated more on commissioning of thermal power 
plants. Coal happens to be the basic fuel of any thermal power plant and India had a 
plentiful supply of this basic raw material until recently. In view of the total availability of 
natural gas in the country which is not very encouraging, the public and private sector 
entities have embarked upon imported coal as a means to bridge the deficit. Coal is the 
mainstay of the power production in India and is expected to remain so in the future. 
5) Privatization in Various Developed and Developing Countries 
Philip Gray (2001), has reviewed the evidence on the extent to which private participation 
in developing countries have been achieved. First and foremost, private investors will only 
invest in infrastructure enterprises if the government gives a credible commitment to cost 
covering tariffs. Commitments of these kinds are far more durable than the same 
undertakings given to managers of public enterprises, who have limited leverage to 
negotiate commitments and no effective sanction if governments succumb to populist 
pressures to renege. Bacon R. W. et.al. (2002) have revealed that the sequencing of 
reforms is crucial to the long-term sustainability of electric power industry in developing 
countries. Harris Clive (2003) has reviewed private Participation in Infrastructure in 
developing countries, about the trends, impacts and policy lessons. Anoop Singh et al. 
(2005) in a review, of private investment in power sector in developing countries have 
emphasized that apart from macroeconomic stability, the pace and sequencing of refonns 
has a strong influence on private investment in the power sector. Yin-Fang Zhang, David 
Parker and Colin Kirkpatrick (2008) have reviewed the electricity sector reforms in 
developing countries. They have found that electricity sector reforms have altered 
significantly the sector's market structure and institutional framework. Over the last few 
decades' electricity sector in both developed and developing countries have been subject 
to restructuring to introduce private capital and increase competition. Cropper Maureen L. 
et al. (2012) estimated the impact of restructuring on electricity generation efficiency in 
the Indian Thermal Power Sector. They have examined the impact of the unbundling of 
power generation from transmission and distribution on the operating efficiency of state-
owned thennal power plants in India. In study of developing countries it has been 
witnessed that apart from macroeconomic stability, the pace and sequencing of reforms 
has a strong influence on private investment in the power sector.Paton Celine (2012) has 
emphasized greater private sector participation and renewable energy development in the 
context of Moroccan Electricity Industry growth. Due to its advantageous geographic 
location and relatively low labor costs, Morocco has built close ties with Europe, its main 
trading partner. Kintanar Noel Eli B., et.al. (2003) have described how the Government of 
the Philippines continues to pursue its policy of encouraging the private sector to 
participate in the financing, construction, management and operation of infrastructure 
services and facilities in the country. Victor David G. and Thomas C. Heller (2006) 
evaluates the experiences of five countries- Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa 
- as they have shifted from state-dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger 
private sector role. 
Research Gap 
On completion of the literature review, it is observed that sector wise classification such as 
private sector's contribution to power generation in Uttar Pradesh is not very well addressed in 
view of its potential for significant contribution in changing scenario of power generation and 
open access to private sector participation. With the given background of lowest per capita 
power consumption, population increase, infrastructure growth and industrialization, it appears 
that these factors may influence the growth of power sector in Uttar Pradesh provided the 
sectoral reforms are proper and adequate for facilitating fuel supply, realization of revenue and 
reduction in various losses. Besides these, conducive government policy, workforce & political 
stability and encouragement of market driven mechanism, are few other important influencing 
factors which pave the growth of private sector participation. 
Therefore the Research gap identified for the study is mainly focused on identifying the factors 
affecting sustainability of private sector participation in power generation. It has also been 
attempted to determine the problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. Since these factors are greatly influenced by the policies of 
the Government, therefore it has been an earnest need to assess the role and impact of 
Government policies relating to private sector participation in Power generation in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
Research Methodology 
The proposed Research Methodology aims to solve the research problem with extensive use of 
primary data. However, secondary data is collected to assess the market potential where the 
probable demand pattern is likely to grow and the factors affecting the same , may it be techno 
commercial, consumer behavior, regulatory or environmental. The related primary data may be 
backed up by secondary data from reliable sources and published data from government 
agencies. 
The objective is to analyze the pace of growth of power market in Uttar Pradesh within the 
limitations of Techno-Commercial aspects in the context of the factors of the neighboring 
states and within the framework of Indian power sector related policies. 
Thus the objectives of the study lie within the frame of the following points. 
1) To identify the factors affecting the sustainability of private sector participation in 
power generation in the geographical region of Uttar Pradesh. 
2) To detemiine the problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
3) To assess the role and impact of Government policies relating to private sector 
participation in Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
4) To devise measures by which private sector participation in power generation in Uttar 
Pradesh could be increased. 
5) To deteraiine the probable impact of private sector power generation on consumers in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
1 Hypothesis testing 
Based on the objectives and the problem statements test construct and hypothesis were made 
which were tested with the help of primary data based on the survey questionnaire meant for 
end consumers of power and the other meant for power generation companies. 
2 Type of Research 
The study is mainly descriptive and partially exploratory in nature, however extensive use of 
primary data along with the secondary data processing and opinion poll of customers is 
incorporated to assess the situation close to practicality. 
3 Population/Universe 
The population universe is the Power market comprising of six of major cities under 
discussion. The criteria for selection of samples is based on the secondary source report of 
CRISIL (Research Outlook 2007-08 to 2011-12: Sector: Power) regarding top 20 major 
potential cities/districts of Uttar Pradesh. Three each of two groups namely Muzzafamagar, 
Kanpur , Agra & Allahabad , Varanasi ,Gorakhpur have been considered for the survey 
administered personally during Oct 2012 to Nov 2012 taking 60 samples from each city/district 
totaling 360 samples. 
In another survey targeted to get response from the prospective private sector power 
generation companies of India willing to set up new power projects the sample size was about 
25 power generation companies (67 respondents). 
4 Sampling procedure 
The survey was done through a detailed questionnaire to 'End consumers of power (Electricity) 
who were contacted at the office of the electricity bill collection center. Another questionnaire 
was made for responses from the 'Private sector power generating companies' of India who 
can be prospective companies for setting up of new plants in Uttar Pradesh was administered 
electronically. Snow ball technique was used for getting the details of various key personnel of 
private power generation companies which aggregated to 67 respondents from about 25 
companies. 
5 Questionnaire Development and Administration 
Development of research instrument involved identification of constructs, method of survey to 
be employed, questionnaire design, pretesting of questionnaire and administration of final 
questionnaire. The broad methodology adopted in developing the survey instrument used in the 
study is illustrated as following exhibit. The same is followed by a discussion on the steps 
involved in the design. 
6 Measurement Scales 
As this study aims to measure consumer perception towards the electric power supply quality, 
Likert scale was supposed to be the best suited on a five point scale. 
Two type of questions were posed to end consumer 1) one Likert scale 2) along with few 
multiple choice (with open ended options) to assess the market potential. Similar questionnaire 
was made for survey of power generating companies. 
7 Pilot study 
The survey of end consumer started off in October 2012 with the selection of group of 
respondents based on convenience sample which is common for pilot tests (Zikmund, 2002, 
Boyd et al. 2003) in all 32 questionnaires were distributed to consumers to power to check for 
clarity of the measurement items. Consumers were asked to complete the questionnaire and 
also give open ended answers of their in few questions. A total 30 usable responses were 
obtained and based on the feedbacks of pilot study the questionnaire was slightly revised and 
reliability was established. The pilot scale study has shown a Chronbach alpha value of 
0.82576739 which is quite an acceptable value. 
8 Analysis Techniques 
The outcome of the Survey Questionnaire based on the hypothesis is being analyzed using 
Chi Square test & Kruskal Wallis test for the given set of observed frequencies (n) which are 
subject to (k) independent restrictions (constraints) for an expected growth rate of the market 
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per year while taking a given level of significance (say 0.05).To test the hypothesis Chi Square 
2 {X ) has been calculated and if the calculated value is equal to zero, there is perfect agreement 
between observed and expected frequencies. For a given null hypothesis if the significance 
value is > 0.05 then null hypothesis is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. 
Limitations of the Study 
Although efforts were made to carry on research that was theoretically and empirically sound, 
the study suffers from several limitations: 
1. A general lack of reliable independent statistics regarding the satisfaction of end consumer 
of electricity (power) was observed. In view of the ever continuing monopoly and the sector 
being a state government entity no substantial secondary source of data was available nor 
does any survey exist by the service providers. 
2. The study is restricted to specific cities of Uttar Pradesh. As only select areas of U.P. were 
taken from the select potential areas/ cities based on the CRISIL report, the study covers 
about 60 representative samples from the given places however their market size may vary. 
3. The study assumed that the respondents were all individual customers whose individual 
perception and expectations relating to service quality controlled the decision regarding the 
available service and not taking into account possible impact of Govt policy or family 
influence. 
4. The identified variables may have been influenced by the interest and the knowledge 
limitations of the customers, regardless of the attention & effort, and thus may not be 
considered to be exhaustive. Additionally collecting respondent's data on expectation and 
perceptions of the availability and quality at the same time could have compromised the 
reliability of the data. 
5. The privatization of power generation is in early stage of growth in Uttar Pradesh and 
distribution of few areas are being privatized under government policies therefore the study 
may have got influenced in view of the policies of Government of Uttar Pradesh. 
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Analysis & Findings 
One set of questionnaire was meant for end consumersand theother set of questionnaire was 
addressed to private sector power generation companies to assess the impact of various factors 
affecting sustainability, problems & challenges that confront private sector participation, 
impact of government policies and measures by which private sector participation could be 
increased. The test construct based on the questionnaire of the power generation companies has 
been analyzed based on the mean value of the response on Likert scale (1-5). The following 
factors which affect the sustainability of private sector participation in power, on survey have 
revealed results as appended. 
It is inferred from the table that almost all mean values are higher than 3.5 which indicates that 
these have got significant impact on the factors affecting sustainability. 
Table 1 Analysis of Factors affecting sustainability 
Factors affecting sustainability (on 
Likert scale) 
Implementation of Govt, policy 
Investment cost 
Fuel Cost 
Operation cost 
Maintenance Cost 
Modernization of transmission & 
distribution 
Govt, being single buyer 
Future demand for electricity (power) due 
to population growth in U.P. 
Future demand for electricity (power) due 
to economic development in U.P. 
Cost benefit soludon through Gas based 
power projects 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
3 
0 
4 
3 
7 
7 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
7 
9 
6 
6 
4 
5 
9 
6 
8 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
Mean 
value 
4.25 
3.81 
4.00 
3.75 
3.50 
4.19 
4.13 
4.00 
3.69 
3.56 
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The following factors which asses the Problems & Challenges that confront private sector participation, 
on survey have revealed as appended. It is inferred from the table that almost all mean values are higher 
than 3.5 (except one as discussed below the table) and many of which are having mean value in the 
range of 4.0 (significant impact) or more than 4.0 (highly significant impact) on the given factors. 
Table 2 Analysis of problems & challenges that confront private sector participation 
Problems & Challenges that confront 
private sector participation 
Risk of timely payment by distribution 
companies in U.P. 
Lack of knowledge & experience by 
private entrepreneurs 
Land acquisition problems 
Fuel supply problems 
Inadequate infrastructure 
Bias of state regulator against private 
sector 
Inefficient transmission & distribution 
system 
Inadequate cost recovery 
Non payment of power generation bill by 
the Govt, of U.P. 
Load shedding effect on potential of 
growth 
Longer breakeven point (duration) 
Geopolitical risk in case of coal assets 
acquired abroad by the power generating 
company 
Intervention by NGO's 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
6 
1 
I 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
3 
0 
6 
1 
1 
0 
2 
3 
2 
0 
4 
2 
2 
6 
4 
2 
3 
5 
7 
7 
8 
7 
6 
4 
8 
6 
8 
8 
5 
12 
1 
8 
6 
7 
5 
6 
7 
10 
4 
6 
4 
2 
Mean 
value 
4.75 
2.94 
4.13 
4.00 
4.19 
4.06 
4.19 
4.13 
4.31 
4.00 
3.94 
3.81 
3.75 
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The statement ''Lack of knowledge and experience by private entrepreneurs would significantly 
hinder the privatization process" with a mean value of 2.94 (less than 3.0) and therefore inferred that it 
has not been accepted by the private power generating companies concluding thereby that "Private 
Power generating companies have the competency of their domain and therefore this factor would not 
hinder the privatization process ". 
The following factors which are related to policies of the government, on survey have revealed 
results as appended. It is inferred from the table that all mean values are higher than 4.0 which indicates 
that these have got a much higher impact on the given factors. 
Table 3 Analysis of aspects related to policies of the Government 
Aspects related to Policies of the 
Government 
Financial, Promotional & fiscal incentives 
Improvement in administration & 
beaurocratic functioning 
Simplification of procedure 
Reduction in Administrative Delays 
End of License Raj 
Overall policies of the Govt, of UP 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
5 
5 
7 
10 
7 
10 
8 
8 
Mean 
value 
4.06 
4.31 
4.00 
4.31 
4.25 
4.25 
The following factors which are related to measures by which pvt sector participation could be 
increased, on survey have revealed results as appended. It is inferred from the table that for the mean 
value higher than 3.5 indicates that, by backward integration of fuel supply significant contribufion can 
be done in private sector participation which is a measure by which private sector participation could 
be increased. It can also be inferred that for the mean values higher that 4 .0 regarding adoption of 
alternate source of power has a high impact as a measure by which private sector participation could be 
increased. 
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Table 4 Analysis of measures by which pvt sector participation could be increased 
Measures by which private sector 
participation could be increased 
Backward integration of fuel supply for 
fuel security 
Adoption of alternate source of Power 
generation (wind, solar etc.) 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
7 
6 
5 
4 
4 
Mean 
value 
3.69 
4.19 
The results of the hypothesis testing relating to survey administered to end consumers (other 
set of questionnaire) are summarized in the following tables. 
Table 5 Summary of hypothesis testijig H (1) 
Null Hypothesis statement 
Hypothesis HI a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis HI b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various age groups. 
Hypothesis HI c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various occupation. 
Hypothesis HI d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various income groups. 
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Significance 
value 
0.00 
0.154 
0.357 
0.009 
1 Condition 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Rejected 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that market driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the 
availability and reliability of power in Uttar Pradesh stands valid by age group and 
occupation however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and income group. 
Table 6 Summary of hypothesis testing H(2) 
Hypothesis H2 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across 
various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H2 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value 
across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H2 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across 
various occupations. 
Hypothesis H2 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value 
across various income groups. 
0.00 
0.04 
0.394 
0.002 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed 
that in the expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies 
should be addressed by immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh stands valid only by 
different occupation group, however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age 
group and income group. 
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Table 7 Summary of hypothesis testing H (3) 
Hypothesis H3 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H3 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H3 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various occupation. 
Hypothesis H3 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various income groups. 
0.123 
0.30 
0.868 
0.255 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts stands valid by all the groups of respondents and do not have any 
difference of opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age group, occupation and income 
group. 
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Table 8 Summary of hypothesis testing H (4) 
Hypothesis H4 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H4 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various age 
groups. 
Hypothesis H4 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various 
occupation groups. 
Hypothesis H4 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various income 
groups. 
0.00 
0.392 
0.859 
0.124 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non- subsidized pricing) system in Uttar Pradesh, stands valid by occupation, age 
group and income group however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
Table 9 Summary of hypothesis testing H (5) 
Hypothesis H5 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization, across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H5 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization ,across various age 
groups. 
Hypothesis H5 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should 
be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) 
to households even after privatization across various 
occupation. 
Hypothesis H5 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization , across various 
income groups. 
0.00 
0.035 
0.341 
0.000 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
In view of the analysis of results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is 
observed that in the expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a 
fixed consumption) to households even after privatization , stands valid by occupation, 
however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age group and income group. 
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Table 10 Summary of hypothesis testing H (6) 
Hypothesis H6a: There is no significant difference in the 
mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various 
areas/districts. 
H39othesis H6b; There is no significant difference in the 
mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various age groups 
Hypothesis H6c: There is no significant difference in the 
mean value in the expectation that Pricing of pov/er 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various 
occupations. 
Hypothesis H 6d:There is no significant difference in the 
mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various income 
groups. 
0.049 
0.028 
0.449 
0.183 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially subsidized up to a certain level and subsequently on actual market 
price, non- subsidized mechanism) is a better option stands valid by occupation and income 
group however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts & age group. 
Table 11 Summary of hypothesis testing H (7) 
Hypothesis H7a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations , across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H7b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H7c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H7d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various income 
groups. 
0.000 
0.059 
0.085 
0.250 
Significance 
value is < 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive 
to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations stands valid by 
occupation, age group and income group however has varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts. 
Table 12 Summary of hypothesis testing H(8) 
Hypothesis H8a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Privatization 
should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P. across 
various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H8b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Privatization 
should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P across 
various age groups . 
Hypothesis H 8c: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / 
distribution before privatization of generation in U.P 
across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H 8d: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that Privatization 
should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P. across 
various income group. 
om 
0.633 
0.378 
0.030 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Rejected 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P., stands valid by occupation, age group however 
has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and income group. 
Table 13 Summary of hypothesis testing H (9) 
Hypothesis H 9a: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies 
across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H 9b: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies, 
across various age groups . 
Hypothesis H9c: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies, 
across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H 9d: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies 
across various income groups. 
0.081 
0.421 
0.713 
0.877 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies in U.P., stands valid all occupation, age group and income 
group and areas/districts. 
Conclusions 
It is inferred that among the factors affectingsustainability the issues of implementation of 
government policies, modernization of transmission and distribution, adoption of alternate 
sources and future demand due to population growth are significant.Besides this, investment 
cost, fuel cost, operation & maintenance cost and modernization of transmission & distribution 
would have a significant impact on the sustainability of private sector power 
generation.FoUowing are the conclusions drawn from the abovestudy on various issues. 
1 Issues Relating to Power Generation Companies: 
a) Related to sustainability of private sector participation in power generation in Uttar 
Pradesh 
From the survey administered to the private sector power generation companies it is 
inferred that implementation of Govt, policy participation has very significant impact on 
sustainability of private sector. Though less impacting Investment cost would have significant 
impact on the sustainability of private sector participation in power generation. 
Fuel cost has been considered to be having very significant impact on the sustainability of 
private sector power generation, the operation & maintenance cost would have also have 
significant impact on the same. Modernization of transmission & distribution would have as 
significant impact on the sustainability of private sector power generation as Govt, being single 
buyer is impacting conversely on the sustainability of private sector power generation. 
An increasing trend of population growth in U.P. would more significantly on future 
demand for Electricity (power) compared to the rising trend of economic growth in U.P. It is 
also inferred that Private companies have a significant cost benefit if they undertake gas based 
power projects. 
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b) Related to problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
Risk of timely payment by distribution companies in U.P. would significantly impact 
privatization has been rated to be very high on the Likert scale (4.75) which seems to be the 
biggest problem among all problem and challenges . Whereas land acquisition problems, fUel 
supply problems, inadequate infrastructure & inadequate cost recovery are the few factors 
which would significantly hinder the privatization process it is inferred that lack of knowledge 
and experience by private entrepreneurs would not significantly hinder the privatization 
process. 
. The statement ''Lack of knowledge and experience by private entrepreneurs would 
significantly hinder the privatization process'" hasa mean value of 2.94 (less than 3.0) and 
therefore inferred that it has not been accepted by the private power generating companies and 
concluding thereby "Private Power generating companies have the competency of their 
domain and therefore this factor would not hinder the privatization process ". 
Inefficient transmission and distribution capacity & nonpayment of power generation bill 
would significantly hinder the privatization process. Bias of state regulators for public sector 
corporations or against private sector companies & load shedding would seem to be equally 
and significantly impacting the privatization process the potential and growth of private sector 
power companies. Geopolitical risk in case of coal asset acquired abroad and the intervention 
by NGO s would also have significant impact on privatization process. 
c) Related to role and impact of Government policies relating to private sector 
participation in power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
The following factors have been observed to be very significant which are related to the 
role and impact of government policies (all have mean value at least 4.0 or above). 
Financial promotional and fiscal incentives, improvement in administrative & beaurocratic 
functioning, simplification of procedure, reduction in administrative delays, improvement in 
overall policies of the Government and end of License Raj regime. 
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d) Related to measures by which private sector participation in power generation can be 
improved in Uttar Pradesh 
It has been obsen'ed that two major factors which have importance in improving the 
private sector participation have been considered to be significant are backward integration of 
fuel supply which would have significant impact on fuel security and prospects relating to 
producing electricity through renewable energy by private companies. 
2 Issues Relating to End Consumers:The exclusive survey of end consumer(s) has 
concluded that 
a) For the hypothesis that Market driven (non -subsidized) price mechanism can improve 
the availability and reliability of power in U.P. when analyzed on the demographic 
parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by all 
age groups & occupation however there was varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts & income groups . 
b) The hypothesis based on the statement that Immediate privatization of power 
generation and distribution would improve power generation & distribution of power 
supply in U.P. when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on 
the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by all occupation however there was 
varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, income groups and age groups. 
c) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Large size plants/capacity addition of 
power plants will have negative environmental impacts when analyzed on the 
demographic parameters revealed that based on the mean value was very well accepted 
and stands valid by all age groups , occupation , areas/districts & income groups .This 
also reveals that there is a general awareness among people of all groups on such vital 
issue of environmental concern. 
d) For the hypothesis based on the statement that, with high capital investment there is a 
likely of increase tariff in open market of power generation when analyzed on the 
demographic parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands 
valid by various occupation, income groups and age groups however there was varied 
opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
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e) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would not have any effect 
on subsidies provided for household consumers when analyzed on the demographic 
parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by 
various occupation however there was varied opinion on the basis of income groups 
areas/districts and age groups. 
f) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would result on pricing of 
power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price (non -
subsidized) mechanism when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that 
based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various occupation & 
income groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and age 
groups. 
g) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Private companies in power generation 
would have stronger incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory 
obligations when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on the 
mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various occupation, income groups and 
age groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
h) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization for transmission / 
distribution followed by before privatization of power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
would be beneficial for consumers when analyzed on the demographic parameters 
revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various 
occupation & age groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts and income groups. 
i) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would have the impact of 
reducing power deficit through the addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on the 
mean value it was very well accepted and stands valid by all age groups, occupation , 
areas/districts & income groups. 
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Recommendations 
Many assume that reforms will cut costs and lead to lower tariffs which is not the case in 
reality. In fact, the fundamentals are different at conclusion in the industry point of view and 
opposite to the general perception . In view of the tariff fixation the policy would be required 
to support market driven price mechanism which may not be acceptable to the end consumers 
in large, however a middle way of moving ahead in this direction can be the implementation of 
tariff plans as per price band method which is a more practical approach in moving towards the 
market driven price mechanism.The following are the recommendations of the above study. 
1) Related to Problems & Challenges that confront Private Sector Participation 
Among the problems and challenges being faced are issues of risk of timely payment by 
distribution companies, infrastructure problem, inefficient transmission & distribution system 
and land acquisition problem. In the survey administered to the private sector power generation 
companies the issue of timely payment has been observed to be the most significant factor that 
impacts private sector participation. In view of this, it is recommended that the Government of 
Uttar Pradesh may take up such reform process which ensures timely payment by distribution 
companies. In the other survey administered to the end consumers it has been observed that the 
hypothesis which relates to the privatization of transmission and distribution (even before that 
of generation) has been supported by various age group and occupation (though have varied 
opinion on the basis of area and income group). Fuel supply problem has also been considered 
significant among such issues. Bias of state regulator against private sector, land acquisition 
problems, inadequate cost recovery, nonpayment of power generation bill and load shedding 
are other such important issue which needs to be addressed by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh immediately in order to have successful reform process and to remain attractive for 
future investments by private sector companies. It may be noted that the private sector power 
producers do not significantly acknowledge the lack of knowledge & experience by private 
entrepreneurs which shows high confidence that the private producers can efficiently manage 
new power projects. Therefore the following factors should be immediately addressed by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh in view of the problems and challenges being faced by power 
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generation companies to pave the way for their investment in power generation projects in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
a) Timely payment by distribution companies 
b) Ensuring ways and means of adequate cost recovery 
c) Addressing land acquisition problems 
d) Improving Infrastructure and modernization of Transmission and distribution 
e) Ensuring unbiased state regulator for power sector 
2) Related to Policies of the Government (Reform process) 
There has been a large variation in the performance of the states and reforms alone do not 
indicate success in tenns of loss reduction or efficiency. This variation was observed due to the 
fact that some states were choosing to privatize distribution, some simply unbundling the 
SEBs, and others keeping the SEBs intact while adopting organizational refonns aimed at 
improving economic efficiency. The main factor in explaining outcomes is the ability of the 
state governments to implement reform (or operational improvement) plans and the strength of 
their institutions. Governments with weak institutions have performed poorly even when they 
had ambitious reform plans, as in Orissa. Governments with strong institutions and sustained 
commitment to reform (e.g., Andhra Pradesh and subsequently Delhi) have fared much better. 
It is therefore required that following areas must be improved by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh to encourage private sector participation and make the power sector viable and 
efficient. 
a) Simplification of procedures 
b) Reduction in administrative delays and decision making 
c) Elimination of multiplicity of clearance 
d) Recovery of revenue 
e) Other aspects of the reform process which need to be in place concun-ently and 
consistently 
f) Restructuring of legal issues should be well before in place. 
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3) Related to Factors Affecting Sustainability 
In the survey administered to the end consumers of power the hypothesis 'Market driven (non-
subsidized) price mechanism can be the option to improve upon the availability and reliability 
of power in U.P.' was accepted by all age group and occupation, however had varied opinion 
on the basis of area and income group. When considered on the basis of price band method 
(initially subsidized upto a certain units and subsequently on market price mechanism) , the 
statement was in agreement with various occupation and income group. It was also understood 
that for the hypothesis relating to privatization of transmission & distribution to be done before 
that of generation was in agreement with various age group and occupation however has varied 
opinion on the basis of area and income group. In the same survey the hypothesis relating to 
rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized pricing) system due to high capital investment 
was acknowledged by all occupation, age group and income group however had varied opinion 
on the basis of area/districts. 
Environmental considerations have not played a major part of Indian reforms, although the net 
effect of refonns has probably been positive for the enviromnent. In response to the survey 
administered to the power generation companies it has emerged as one of the significant 
aspects of sustainability if the private power generation companies take up the gas based power 
plants. Also in the survey administered to the end consumer all the respondents have 
considered this aspect as an environmental consideration. It is recommended that all potential 
private sector players must ensure their fuel security by having own assets or long term 
agreements with suppliers to ensure fiiel security and remain competitive in the market. 
The problems related to power sector which needs to be addressed immediately, especially 
with respect to sustainability and generation deficit are 
a) Economically viable price mechanism 
b) Issue of subsidy 
c) Cost of supply versus realization, 
d) Remedial for utilities which are bleeding money 
e) Wasteful consumption in irrigation and 
f) Capacity addition to overcome power deficit. 
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In view of the above study it is inferred that large potential exists across the state of Uttar 
Pradesh which is in want of energy so as to cope up with the increase in population grow1;h and 
industrial growth as has also emerged in the survey administered. Policy changes as are being 
notified by the Government of Uttar Pradesh from time to time which are welcome move and 
are the need of the hour. 
4) Related to Measures by which Private Sector Participation could be increased 
It was found through the survey that inadequate infrastructure and a lack of governance and 
transparency were the major obstacles to investment in power sector. The report concludes that 
by improving upon these obstacles will result in an improvement in India's attractiveness for 
investment. The Government, though sensitive to the challenges, has to hasten policy-making 
and implementation, so that India continues to remain attractive. Kintanar Noel Eli B., et.al. 
(2003) have described how the Government of the Philippines continues to pursue its policy of 
encouraging the private sector to participate in the financing, construction, management and 
operation of infrastructure services and facilities in the country. Besides key factor as discussed 
above the following are some important measures by which private sector participation can be 
increased. 
a) Tariff structure revision with 
b) Link to market driven price mechanism 
c) Mode of participafion such as BOOT concept 
5) Mode of Private Sector Participation 
It is also understood from the study that private sector participation would lead to better 
competition among the private players and public sector utilities would also be forced for 
adoption of such management to remain competitive. The concept of BOOT can work very 
well as these have been well experienced in other infrastructure sector. It is also advisable to 
the power sector players to have their fuel linkages and fuel security plans in place before 
entering in power generation sector. Also the fuel opted would have their envirormiental 
concerns which needs to be separately addressed in view of MoEF guidelines. From the 
response of private sector power generating companies, it has also been inferred that 
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a) Best Public - Private Partnership in case of a joint venture is 49-51 % which mean for 
such participation between public and private partnership the management control has 
to be in the hands of private sector. 
b) As regards the Equity participation between foreign & Indian company in power 
generation there are varied opinion on the composition of equity participation however 
it has been observed that 30-70% and 49-51 % composition has been preferred by 
private sector power generators. 
c) For the altemative mode of Private Sector of participation BOOT concept has been 
widely agreed. 
Directions for Future Research 
Based on the above research, following directionshave been pointed out for future research 
1. Future researchers may expand the scope of study to other geographical region of India 
or other Indian states or other region of the world where it may deem suitable and 
worthy to conduct the research work. 
2. Further research may be carried to explore other / additional important factors or 
decision making variables. 
3. The present private sector power generation is in nascent stage in various Indian states, 
with the upcoming technology and globalization it may happen easily that private 
power producers may take competitive advantage and thereby bringing the private 
sector participation to a greater extent which may be studies in further research. 
Bringing the cost of power to lower side is presently not viable in the current scenario 
however with the advent of new technologies it may happen in future. In view of that 
various other issues relating to private sector participation may crop up. 
4. Future research may treat this as a service industry wherein multiple service providers 
may be available and accordingly the service quality may also be studied for various 
regions or private power generation companies. 
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Preface 
India represents an attractive destination for the power industry because of being one 
of the fastest growing economies and the second largest populated country. With the 
proper enactment of several policies there has been a phenomenal growth in capacity 
addition in the last few years and in the coming future the trend is likely to continue. 
Reforms such as, the Electricity Act and National Electricity Policy will provide the 
necessary stimulus to the Indian power sector to move ahead. 
In order to properly address the demand-supply gap the effective solution lies 
in tapping the underlying potential and adding further capacities, thus the states are 
complementing the efforts made by the central government for achieving the targets. 
The states are making targets for capacity additions and formulating strategies in co-
operation with central and private players to ensure that the power deficits can be 
reduced and the very objective of power to all can be achieved. The states are also 
focusing on those aspects of energy, in which they have an edge, such as solar power, 
wind power or hydro power. 
The work is an attempt to effectively analyze the Indian power sector in the 
perspective of private sector participation in power generation in Uttar Pradesh, by 
focusing on key aspects relating to private sector participation in power generation. 
The work is also an attempt to make the study in view of the impacts of refomis done 
in other countries and within India in other states since the area of study on primary 
focus is taken as Uttar Pradesh. 
When India became independent in 1947, the country had a power generating 
capacity of 1,362 MW. Generation and distribution of electrical power was earned out 
primarily by private utility companies. Power was available only in a few urban 
centers; rural areas and villages did not have electricity. 
After 1947, all new power generation, transmission and distribution in the 
rural sector and the urban centers (which was not served by private utilities) came 
under the purview of State and Central government agencies and thus the State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs) were formed in all the states. 
National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), National Hydro-electric Power 
Corporation (NHPC) and Power Grid Corporation Limited (PGCL) were formed by 
the government to assist in meeting the increasing demand for electricity throughout 
the country. Both the State and Central governments participated in the sector's 
development. The Ministry of Power in the Central government fonnulates the 
policies for the power sector and the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) was 
established as a statutory authority to function as an aid for Technical approval of 
projects and also to act as a regulatory authority. As per government guidelines, all 
power projects above a certain capacity have to obtain techno-economic clearance 
from CEA before they can be implemented. A new Ministry of Non-Conventional 
Energy Sources has also been formed to focus on renewable energy sources to 
augment the generation capacity of electrical power. 
The policy of liberalization the Government of India was announced in 1991 
and consequent amendments in Electricity (Supply) Act have opened new vistas to 
involve private efforts and investments in electricity industry. Considerable emphasis 
has been placed on attracting private investment and major policy changes have been 
announced by the Government in this regard from time to time. 
In Chapter -1 power sector of India has been introduced, describing the Indian 
scenario. Global Scenario and the Scenario of Uttar Pradesh. Cost of power 
generation, role of private players, various reforms undertaken by different states, 
global scenario and power generation scenario of Uttar Pradesh has been discussed 
elaborately. 
Chapter- 2 is the survey of literature wherein the need of private sector participation 
in power generation, drivers of private sector participation in power generation , 
sustainability of private sector power projects, availability of resources for capacity 
addition and privatization in various developed and developing countries have been 
discussed. Based on the extensive literature review capturing these points the research 
gap has been established. 
Chapter-3 describes the research methodology wherein based on the research gap and 
the statement of problem the research objectives have been identified. Further based 
on these objectives hypothesis have been framed. The chapter describes on the scope 
of study, type of research, population/universe taken and the sampling procedure 
adopted. The chapter further details the steps of questionnaire development, selection 
of survey method, administration of final questionnaire and the analysis techniques 
applied. At the end of the chapter it includes the limitations of the study under the 
given conditions. 
Chapter-4 exhaustively describes the analysis & findings, based on the of the outcome 
of the survey using suitable statistical techniques such as Chi Square test and 
ANOVA. Hypothesis testing has been done on the outcome of the survey 
administered to the end consumers of power. The other set of survey administered to 
private sector power generation companies have been analyzed to draw apt inferences. 
Chapter-5 completes the study with conclusions drawn from the analysis and 
literature review, incorporating suitable recommendations for these findings and 
suggesting directions for future research. 
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Chapter-1 
Introduction 
Power Sector in India is at a crucial juncture of its evolution from a controlled 
environment to a competitive, market driven regime which endeavors to provide 
affordable, reliable and quality power at reasonable prices to all sectors of the economy. 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of our country has been growing at the rate of about 
8% for the last several years. The liberalization and globalization of the economy is 
leading to an increased pace in industrial and commercial activities and this, coupled with 
penetration of new technologies and Information Technology in the day-to-day life of the 
common man, is expected to result in a high growth in power demand. It is accordingly 
essential that development of the Power Sector should commensurate with the overall 
economic growth of the nation. 
The power sector has been at the forefront of reforms in basic infrastructure of the 
country. In 1991 for the first time, the Government of India armounced the decision to 
allow private investments in infrastructure by opening the power sector to such 
investments. The primary objective of initiating reforms in the power sector was to 
mobilize private investment for its development, goveninient having concluded that it did 
not have sufficient funds to develop the sector itself Being a highly regulated sector, not 
surprisingly policies and regulations are playing a pivotal role in the development of this 
sector. Over the years, the government has realized the importance of the private sector 
participation. 
The Electricity Laws (Amendment) Act was enacted in 1998. For the first time, 
transmission was recognized as an activity distinct from generation and distribution, under 
the Law. Further, a Central Transmission Utility (CTU) was created to facilitate power 
flows from different sources and across various jurisdictions. This would also contribute 
towards the eventual creation of competitive power markets. Legislation was also passed 
in 1998 to create independent regulatory agencies at the Central government level and in 
the states of India. A regulator at the center and in most states has since been set up and is 
flinctioning and many have already issued tariff orders. Regulators have contributed to 
distancing government from the markets, and improving investor confidence about a level 
playing field for all sector participants. 
An omnibus Electricity Act became operational in 2003, which harmonized 
various pre-existing laws. The act has strengthened anti-power theft provisions, which is 
expected to help in reducing power leakages. Under another important provision, the act 
recognizes power trading as a distinct activity and provides private power suppliers open 
accesses to transmission and distribution (T&D) networks enabling them to deliver power 
directly to their customers. The act also de-licensed generation activity except that based 
on hydro and nuclear resources. 
The Electricity Act, 2003 was a turning point in the reforms process which 
removed the need for license for generation projects, encouraged competition through 
international competitive bidding, identified transmission as a separate activity and invited 
a wider public and private sector participation among other things. Some of the other 
major reforms that have been implemented over the years include; unbundling of State 
Electricity Boards (SEBs), tax benefits. Accelerated Power Development and Reform 
Program (APDRP) for distribution, permission for trading of power. 
The Electricity Act 2003 has fixrther liberalized the power sector by providing 
'open accesses' to private power producers and traders to transmission-distribution 
networks and enabling them to supply power directly to their customers. It can be argued 
that with such development, private investors would not need to sell power to SEBs, as 
they can sell power directly to industrial and commercial customers who are able to pay 
for it. It is now to be thought of whether the encouragement to private investors to commit 
large amounts of investments in the power sector is sustainable. It is possible that few 
modest sized investments may be attracted under such conditions. In this perspective it 
appears unlikely that major investments would be committed by private investors when 
the sustainability of the power sector as a whole is far from assured. This is so because the 
issue of inadequate cost recovery from subsidized consumers would remain unaddressed. 
The National Electricity Policy (2005) is one of the key instruments for providing 
policy guidance to the Electricity Regulatory Commissions in discharge of their functions 
and to the Central Electricity Authority for preparation of the National Electricity Plan. 
The Policy aims at accelerated development of the power sector, providing supply of 
electricity to all areas and protecting interests of consumers and other stakeholders 
keeping in view availability of energy resources, technology available to exploit these 
resources, economics of generation using different resources, and energy security issues. 
The Power Sector is endeavoring to meet the challenge of providing adequate 
power needed to fuel the growing economy of the country. However, this growth of the 
Power Sector has to be within the realms of the principles of sustainable development. A 
low carbon growth strategy has been adopted in the planning process and highest priority 
is accorded to development of generation, based on renewable energy sources. Thrust is 
also accorded to maximizing efficiency in the entire electricity chain, which has the duel 
advantage of conserving scarce resources and minimizing the effect on the environment. 
Power generation costs are the key to determining the best generation mix for a 
reliable supply of electricity while making it available for use economically. With an 
increasing demand for power for economic development, countries around the world need 
to evaluate the present and future costs of generating electricity using the presently 
available and expected power generation technologies of future. Evaluating the cost of 
power generation depends on various factors that are responsible for driving the prices of 
electricity. The most important factors driving the power generation costs are government 
policies and incentives, capital (investment cost), fliel costs, operations and maintenance. 
1.1. Cost of Power generation 
The cost of power generation varies, depending on the type of fliel used. The 
choice of fuel for a power plant is influenced by several factors such as the relative cost of 
generation, availability, transportation constraints, and environmental hurdles. The capital 
costs of power plants also vary significantly, based on the source of energy, infrastructure, 
plant size, technology and equipment and interest costs incurred during construction. 
A power regeneration project has a three-part tariff structure. First, the fixed part 
of the tariff comprises the interest on long term debt, interest on working capital. 
depreciation, operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses (including insurance 
expenses), return on equity, incentive return on equity, and taxes. Second, the variable part 
of the tariff comprises the cost of both primary fuel and secondary fiiel. The tariff for 
power generation includes an unscheduled interchange (UI) charge, to account for the 
variation between actual generation and scheduled generation. The overall generation 
tariffs change significantly, in line with changes in factor; such as the debt-equity ratio , 
rate of incentive, Plant Load Factor (PLF) and exchange rate. 
The capital costs of transmission lines vary, depending on the configuration of the 
line, preliminary costs, type of terrain the number of sub-stations, cost of towers and 
interest costs incurred during construction. Transmission tariffs are based on components 
such as interest on long-term debt, interest on working capital, depreciation charges, O&M 
expenses, return on equity and taxes. 
1.1.1 Fuels 
There are three major options for generating electricity: thermal, hydroelectric and 
nuclear. Thermal plants can be based either on coal or on natural gas, including liquefied 
natural gas (LNG)). In India, naphtha is also used a fliel for thermal power plants (in most 
countries, naphtha is not used as a fuel for generating power, due to its more economical 
application in the production of fertilizers and petrochemicals). Power plants can also be 
based on other hydrocarbon fuels like fuel oil and diesel. However, such plants are few in 
number, smaller in size and are primarily used for captive power generation. 
The demand for power varies with the time of the day and the season. A part of the 
demand is always present (base load), while the balance fluctuates with the time of the day 
(peaking demand). The choice of fliel for a power plant depends on the type of demand 
that the plant is expected to meet. In general, power plants with the lowest variable costs 
(fuel costs) should be employed to meet the base demand, while those with a higher 
variable cost should be employed to meet the peaking demand. This will result in a 
minimum overall variable cost of power. 
Coal based power plants have lower variable costs than those based on naphtha or 
natural gas. However, coal-based power plants have high capital costs, which result in 
high fixed costs. In addition, these plants cannot vary their output with variation in 
demand. Hence, coal-based plants are largely used to meet base demand. This results in 
lower fixed costs per unit, due to higher PLF. 
Gas and naphtha based plants have higher variable costs and are more flexible in 
terms of varying their output. Hence, these plants are better suited for meeting peak 
demand. 
Hydroelectric plants have very low variable costs of generation and are the most 
flexible in terms of varying output. However, the total amount of energy that hydroelectric 
plants can produce is dependent on the rainfall. Hence, hydroelectric plants are used 
exclusively to meet peaking demand. 
Nuclear power plants have the highest capital costs and the lowest variable (fuel) 
costs. Hence, these plants are ideal for meeting base-load demand. 
1.1.2 Delivery cost 
The delivered price of any fuel can vary significantly depending on the source of 
supply (imported or indigenous), and the distance of the plant from the source of supply. 
In India, coal is generally transported from mines to power plants through the railways. 
However, the high cost of transportation results in a significant increase in per unit cost of 
coal. As a result, power plants located near coal mines (pit-head plants) are able to 
generate power at a fairly lower rate than plants that need to transport coal over long 
distances. 
Although India has abundant coal reserves, they are of poor quality. Indian coal 
has an average calorific value of around 3,500 kcal per kg and an ash content of around 40 
per cent, as compared to imported coal which has a calorific value of around 6,500 kcal 
per kg and an ash content of around 10 per cent. The lower ash content of imported coal 
results in marginally better operational efficiency and lower ash disposal costs partially 
compensate for its higher cost. 
1.1.3 Supply Reliability 
An assured and reliable supply of fuel is critical for a power plant to ilinction as a 
base load station; an interruption in fuel supply can lower the plant's PLF, resulting in a 
higher overall cost of power. In coal based plants, operating at a PLF of less than 70 per 
cent, boilers have to be put on oil support (for stabilizing the flame in the boiler), which 
results in an increase in the average variable cost of generation. 
In India, fuel supply to power plants has been unreliable, due to inadequate 
transportation infrastructure. Low fuel supply is one of the reasons for the relatively low 
PLF of Indian coal-based power plants (at around 78 per cent in 2007-08), as compared to 
that in developed countries. The supply of gas, for gas-based power plants, has also been 
constrained due to its low availability and the lack of adequate pipeline infrastructure. 
Taking into consideration the fuel supply constraints faced by existing power 
plants, banks and financial institutions insist on a regular fuel supply arrangement (FSA) 
before frinding private sector power projects especially those proposed to be flmded on a 
non-recourse basis. As a result, private power producers want to have legally enforceable 
fuel supply agreements with fiiel suppliers (Coal India Ltd and Petroleum companies) and 
fuel transporters (such as railways) with provisions for liquidated damages for the non-
supply of fuel. Under such an agreement, the power producer would pay a premium on the 
price of the fuel, to ensure its adequate and regular supply and would also guarantee a 
minimum offtake of fuel from the fuel suppher. 
1.1.4 Impact of Technology and equipment 
Equipment costs account for around 75-80 per cent of the overall total cost of a 
thermal plant. However, depending on the choice of technology and equipment, the 
capital cost of two projects of the same size and using the same fuel can be different. For 
instance, a power plant based on imported coal requires a smaller boiler than that based on 
domestic coal. This is due to the higher calorific value of imported coal, which results in 
lower consumption of coal for per unit of electricity generated. Similarly, hgnite-based 
power plants require larger boilers, as the calorific value of lignite is lower than that of 
coal. 
Power plants based near urban areas or in ecologically sensitive regions would 
have higher capital costs, due to the stringent design conditions imposed on the equipment 
m terms of thermal efficiency and emission standards, resulting in the need for additional 
pollution control equipment. 
In addition, if a coal-based power plant includes a captive coal washery, it could 
increase capital costs. However, the use of washed coal results in a reduction in 
transportation costs (as washing reduces the ash content of the coal) and ash- disposal 
costs. In addition, it results in savings in investments on setting up an ash-handling plant 
and pollution control equipment. 
1.1.5 Engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contracts 
The setting up of a power project involves coordination with many suppliers. In 
order to ensure the timely execution of the project, the services of an Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contractor are generally employed. The EPC 
contractor undertakes the turnkey execution of the project on a fixed time and fixed 
price basis, while guaranteeing the performance of the power plant in accordance with 
the specifications stipulated by the developer. The value of the EPC contract usually 
accounts for 80-85 per cent of the total project cost which mainly includes the 
equipment cost plus the cost of services of EPC contractor. In general, power plants 
executed on the basis of an EPC contract cost higher. 
1.1.6 Rehabilitation and resettlement costs 
Thermal power plants require less rehabilitation and resettlement cost because of 
being compact. Hydroelectric power plants however involve significant rehabilitation and 
resettlement costs, as they require a huge land surface area. Also, if they have water 
storage facility, that is, a dam along with the hydroelectric power plant, then costs will be 
incurred on the rehabilitation and resettlement of people living in the area that will be 
submerged when the project is completed. 
1.1.7 Tariff computation of alternate fuels 
This section illustrates the methodology for computing the tariff of a typical power 
project on the basis of the norms laid down in the two-part tariff policy. Certain 
assumptions have been made on the basis of examples. The methodology and the 
assumptions have been detailed below. 
The payment due to the generation company by the buyer in any year is computed as 
follows: 
Total payment due = Fixed charges + Variable charges + UI (Unscheduled Interchange) 
charges 
a) Fixed charges comprise, 
i. Interest on long-term debt 
ii. Depreciation 
iii.O&M expenses (including insurance expenses) 
iv. Return on equity 
V. Incentive return on equity 
vi. Interest on working capital 
vii. Taxes 
b) Variable charges comprise 
i. Cost of primary fuel 
ii. Cost of secondary fuel 
c) Unscheduled interchange charges (UI) 
1.1.7.1 Interest on long-term debt: A debt-equity ratio of 2.33:1 is normally assumed. 
This is also the norm (mandated by the published Tariff Policy in January 2006) by the 
Government of India. This is the most common norm followed by Indian fmancial 
institutions for flmding private sector power projects. Further, a break-up of the loan 
component into domestic debt and foreign debt has been assumed. Representative interest 
rates have been assumed for rupee and foreign currency debts. 
The repayment period is assumed to be 12 years after the commencement of 
commercial operations by the power project. The interest and the principal is assumed to 
be payable on a quarterly basis. A 2-year moratorium after the commencement of 
commercial operations for the repayment of the principal has been assumed. 
1.1.7.2 Interest on working capital: Working capital for a coal based / lignite-fired 
generating station has been calculated on the following basis: 
Fuel inventory is assumed at one and half months for pithead generating stations 
and 2 months for non-pithead generating stations, corresponding to target availability. 
Fuel oil inventory is assumed at 2 months corresponding to the target availability. O&M 
expenses are assumed for 1 month. 
Receivables are assumed at 2 months of fixed and variable charges for sale of 
electricity calculated on target availability .Maintenance spares at the rate of 1 per cent of 
the historical cost escalated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of 
commercial operation. 
Working capital has been assumed to be on a normative basis and the rate of interest 
applicable will be the short-term prime lending rate of the State Bank of India. A bank 
finance of 75 per cent of the gross working capital requirement has been assumed (a 25 
per cent working capital margin has been assumed). 
1.1.7.3 Depreciation charges: Depreciation is assumed to be allowed over the 'fair life of 
the assets' at the rate notified by Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). In 
addition, advance against depreciation under CERC norms has been assumed to be 
allowed to meet debt service obligations by considering the repayment period of loan as 
10 years. While determining the advance against depreciation, cumulative depreciation 
recovered shall also be compared with the cumulative loan repayments made. 
1.1.7.4. 0& M charges: O & M charges make a significant impact of the total cost of 
power generation. In view of the type of equipment such as indigenous or imported the 
O & M costs may vary. However for the purpose of estimation this has been taken at a 
fixed percentage of the capital cost. 
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1.1.7.5 Other factors influencing tariff computation 
a) Return on equity: The return on equity has been calculated on the original equity 
of the project, at the rate of 14 per cent per annum on a PLF of 80 per cent. The 
equity capital is assumed to be constant over the life of the Power Purchase 
agreement (PPA). It has been divided into domestic equity and foreign equity. 
b) Incentive return on equity: Incentive has been calculated at a flat rate of 25 Paise 
/ Kwh for ex-bus scheduled energy corresponding to scheduled generation in 
excess of ex-bus energy corresponding to target PLF of 80 per cent. 
c) Tax: The tax is treated as a component of fixed costs and the guaranteed return on 
equity is on a post-tax basis. A tax rate per 35 cent assumed for calculation. 
d) Depreciation of the rupee: In case of the depreciation of the rupee, the increases 
in the rupee equivalent of foreign equity and debt is covered for calculating the 
return on equity. However, the depreciation of the rupee has not been assumed for 
the purpose of calculation of base-level tariffs. 
e) Fuel: A PLF of 80 per cent is assumed for calculating fuel requirements. The 
calorific value, Station Heat Rate (SHR) and fiiel prices have been suitably 
assumed, depending on the type of the fuel. No increase in the price of fiiel has 
been assumed for the entire life of the project. This has been considered as a rise in 
cost of fiiel will be a pass through cost. 
1) Discounting rate: In order to compare two projects, a levelised tariff over the life 
of the project is calculated, by discounting the tariffs over the life of the Project. A 
discounting rate of 12 per cent has been assumed. 
11 
The computation of tariff is as following. 
Table 1.1: Computation of tariff 
11 Tbermal Power plant 
Capacity 
Capital cost 
Debt-equity ratio 
Foreign debt portion 
Interest on foreign debt 
Interest on Indian debt 
Interest on working 
Guaranteed PLF 
Gross generation 
Calorific value 
Station heat rate 
Auxiliary consumption 
Fuel requirement per 
Fuel price (inci of 
transport) 
0 & M charges 
(first year) 
Levelised tariff 
First year tariff 
Terminal year tariff 
(MW) 
(Rs million) 
(per cent) 
(per cent per annum) 
(per cent per annum) 
(per cent per annum) 
(per cent) 
(million kwh) 
(kcal per 1^ ) 
(kcal per kwh) 
(per cent) 
(million tonnes) 
(Rs per tonne) 
(Percentage of capital 
cost) 
(Rs per kwh) 
(Rs per kwh) 
(Rs per kwh) 
Coal 
500 
22,500 
2.33 
60 
6.5 
11.5 
10.5 
80 
3,504 
3,500 
2,500 
7 
2.50 
1,832 
2.5 
2.699 
2.835 
2.338 
Naphtha 
500 
15,000 
2.33 
60 
6.5 
11.5 
10.5 
80 
3,504 
10,500 
1800 
3 
0.60 
25,169 
2.5 
6.735 
7.323 
6.364 
Gas 
500 
17,500 
2.33 
60 
6.5 
11.5 
10.5 
80 
3,504 
10,000 
1,800 
1 
0.63 
4,780 
2.5 
2.177 
2.341 
1.756 
Source: Adapted from CRISIL Research: Power (Annual Review May 2008) 
Note 
1) The project cost is the completed project cost in rupees. 
2) No provision has been made for escalation in parameters such as fuel price, 0 &M charges, 
exchange rate, etc, over the life of the project. 
3) The calorific value of gas is in kcal per cubic meter, price is in terms of Rs per thousand cubic 
meter and the requirement is in billion cubic meter. 
4) Levelised tariff is calculated for 25 years in the case of coal-based plants, gas- and naphtha-based 
plants. 
5) Coal prices are for "D' grade coal for which the power plant are having linkages with Coal India 
limited 
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1.2 Power generation scenario of India 
The Indian power sector is one of the most diversified sectors in the world. Sources for 
power generation range from commercial sources like coal, lignite, natural gas, oil, hydro 
and nuclear power to other viable non-conventional sources like wind, solar and 
agriculture & domestic waste. The demand for electricity in the country has been growing 
at a rapid rate and is expected to grow further in the years to come. In order to meet the 
increasing requirement of electricity, massive addition to the installed generating capacity 
in the country is required. 
The Ministry of Power of the Government of India (the Goverimient) provides 
overall guidance to the sector. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is 
empowered to regulate the sector at the national level, including central power utilities in 
accordance with the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act 1998. The central power 
utilities include the National Thermal Power Corporation, National Hydroelectric Power 
Corporation & Nuclear Power Corporation, which are engaged in generation and the 
Power grid Corporation, which is engaged in interstate power transmission. The 
Government also owns financing institutions devoted solely to power sector lending such 
as Power Finance Corporation (PFC) and the Rural Electrification Corporation. Recently, 
the Government established the Power Trading Corporation, to be responsible for power 
trading among states and between states and central power utilities. At the state level, the 
state govermnents control the sector through State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and 
Electricity Departments (EDs). These SEBs and EDs are responsible for generation, 
transmission and distribution usually within their own states and teiritories. 
Wliile planning the capacity addition program, the overall objective of sustainable 
development has been kept in mind. After its structured growth in post-Independence era, 
Indian power sector has made substantial progress both in terms of enhancing power 
generation and in making available power to widely distributed geographical boundaries. 
The Installed generation capacity in the Utility sector has increased to about 205340.26 
MW at the end of June 2012. The Indian power sector is largely coal based with the total 
Installed Capacity comprising of 116333.38 MW ( 56.65 %) coal based, 18903.05 MW 
(9.20%) gas based, 1200 MW (0.58 %) diesel generation, 39291.40 MW (19.13%) hydro, 
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4,780 MW (2.32 %) nuclear and 24832.68 MW ( 12.09%) from renewable energy sources. 
Development of Renewable Energy Sources is being accorded special emphasis in view of 
their inherent advantages. The relation of power generation/transmission/distribution 
related central public sector entities and their flinctioning with central government & 
planning commission and coordination with state governments are as following. 
Figure 1.1: Structure & Management of Central Government set up in 
Power sector 
State Ministry 
of 
Power 
State 
Electricity 
Boards 
Planning Commission, Governme/jt 
of India 
(Planning) 
Ministry of Power, Government of 
India 
(Power Policy) 
Central Electricity Authority 
(Technical Analysis & Approval of Projects) 
Public Sector Corporations 
National Thermal Power Corporation 
National Hydro Power Corporation 
Power Grid Corporation 
Power Finance Corporation 
Rural Electrification Corporation 
(Loans, Power contracts) 
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The power generation scenario by the Central Government units, state government and 
Private sector participation are as following. 
Table-1.2: Power Sector at a Glance - "All India" As on 30-06-2012 
Sector 
State Sector 
Central Sector 
Private Sector 
Total 
Fnel 
Total Thermal 
Coal 
Gas 
Oil 
Hydro (Renewable) 
Nuclear 
RES** (MNRE) 
Total 
MW 
86,275.40 
62,073.63 
56,991.23 
2,05,340.26 
MW 
136436.18 
116,333.38 
18,903.05 
1,199.75 
39,291.40 
4,780.00 
24,832.68 
2,05,340.26 
%age 
42.01 
30.22 
27.75 
100 
%age 
66.44 
56.65 
9.20 
0.58 
19.13 
2.32 
12.09 
100.00 
Source: Central Electricity Authority (2012) 
Renewable Energy Sources(RES) include SHP, BG, BP, U&l and Wind Energy 
SHP= Small Hydro Project ,BG= Biomass Gasifier ,BP= Biomass Power, 
U & I=Urban & Industrial Waste Power, RES**=Renewable Energy Sources 
The Hydro generating stations with installed capacity less than or equal to 25 MW are indicated under 
RES. 
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Table-1.3: Installed capacity of power utilities in different States and 
Union Territories of India in MW as of 30-06-2012 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
State/Union Territory 
India 
IVlaharashtra 
Gujarat 
Tamil Nadu 
Andhra Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Rajasthan 
IMadhva Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Haryana 
Punjab 
Delhi Territory 
Orissa 
Chhattissarh 
Damodar Valley Comn 
(WB & Jhar) 
Kerala 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jharkhand 
Uttarakhand 
Jammu and Kashmir 
Bihar 
Total 
Installed 
Capacity 
205340.26 
26499.35 
23086.74 
17656.22 
16384.83 
13682.99 
13465.44 
10247.48 
9085.36 
8507.29 
7573.25 
7114.96 
6932.15 
6596.33 
5649.11 
5288.86 
3827.73 
3714.10 
3049.86 
2556.56 
2356.15 
1833.93 
Total 
Thermal 
136436.18 
18790.22 
18161.82 
7617.33 
11471.08 
10822.87 
6355.65 
5777.13 
5106.15 
7229.54 
5987.21 
3538.46 
6125.42 
4332.10 
5207.44 
5095.60 
1687.94 
197.17 
2828.88 
350.23 
609.59 
1624.70 
Nuclear 
4780.00 
690.14 
559.32 
524.00 
275.78 
335.72 
254.86 
573.00 
273.24 
0.00 
109.16 
208.04 
122.08 
0.00 
47.52 
0.00 
95.60 
34.08 
0.00 
22.28 
77.00 
0.00 
Hydro 
39291.40 
3331.84 
772.00 
2122.20 
3734.53 
1821.42 
3599.80 
1527.80 
3223.66 
1116.30 
1343.18 
3014.89 
666.12 
2166.93 
120.00 
193.26 
1881.50 
2950.94 
200.93 
1998.18 
1539.03 
129.43 
Renewable 
ener5v** 
24832.68 
3687.15 
3593.60 
7392.69 
903.44 
702.98 
3255.13 
2369.55 
482.31 
161.45 
113.70 
353.57 
18.53 
97.30 
274.15 
0.00 
162.69 
531.91 
20.05 
185.87 
130.53 
79.80 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Assam 
Goa 
Meshalava 
Pondkherry Territory 
Tripura 
Sikkim 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Manipur 
IMizoram 
Nagaland 
NLC 
Chandiearh Territory (T) 
Dadra and Na&ar Hayeli 
(T) 
Daman and Diu (T) 
Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands (T) 
LaksliadweeD (T) 
1020.04 
418.32 
373.62 
279.66 
265.07 
206.48 
213.76 
157.80 
138.92 
103.18 
100.17 
105.71 
75.38 
44.90 
65.40 
10.72 
559.21 
362.47 
28.01 
260.35 
186.69 
79.10 
36.93 
71.37 
68.14 
21.19 
100.17 
45.13 
66.92 
37.52 
60.05 
9.97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
19.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.84 
8.46 
7.38 
0.00 
0.00 
429.72 
0.00 
314.58 
0.00 
62.37 
75.27 
97.57 
80.98 
34.31 
53.32 
0.00 
51.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
31.11 
30.05 
31.03 
0.03 
16.01 
52.11 
79.26 
5.45 
36.47 
28.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.35 
0.75 
Source: Ministry of Power, Govt, of India, through website (2012) 
••Renewable Energ) Sources (RES) includes small hydro projects, biomass gasifiers, biomass power and 
urban & industrial waste power. 
The sector added conventional capacity of 50,502 MW and almost 4,460 MW of wind and 
solar during 20! I-I2 the conventional capacity addition was 69 per cent higher than the 
previous year. Coal accounted for 90 per cent of the total capacity addition. This was 
followed by hydropower. (7 per cent) and gas based capacity (3 per cent) overall, the 
capacity addition during the Eleventh Plan period was 54,964 MW. This accounts for 88 
per cent of the revised target of 62,374 MW set by the planning commission in its mid-
term appraisal and 70 per cent of the original target of 78,700 MW. During the Eleventh 
Plan period 12,871 MW of renewable capacity was added up to January 2012. The target 
for the plan period is to add 14000 MW of grid connected renewable capacity. 
17 
The working group on power for the 12"" plan constituted by the Planning 
Commission aims for a capacity addition of 75,785 MW of conventional capacity, 18,500 
MW of renewable capacity and 13,000 MW of the captive capacity. The conventional 
capacity addition targets of 100,000 MW and also the original Eleventh Plan Target of 
78,700 MW with the achievements in the previous plan periods certainly required 
policymakers to review and set realistic targets. The cutback is perhaps a fallout of the 
fuel crisis (particularly coal and gas) since the majority of fiiture capacity would be 
thermal. The capacity addition target mcludes 62,695 MW of coal based capacity, 9,204 
MW of hydro capacity, 2800 MW of nuclear capacity and 1086 MW of gas based 
capacity. 
The majority (about 90%) of the proposed coal-based capacity addition of 56,373 
MW will be based on domestic coal resources comprising linkages (38,548 MW) and 
captive coal blocks (17825 MW), remaining about 6292 MW (10 per cent) of the capacity 
addition will be based on imported coal. Over 40,000 MW of coal based (or 64 %) will be 
contributed by the private sector followed by 19 per cent by states and 17 per cent by the 
center. 
The private sector is expected to contribute the largest capacity at 42,131 MW (or 
56 %) of the total capacity addition. The central sector is expected to account for 19,858 
MW (26 % ) and the state sector, which currently has the highest installed capacity, will 
continue only 13,796 MW (about 18 per cent). 
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At present, the demand & supply gap is extremely large. Additional capacity needs have been 
forecasted at 56.6 GW between now and 2030. Power industry is facing significant time 
pressure and financial constraints in developing this additional capacity. This has created 
opportunities for private power generation. Recent efforts to liberalize the electricity supply 
industry have been reflected in the Department of Energy (DoE)'s mandate that Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs) make up 30.0 per cent of new generation capacity by 2030. 
Figure 1.2 
SECTORWISE GROWTH OF GENERATION CAPACITY (MW) 
2000-01 to 2010-11 
WOOO r - • 
80000 t 
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State Central Pf vain 
Source: Ministry of Power, Government of India 
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Table 1.5: All India Power Supply Position Energy-Wise & Peak - Wise (Utilities) 
1984-85 to 2010-11 
^ car 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
2008-09 
2009-10 
2010-11 
l-.nc'rg> 
Requirement 
((•Wh! 
155432 
170746 
192356 
210993 
223194 
247762 
267632 
288974 
305266 
323252 
352260 
389721 
413490 
424505 
446584 
480430 
507216 
522537 
545674 
559264 
591373 
631757 
690587 
739343 
777039 
830594 
861591 
\>ailabilit\ 
((AVh) ' 
145013 
157262 
174276 
187976 
205909 
228151 
246560 
266432 
279824 
299494 
327281 
354045 
365900 
390330 
420235 
450594 
467409 
483350 
497589 
519398 
548115 
578819 
624495 
666007 
691038 
746644 
788355 
Dellcit 
10419 
13484 
18080 
23017 
17285 
19611 
21072 
22542 
25442 
23758 
24979 
35676 
47590 
34175 
26349 
29836 
39807 
39187 
48085 
39866 
43258 
52938 
66092 
73336 
86001 
83950 
73236 
Deficit 
6.70 
7.90 
9.40 
10.91 
7.74 
7.92 
7.87 
7.80 
8.33 
7.35 
7.09 
9.15 
11.51 
8.05 
5.90 
6.21 
7.85 
7.50 
8.81 
7.13 
7.31 
8.38 
9.57 
9.92 
11.07 
lo.n 
8.50 
I'lak Di'mand 
Demand 
(M\V) 
25810 
28090 
30850 
31990 
36245 
40385 
44005 
48005 
52805 
54875 
57530 
60981 
63853 
65435 
67905 
72669 
74872 
78441 
81492 
84574 
87906 
93255 
100715 
108866 
109809 
119166 
122287 
A\ailahilit> 
22800 
24215 
26924 
28242 
31713 
33658 
37171 
39027 
41984 
44830 
48066 
49836 
52376 
58042 
58445 
63691 
65628 
69189 
71547 
75066 
77652 
81792 
86818 
90793 
96785 
104009 
110256 
Deficit 
3010 
3875 
3926 
3748 
4532 
6727 
6834 
9028 
10821 
10045 
9464 
11145 
11477 
7393 
9460 
8978 
9244 
9252 
9945 
9508 
10254 
11463 
13897 
18073 
13024 
15157 
12031 
Deficit 
11.66 
13.79 
12.73 
11.72 
12.50 
16.66 
15.53 
18.79 
20.49 
18.31 
16.45 
18.28 
17.97 
11.30 
13.93 
12.35 
12.35 
11.79 
12.20 
11.24 
11.66 
12.29 
13.80 
16.60 
11.86 
12.72 
9.84 
Source: Ministry of Power, Government of India 
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Figure 1.3; Capacity addition requirement (MW) during 12th plan (2012-2017) 
80000 
70000 H 6 2 6 9 5 
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50000 
40000 
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75785 
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Source: Report of working group for 12* five year plan (Govt of India, Ministry of Power Jan 2012) 
(Type of Capacity Demand corresponding to 9% GDP GR & 0.9 Elasticity) 
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Fig 1.4 Sector wise breakup of 12th plan (2012-2017) capacity in MW 
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Source: Report of working group for 12* five year plan (Govt of India, Ministry of Power Jan 2012) 
From the above data it is inferred that in the 12"" five year plan there is going to be a larger role of 
private sector in further capacity addition. The private sector's contribution to the power sector in the 
11th Plan has been much more than what the planning commission had originally anticipated. The 
commission had envisaged the private sector to contribute only 19% of new capacities at the 
beginning of the Plan. But in 2010, it revised the figure to 30%. The private sector made a significant 
contribution with a share of over 58 % during 2011-12 and 42 % during the entire eleventh plan 
period. It is now expected that the private sector should contribute about 56% of new capacities in the 
12th five year plan (2012-17). 
The financial health of many State Electricity Boards (SEB) has been deteriorating due 
to insufficient cost recovery, inadequate tariffs and high operating costs. Consequently, most of 
the SEBs are now being restructured under various initiatives to achieve financial viability and 
improve operational efficiency. 
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Ever since beginning of the power sector in India the enacting rules have been changed 
and updated from time to time. From the following table it is evident that the sector has been 
under the focus of various governments from decades back, however the kind of reform needs 
to be there in consistency and pace with the development taking place across the country in 
various economic perspective and globalization. 
Table-1.6 Regulations for the Power Sector 
Lavra / Policies 
The Electricity Act, 1910 
The Electricity Act, 1948 
iThe Amendment /IPP Process, 1991 
Mega Power Policy, 1995 
The Regulatory Commission Act, 
1998 
The Electricity (Amendment) act, 
1998 
Electricity Act, 2003 
National Electricity Policy 2005 
National Tariff Policy 2005 
• • 
Objective 
Infrastructural frame work for 
supply of electricity 
Mandated creation of SEBs 
Private investment in Power 
generation 
Setting up of Mega Power 
Plants 
Provision for setting up of 
central State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission 
Making transmission a separate 
activity 
Providing reliable and quality 
power to customers at 
reasonable rate 
Accelerated development of the 
power sector 
Tariff Structuring 
, Impact ^^^^ . I 1 
Attracted private capital 
Ownership in the hands of 
SEBs 
Projects from private players 
came into generation 
Mega Power Plants get 
benefited 
Independent regulatory 
mechanism 
Central Transmission Utility & 
State Transmission Utilities 
were setup 
Investments in capacity 
addition 
Economics of generation using 
diflFerent resources 
Attractive tariff for players 
Source: Ministry of Power & compilatiwi ty airthw 
From the above table it is inferred that the Government of India has tried to reform the Power 
sector since very beginning as per the changed requirements and the need of the hour. This has 
made significant impact on the scenario of power generation in the country. It becomes more 
encouraging for private sector participation in view of the potential to grow and with the 
advent of new technologies and changing economic scenario across globe, the sector may lead 
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towards a market driven mechanism of tariff fixation. This will not only make the Government 
free from the burden of subsidy but explore the potentials of market driven economics in the 
country. 
1.3 Power generation capacity addition: Role of private sector players 
Many private players have announced huge capacity additions. Announcement of the top 16 
private players itself totals to more than 120 GW. It is believed that a small proportion (around 
30 per cent) will probably materialize and that too mostly in the Twelfth Plan. 
Generation capacity additions are estimated at a realistic level at estimated at 69 GW 
against the government targets of 82 GW in the Twelfth Plan. It is estimated that the demand to 
growth would be at around 8 per cent in the Twelfth Plan. Concomitant additions are expected 
in transmission and distribution, in line with the generation capacities. 
The investment expected during the Eleventh Plan was around 3.5 trillion with state 
having the major share at 43 per cent of the investments. Going ahead, in the Twelfth Plan, it is 
expected to be in reverse trend, as the private capacity addition would be more then central and 
state put together. The investments are estimated to be at 4.7 trillion with private players share 
jumping from 16 per cent to 40 per cent (about 3 fold increase). 
Private players have made announcements of capacity addition for addressing the 
energy demand-supply gap from time to time. The government had amiounced a liquid fuel 
policy which focused on adding capacities, based on liquid fuel (naphtha, fuel oil etc). On the 
recommendation of state governments, IPP (Independent Power Producer) Planned around 12 
GW of capacity on liquid fuel, which was subsequently modified to naphtha-based plants. 
Though many private players had shown interest in setting up these capacities, only around 5 
GW of capacities materialized. Most of the projects fizzled due to delays in financial closers, 
higher costs of petroleum products because of soaring crude price and SEBs unwilling to buy 
power at a high cost. 
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Table-1.7 Announcement by top private sector power producers 
1 ^ ^ ^ Top private players 
Reliance Power 
JSW Energy 
IndiaBulls Power Service 
Tata Power 
Lanco 
Adani 
Jayprakash Power 
Videocon 
Jindal Power (JSPL+JP) 
Torrent Power 
CESC 
Essar Power 
GVK Power 
GMR Energy 
Sterlite Energy 
Visa Power 
Total Top Players 
Total announcement MW 
28195 
15000 
11000 
10000 
10000 
10000 
5275 
5000 
4670 
4500 
4250 
4000 
3660 
3440 
2400 
1200 
122590 
Source: CRISIL Research: Power, (Annual Review May 2008) 
In the current situation, most of the projects are coal-based. Many coal blocks have 
already been allocated to private players for mitigating the fuel risk to certain extent. In this 
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scenario, it is required to assess the likely success in implementation of these announced 
capacities over the next decade, especially in relation on the expected growth in demand over 
this period. 
In order to meet the shortfall between requirement of domestic coal and its availability, 
power utilities have been importing coal for blending in power stations designed to operate on 
domestic coal. In addition, coal is also imported by thermal power stations designed to operate 
on imported coal. Increase in variable cost of generation with 10% of blending of imported 
coal in the plant design to operate on the domestic coal is of the order of 10 to 45 paisa per 
Kilowatt hour depending upon location of plant. To keep the operating cost of generating 
power plants at reasonable level, the new thermal power plants are based on super critical / 
ultra super critical technology with higher plant efficiency. 
The government in 2007 allocated many coal mines to private sector players for 
development. Out of a total of 165 blocks, coal blocks allotted to power sector were 74 (with a 
62 per cent share of the reserves) of the 74 block for power sector 23 were allocated to private 
players - within this, 17 blocks were allotted to Independent Power Producers (IPPs) thus have 
a share of 20 per cent of the total reserves allocated for power sector. These reserves of 3619 
million tons (assuming a station heat rate a 2500 kcal / KWh and a calorific value of 3500 
Kcal/Kg) can support 23,160 MW of power capacity for a project of 25 years. 
Thus, based on the scenario of the top 16 players regarding Iiiel supply, captive and imported 
(assuming the 2 UMPP's would tie up supphes) coal supplies were assured for private players 
to set up capacities of at least 31 GW in the Twelfth Plan. 
The comfort comes from the captive / tied up coat reserves available with players to the 
capacity announcement made by them. 
With the availability of captive coal blocks, the top private players would be able to add 
around 27 GW and after including the Tilaiya coal mine reserves, it would add up to 31 GW. 
Keeping this is lieu with capacity addition announcements made by each player, we see a 
greater assurance (driven by fuel available) of capacity addition from players like Jindal Power 
Total and Reliance. 
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Other issues related to capacity addition are as following. 
1) Land clearance 
Typically, land required for 1 MW is around 0.8 acres; hence with capacity announcement of 
over 120 GW by top private players there would be requirements of around 1 lakh acre of land 
and that too with closer proximity to fiael source and water. 
2) Environmental and forest clearances 
Twenty power projects were awaiting environmental clearance (as on 29th Aug 2012,PTI) 
while another 28 projects were yet to get their clearance for diversion of forest land, the 
Environment Ministry has said. It is worth mentioning that environmental and forest clearance 
were given to 166 and 143 power projects respectively during the last three years, the same 
were rejected in few cases. Water supply is another major issue that could arise in states with 
fewer water bodies. 
Though there are number of steps to ensure timely decisions on the applications for 
environmental clearances by constituting sector specific Expert Appraisal Committees (EACs) 
for appraisal of thermal, hydro and nuclear power projects ,the main reasons for pendency are 
delay in submission of Environmental Impact Assessment report and Environment 
Management Plan including public hearing report, deficiency in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) / Environment Management Plant (EMP) reports inadequate data and non-
submission of complete information by the project proponents. 
3) Equipment Scenario 
The domestic availability of generation equipment Boiler Turbine Generator (BTG) to meet the 
capacity addition of 78 GW is insufficient. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL) the major 
player has capacity to produce only 10 GW each year though it is planning to ramp up its 
capacity. Larson & Toubro (L&T) is planning to foray in equipment manufacturing by setting 
up a capacity of 4 GW . Reliance Energy and NTPC are also planning to also set up individual 
equipment facilities. In the twelfth Plan, there would however, be continued imports to satisfy 
the deficit in the BTG Scenario. 
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Scope of Merchant Power Plants 
In lieu with the continued deficit scenario, many players are planning to set up merchant power 
plants for maximizing the pricing opportunity currently prevailing in the system. A merchant 
power plant does not have a signed power purchase agreement, which permits the players to 
get a market determined rate for the sale of power and earn higher returns. Price for merchant 
power would be driven by some of the following factors: 
1) Unscheduled interchange charges 
2) Trading charges 
Addition of power generation capacity by private players (through Casel* - Case 2** 
route): The overall adding announced by top private players total a gargantuan amount of 120 
GW; It is estimated that around 36 GW (around 30 per cent of the announced capacities) of 
this to be added by the private players in the Twelfth Plan. Theses capacity would be added to 
meet demand in state (which are resource and cash constrained to step projects on their own) 
through Casel* - Case 2**' project awarded through International Competitive Bidding (ICB) 
route. 
Captive coal blocks allocated to private players along with the imported coal tie ups (in 
case of UMPPs) provide an assured supply to meet 31 GW of power generation which would 
act as a support for these huge capacity additions tlirough the private route. However, the key 
risk related to timely development of coal blocks. Continued deficit scenario has also increased 
opportunity for setting up of Merchant capacities and earns higher returns. At least around 7-8 
GW of merchant capacity in planned. Going ahead with this the Research expected the 
merchant power plants to be line with regulated returns due to competition. This is backed by 
balanced scenario in the economy and strong competition brewing up in the Twelfth Plan. 
Hence, it is believed that standalone Merchant power plant operation would not be viable in the 
long term. 
*Case !: The private developer has to make airangement for the land, fuel and water linkages 
**Case 2: The govenuiient facilitates aiTangement for the land, fuel and water linkages then calls for competitive bids 
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India's growth story so far has been impressive with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growing at a brisk pace of 9 per cent; expected to be around the 8 per cent mark for the next 
few years. Infrastructure need to grow at a similar level for sustaining this GPD growth. 
Overall infrastructure development has been an inherent issue in India. However, 
reforms and regulatory changes, of the last few years, have ensured acceleration in the pace of 
Infrastructure growth, includmg the power sector. Nevertheless, a lot is still to be achieved. 
The power sector has continued to witness a deficit scenario in the trend plan. Capacity 
addition has been around 50 per cent compared to the targets. The Eleventh Plan government 
targets had been at 78,577 MW. With the Electricity Act, 2003 and opening of the power 
sector, private players can enter generation without requiring a license. This, coupled with the 
growing deficit scenario, has been the main for private players announcing huge capacity 
additions. The captive coal blocks allocated by the coal ministry in 2007, to private players has 
also facilitated this huge capacity addition program. 
In this thesis, it is focused to evaluate the potential of actual private sector participation 
in the power sector for the generation segment. Given the continuing power deficit levels and 
rising cost of power, long-term planning for power purchases through an appropriate mix 
remains important. It is especially the case with Dis-Coms (Distribution Companies) in states 
with high levels of power deficit, as it would enable them to expedite capacity addition by 
engaging the private sector and thus meet the growing power demand in their license area in a 
cost-effective manner. While competitive bidding has been recommended for procurement of 
power by Dis-Coms as per the provisions of National Electricity Policy (2005) and Electricity 
Act (2003), many states are yet to follow the same. 
Thrust on the competitive bidding for procurement of power by the discoms should 
increase going forward, given that the exemption available of five years has completed in 
January 2011 for state/central sector owned generating utilities. 
Gujarat has been one of the successful states in terms of sourcing power the bid route 
and is amongst the first mover among all the states. It has not only been able to contract the 
highest quantum of long-term contracted capacity (at about 6000 MW) entirely through 'Case 
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ir competitive bidding route but also at relatively lower tariffs (average levellised tariff at Rs. 
2.5/unit) as compared with that in other states following a similar route. 
Some states have adopted 'Case IF bidding, which in turn has enabled discoms to 
contract capacity at a lower tariff level than in 'Case I' due to the attractiveness of such 
projects aided by proximity to coal mines in some cases and the aggressive bidding approach 
by private Independent Power Producers (IPPs) due to upfront support available from the 
procuring agency/State Govenmient. 
While the average tariff through competitive bidding (Case I) is observed to be between 
Rs. 2.5-3.2/Unit for coal-based plants, sustainability of such tariffs remains to be seen going 
forward, especially under the environment of rising commodity prices, expected continuance of 
inadequate domestic coal availability leading to increased dependence on imported coal, and 
also possibilities of delays in project execution. 
1.4 Reforms undertaken by different Indian States: 
The various reform initiatives taken in different states are detailed as following. 
1.4.1 Reforms of Andhra Pradesh: 
All the Generating Stations owned by erstwliile APSEB (Andhra Pradesh State Electricity 
Board) were transferred to the control of APGENCO which came into existence on 28.12.1998 
and commenced operations from 01.02.1999. It was formed as part of power sector reforms by 
the state government to unbundle the activities relating to Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution of Power. 
The installed capacity of APGENCO as on 01.09.2008 was 7048.9 MW comprising 
3382.50 MW Thermal, 3664.4 MW Hydro and 2 MW Wind power stations, and contributes 
about half the total Energy Requirement of Andhra Pradesh. APGENCO was thfrd largest 
power generating utility in the Country next to NTPC and MAHAGENCO. It's installed Hydro 
capacity of 3664.4 MW is the second highest among the Country. 
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1.4.2 Arunachal Pradesh Electricity Department 
Department of Power, Arunachal Pradesh, is a State Government Department, assigned to 
carry out ail the activities of Power Sector, enforced upon the relevant Acts and Rules of 
Electricity, Power & Energy, co-ordinate among all the power utilities and stake holders 
operating in the state and advice the State Government on all matters relating to Power, 
Electricity & Energy. The Department of Power also implements various Power Projects 
sanctioned and sponsored by the State and Central Governments. Hydro Power and Non-
Conventional Energy activities, under the domain of this department, are independently 
functioning in the names of: Department of Hydro Power Development (DHPD) and 
Arunachal Pradesh Energy Development Agency (APEDA). 
1.4.3 Reforms in Assam 
Power is a critical infrastructure for economic growth. Before its unbundling Assam State 
Electricity Board (ASEB) was the sole agency to generate, transmit and distribute electricity to 
the entire state of Assam. ASEB was created in 1975 under the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948. 
Power sector reforms were initiated in the country in the year 1991 enabling private sector 
investment in Generation to begin with. State Governments also followed up by reforming 
State owned utilities. Orissa was the first State to implement comprehensive reforms by 
unbundling Orissa State Electricity Board. The electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 
enabled constitution of regulatory commissions by Central and State Governments. Further 
thrust was given to the power sector with the enactment of the Electricity Act 2003. In Assam, 
the State Regulatory Commission of Assam was set up in May 2001. 
In tune with Power Reforms and Restructuring process Government of Assam and ASEB had 
undertaken the following steps 
a. MOU signed with GOT on Power reforms in Feb 2001. 
b. Tripartite Agreement Signed between GOI,ADB & GOA in Dec 2003. 
c. Unbundling of ASEB into five different companies hiving away Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution activities into separate companies in December are. 
1) Lower Assam Electricity Distribution Company Ltd ( LAEDCL) 
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2) Upper Assam Electricity Distribution Company Ltd ( UAEDCL) 
3) Central Assam Electricity Distribution Company Ltd ( CAEDCL) 
4) Assam Power Generation Company Ltd (APGCL ) 
5) Assam Electricity Grid Corporation Ltd (AEGCL) 
1.4.4 Reforms in Chhattisgarh 
The Chhattisgarh State was formed as per the Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act 2000. The 
President of India gave his consent to this Act on the 25th August 2000. The Government of 
India subsequently set the first day of November 2000 as the day on which the State of Madhya 
Pradesh would be bihircated into State of Chhattisgarh and State of Madhya Pradesh. 
Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board was formed in accordance with the Section 5 of the 
Electricity Supply Act 1948 as per the Notification published in the gazette of the Government 
of Chhattisgarh dated 15th November 2000. Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (CSEB) 
became fiinctional w.e.f 01.12.2000. 
The Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board has been reorganized into following five companies 
in accordance with the provisions contained in the Electricity Act 2003 by the Govt, of 
Chhattisgarh vide Notification dated 19.12.2008. 
1) Chhattisgarh State Power Holding Company Limited 
2) Chhattisgarh State Power Generation Company Limited (Genco) 
3) Chhattisgarh State Power Transmission Company Limited (Transco) 
4) Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited (Disco) 
5) Chhattisgarh State Power Trading Company Limited 
1.4.5 Reform of Delhi Vidyut Board 
The Delhi Vidyut Board was formed by the Government of NCT Delhi in 1997 for the purpose 
of generation and distribution of power to the entire area of NCT of Delhi except the areas 
falling within the jurisdiction of NDMC and Delhi Cantonment Board. On July T' 2002, The 
Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB) was unbundled into six successor companies: 
Delhi Power Supply Company Limited (DPCL)- Holding Company; 
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Delhi Transco Limited (DTL) - TRANSCO; 
Indraprastha Power Generation Company Limited (IPGCL) - GENCO; 
BSES Rajdhani Power Limited (BRPL) - DISCOM; 
BSES Yamuna Power Limited (BYPL) - DISCOM; 
North Delhi Power Limited (NDPL) - DISCOM. 
1.4.6 Reforms of Gujarat 
As a part of Power Reform Process, the Electricity Act, 2003, was passed by the Central 
Government and Gujarat Electricity Industry (Re-organization & Regulation) Act, 2003, was 
passed by the Governn:ient of Gujarat to restructure the Electricity Industry with an aim to 
improve efficiency in management and delivery of services to consumers. 
Under the provisions of the said Acts Govt, of Gujarat framed the Gujarat Electricity Industry 
Re-organization & Comprehensive Transfer Scheme, 2003, (the Transfer Scheme) vide 
Government Notification dated 24-10-2003 for transfer of assets/liabilities etc. of erstwhile 
GEB to the successor entities. 
Accordingly erstwhile Gujarat Electricity Board (GEB) was reorganized effective from 1st 
April, 2005 in to Seven Companies with functional responsibilities of Trading, Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution etc. 
The Companies incorporated are as under: 
a) Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. (GUVNL) -Holding Company 
b) Gujarat State Electricity Corp. Ltd.(GSECL) -Generation 
c) Gujarat Energy Transmission Corp. Ltd.(GETCO) -Transmission 
d) Uttar Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (UGVCL) -Distribution 
e) Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (DGVCL) -Distribution 
f) Madhya Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (MGVCL) -Distribution 
g) Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (PGVCL) Distribution 
1.4.7 Reforms of Haryana 
Haryana Power sector comprises four wholly State-owned Corporations viz HPGCL, HVPNL, 
UHBVNL and DHBVNL which after unbundling of the HSEB in 1998 are responsible for 
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power generation, transmission, distribution and trading in the State. These utilities and the 
HERC work under the administrative control of the Deptt. of Power which is headed by 
Principal Secretary, Power. 
The State power sector was restructured on August 14, 1998. The Haryana State 
Electricity Board (HSEB) was reorganized initially into two State-owned Corporations namely 
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. (ETVPN) and responsible for operation and maintenance 
of State's own power generating stations. HVPNL was entrusted the power transmission and 
distribution fiinctions. Simultaneously, an independent regulatoiy body i.e. Haryana Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (HERC), was constituted to aid and advise the State Govt, on the 
development of the power sector, to regulate the power utilities and take appropriate measure 
to balance the interest of various stake-holders in the power sector, namely electricity 
consumers, power entities and generation companies etc. 
HVPNL was ftirther reorganized on July 1, 1999 by carving out two more 
Corporations, namely Uttar Haryana Bijh Vitran Nigam Ltd. (UHBVNL) and Dakshin 
Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (DHBVNL) with the responsibility of distribution and retail 
supply of power within their jurisdiction. While UHBVNL is responsible for Panchkula, 
Ambala, Yamunanagar, Kurukshetra, Kaithal, Kamal, Panipat, Sonepat, Rohtak, Jliajjar and 
Jind districts, DHBVN caters to Hisar, Fatehabad, Bhiwani, Sirsa, Faridabad, Gurgaon, Mewat, 
Rewari and Namaul districts. 
1.4.8 Reforms of Orissa 
Orissa was the first State to get assistance from the World Bank for restructuring. In Orissa, the 
generating plants were running at 36 percent PLF in 1993-94, transmission and distribution 
losses were at 43 percent and the proportion of bills collected was only 17 percent. The entire 
Orissa project was in three parts and the total cost of the project was US $ 997.2 million. The 
World Bank provided $ 350 million and the Overseas Development Agency of the UK 
provided $ 110 million. 
Northern region remains the most potential area for installed power with maximum 
shortfalls followed by Southern region. This provides an opportunity to bridge demand-supply 
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gap in the Indian power sector. According to the research report "Indian Power Sector 
Analysis" installed power capacity is projected to add more than 45,000 MW by 2013-14. The 
addition will be insufficient for the growing Indian economy. Rising investment into 
infrastructure and speed of urbanization will increase demand for power in some states. 
Demand driven power sector will boost private investment especially merchant power 
plants. In addition, renewable power will remain a favorite investment avenue as more than 
80% renewable power is generated by private players. 
1.5 Global Scenario of Power generation 
Power sector reforms are ought to be in line with the product market competition, privatization 
and regulation. The process of reform in the electricity sector in developed countries has been 
well documented and appears to have been reasonably successful (Pollitt, 1995; Newbery, 
1999). 
Developing countries can suffer from serious institutional weaknesses, meaning that 
planned reforms may not produce their intended benefits and thus the path to reform has been 
more difficult In developing countries, (Parker, 2002). 
In most developing countries the process of capacity building and establishing adequate 
regulatory institutions has been a slow and complex one, lagging behind the entry of private 
operators in the electricity sector. 
In the past decade, the pace of reform and change in the electricity sector has rapidly 
increased and the nature of the reforms adopted has become steadily more sophisticated. Many 
countries, from the very large, such as China, to the very small, such as Bolivia, have 
enthusiastically adapted earlier reform models to their own needs and circumstances. Both 
developed and developing countries have embarked on a program of liberalizing and reforming 
their power sectors. The principal driving forces behind this reform movement, described by a 
number of authors include the following: 
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(a) the poor performance of the state-run electricity sector in terms of high costs, 
inadequate expansion of access to electricity service for the population, and/or 
unreliable supply; 
(b) the inability of the state sector to finance needed expenditures on new investment 
and/or maintenance; 
(c) the need to remove subsidies to the sector in order to release resources for other 
pressing public expenditure needs; and 
(d) the desire to raise immediate revenue for the government through the sale of assets 
from the sector. 
In many countries all these factors have been present at the same time, with the notable 
exceptions of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where policies of 
encouraging heavy industrialization had left the power sector with short-term excess capacity, 
so that new capacity was a lower priority than in most other countries. Although some 
traditional state-owned and run enterprises have performed well and indeed were often formed 
by nationalizing private-sector companies that were either too small to exploit economies of 
scale or too large to prevent monopolistic abuse, there was an increasing awareness during the 
1980s that a lengthy period of state ownership, without the forces of competition or the 
incentives of the profit motive to improve performance, eventually resulted in excessive costs 
low service quality, poor investment decisions and lack of innovation in supplying customers. 
Although many countries have expressed some dissatisfaction with the operation of their 
state-owned power sector, there has been a wide range of responses to the problems perceived. 
Some countries have felt it impossible or undesirable to embark on any reform strategy that 
entails opening electricity production or sales to private participants, whereas other countries, 
although willing to engage private participation, have chosen very different strategies for doing 
so. The variety of responses that have aheady emerged globally is one of the most striking 
features of the power sector in the past decade. 
There has been considerable interest in the wider issues of why some countries chose to 
undergo economy-wide reforms in terms of reducing the role of the state, introducing the 
private sector into markets once exclusively reserved for previously state-owned enterprises. 
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and generally liberalizing control both a wide-ranging analysis and discussion of these issues 
for developing countries suggest that two essential conditions must be met before reform is 
attempted, (a) It should be generally perceived in the country that reform is desii-able and 
(b) Carrying out the reform agenda should be politically feasible. 
Electricity-sector reform has been advocated by such international lending agencies as the 
world bank the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank as well as by such organizations as the World Energy Council. To assess 
what has been achieved by which countries, these bodies have carried out analyses of the steps 
taken by their member nations. At the same time, the private sector has a great interest in 
knowing what is happening on a comparative basis, so that investment decisions can be put 
into proper context, and a number of publications have addressed this need for information. 
From a global perspective, the movement to reform power sectors appears to be sweeping 
across the developing world at a rate similar to that in the industrialized world. 
The World Bank Group has reviewed and evaluated its lending and advisory assistance 
during the 1990s in supporting electricity sector reform and private sector development in the 
electric power sector (PSDE). The results of this evaluation were presented in the World Bank 
publication, "Power for Development: A Review of the World Bank Group's Experience with 
Private participation in the Electricity Sector". 
Among the top 15 electricity producers in the world, India ranks fifth with an installed 
capacity of over 152 Gigawatts. According to the latest figures available, the country produced 
787,546,450,000 kilowatt hours of electricity in 2008, which is about 4 percent of the total 
power generation in the world. Only four other countries produce more electricity than India. 
The U.S. tops the list with a production of 4,110,259,050,000 kilowatt hours of power in 2008. 
The country is also the world's largest consumer of electricity. In 2007, it consumed 
3,872,598,000 megawatt hours of electricity. 
The U.S. is followed by China with a total electricity production of 3,221,798,270,000 
kilowatt hours in 2008. Even in power consumption, China ranks second m the world. In 2009, 
it consumed 3,650,600,000 gigawatt hours of electricity. At 277 watts, its per capita power 
consumption is almost five times that of India. While Japan is in the third place with a 
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production of 1,009,445,000,000 kilowatt hours of electricity in 2008, Russia is the world's 
fourth largest producer of electricity with a production of 982,998,790,000 kilowatt hours of 
electricity in 2008. 
Russians consume 840,380,000 Gigawatt hours of electricity making them the fourth 
highest users of power. On the other hand, Japan's total electricity consumption in 2008 was 
1,007,067,000 gigawatt hours. The other countries that are there in the list include Canada, 
Germany, France, Brazil, South Korea, UK, Italy, Spain, Australia and Maxico. Despite the 
fact that India has the fifth largest electricity-generation capacity in the world, the country is 
still facing major power crisis. While most of the Indian villages do not have electricity, all 
most all Indian cities suffer daily power cuts. Although India is the world's fifth largest 
consumer of electricity, the country has amongst the lower per capita power consumption rates 
in the world. Only Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Congo, Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, Myanmar, 
Sudan, Cameroon, Nepal and some other sub-Saharan countries have lower power 
consumption than India. 
Competition in electricity supply is still in its infancy in India and similar was the 
condition of United Kingdom in 1990 when in England and wales a daily spot market known 
as electricity pool was created which was administered by National grid company (NGC).Each 
morning the competing generating companies would submit bids for their various generating 
sets to NGC for the following days operation. Each bid included an offer price at which the 
generating company would be prepared to operate its various generating units for the following 
day. Once the generators had submitted their bids to the pool the NGC examined its own 
demand forecast for the following day and ranked each generating unit in the order of price 
(lowest price fu-st) ,The final schedule was published at 15 hrs so that generating units were 
notified. As there was often considerable overcapacity in the system any generating unit for 
which the offer price was too high were either placed on standby or forced from the pool to 
excluded and shutdown. As electricity cannot be store it is essential that the controllers of the 
transmission grid be able to bring online additional generation capacity at very short notice. It 
led to the condition of varying pool price which reflected the demand on transmission grid. 
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Since inception, the electricity industry in the USA was treated as a natural monopoly 
and accordingly was subject to regulation primarily by individual states. The sector was 
characterized by vertically integrated private Investor Owned Utilities (lOUs) owning the 
entire generation, transmission and distribution assets in the area of their operation. The federal 
involvement was limited to oversight of interstate transmission and wholesale trading through 
the Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
The reform effort in South Korea's electricity sector problems have been analyzed by John 
Byrne, et. al. (2004) including power liberalization strategy relating to economic, political, 
social and environmental contradictions of the country. South Korea's economic miracle was 
founded on a rapidly expanding electricity sector, using a model termed as 'synergistic 
development,' in which electricity and economic growth are regarded as mutually reinforcing 
imperatives of modernization. A legacy of the model has been high public sector debt, 
extensive use of nuclear energy, high environmental costs, and low public accountability. 
During its 35-year pursuit of synergistic development. South Korea was transformed socially 
and politically, replacing a military dictatorship with a democracy and evolving an active civil 
society, while becoming integrated into the global economy. When the Asian economic crisis 
hit South Korea in 1997, the electricity sector's financial vulnerability was exposed and 
structural adjustment measures were demanded by the international financial community. In 
response, South Korea revised its development model, embracing a neoliberal reform 
programme termed as 'harmonized development.' The liberalization and privatization plan was 
of unusual scope and ambition. But by June 2004, the government had lost confidence in the 
ideal of harmonization and halted the sector's privatization. 
Pakistani electrical power sector has been described by Ijlal Naqvi (2012) regarding 
Governance and Development that indicates the Pakistani power crisis in a larger context of 
continuity through periods of dictatorship to democracy and suggests how efforts can be made 
to make state service delivery more responsive to citizens that might be reconceived. A 
historical review of the Pakistani power sector establishes first and foremost that the crisis is 
the product of longer-term processes for which the policy solutions currently being proposed 
(with the support of international donors and multilateral lenders) are inadequate. Depoliticized 
attempts at power sector reform have little to offer in light of the pervasively informal and 
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negotiated nature of the fragmented Pakistani state. The institutions of power sector governance 
are mutually constituted by the formal rules and the informal—personal relationships, language, 
money violence and power. These rules of the game are as relevant to relations within and 
between public sector organizations as they are to the engagement of citizens with their state. 
The same rules apply at the margins of the state-informal squatter settlements~as at the core, 
though the resources brought to bear and the resultant outcomes are different. The internal 
incoherence of this state underscores the limitations of formal rules in determining outcomes, 
and the poor prospects for reform efforts that focus exclusively on the formal aspects of 
governance. To proactively engage with the question of political will, leads away from top-
down policy perspectives and counter to the depoliticizing tendencies that currently shape 
policy reforms. Instead, an energized and informed local participation can be a counterweight 
to the inertial tendencies of a Pakistani state whose reforms tend to be co-opted by existing 
power centers rather than result in changed outcomes' 
The Electricity sector in India is at the forefront of the worldwide trend of growing private 
participation in infrastructure. Although sixty-two developing countries have made at least 
some progress in introducing private participation in electricity, the breadth and depth of the 
private participation remain uneven. The most successful countries have been those that have 
found the political will to abandon a long history of subsidized tariffs and to establish 
regulatory frameworks that offer credible commitments to investors. The sustainability of 
forms of private participation that do not involve these elements is being tested in some 
countries in Asia, where recent experiences should provide important lessons for countries that 
are at an earher stage in framing their private participation strategies. 
While it is easy to state that competition in the energy market is a desirable thing, in 
practice it is difficult to achieve a truly competitive market among utility companies. Utility 
networks, be the gas or electricity, lend themselves to monopolies and are not naturally suited 
to competition. This is because it is impractical and prohibitively expensive to construct two or 
more set of competing transmission / distribution network. 
The duel objectives of power sector reforms in India, improving efficiency and attracting 
private investment, are far from being achieved. It is commonly acknowledged that 
competition in the sector can help achieve the objectives of the reforms, but although the 
Electricity Act of 2003 promised to usher in competition, after several years of its enactment 
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there is very little competition in generation and absolutely no competition in retail supply. The 
introduction of competition in the power sector in India by private sector participation is 
expected to be drawing upon the US model of deregulating generation and retail supply whilst 
simultaneously keeping transmission and distribution under regulation. 
1.6 Power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
The State of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) with a population of more than 200 million people is India's 
most populous state. In the past, the Government could not manage its public expenditure well 
and often utilized borrowings to meet recurring and un-remunerative expenditure, leading to a 
mounting debt burden. Development expenditure was crowded out by poorly targeted 
subsidies, stagnating revenues, and rising salary and interest costs. Average budgetary support 
over the past few years, from the Government of Uttar Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh State 
Electricity Board (UPSEB), has been about 1 percent of the Gross State Domestic Product 
(GSDP). 
The Government of Uttar Pradesh announced it's a power sector reform policy statement 
in January 1999. The objective of this policy was to restore the credit worthiness of the power 
sector and to create an environment which will attract private investments, promote 
competition and efficiency and facilitate sustainable development of power sector. 
The aim of the reform programs of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh was to 
withdraw from the power sector as owner, operator & regulator of the utilities and to have 
commercially operated utilities ftinctioning in a competitive and appropriately regulated power 
market. Restructuring and unbundling of U.P. State Electricity Board has been done while 
segregating power generation, transmission and distribution fiinctions into autonomous and 
separately accountable entities, through transfer of assets, liabilities and personnel. By 
establishing an independent regulatory Body, UP Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(UPERC), Power Sector in U.P. started functioning under regulated regime since June 1999. 
UPSEB was unbundled in January 2000 into three Corporations i.e. U.P. Power Corporation 
limited (UPPCL), Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (UPRVUNL) & Uttar 
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Pradesh Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited (UPJVNL). Different Corporations started flinctioning 
conraiercially. 
1) Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited (UPPCL), which is responsible for 
transmission and distribution of electricity in Uttar Pradesh. 
2) Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (UPRVUNL) which owns and 
operates the existing thermal power stations of UPSEB. 
3) Uttar Pradesh Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited (UPJVNL) which in addition to their own 
small hydro power houses owns and operates the existing and under construction hydro 
power stations of UPSEB. 
The U.P. Power Sector reforms are being done keeping in view the following goals. The 
electricity will be supplied under the most efficient conditions in terms of cost and quality to 
support the economic development of the state of Uttar Pradesh. Protection of interest of 
consumers is also being tried to be assured. The Corporatization and Commercialization of 
new emerging entities is being done in phased manner. Promotion of private sector 
participation in power generation privatizes distribution business also in phases. Tariff reform 
is being done with the objective to rationalize tariff for full cost recovery and minimize cross 
subsidy. 
UPERC established in September, 1998 under Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 
1998 of Govt, of India (and is deemed to be set-up under UP Electricity Reforms Act, 1999). 
The prime objective of UPERC is to create a regulatory environment to promote transparency, 
efficiency and economy in the operations and management of the power utilities, and to 
encourage competition and help UP to attract private capital for the power sector development 
while appropriately safeguarding the interests of the consumers. The main functions of UPERC 
are as following: 
i. Determine the tariff payable for the use of the transmission facilities, 
ii. Regulate power purchase and procurement process of the transmission utilities 
and distribution utilities including the price at which the power shall be procured 
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from the generating companies, generating stations or from other sources for 
transmission, sale distribution or supply in the State. 
iii. Promote competition efficiency and economy in the activities of the electricity 
industry to achieve the objects and purpose of this Act. 
iv. Regulate investment approval for transmission, distribution or supply of 
electricity to the entities operating within the State, 
v. Aid and advise the State Government in matters concerning electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply in the state, 
vi. Issue Ucense for transmission, distribution or supply of electricity and determine 
the conditions of the license, 
vii. Regulate the working of licensees and other persons authorized or permitted to 
engage in the electricity industry in the State and to make their working efficient, 
economical and equitable; 
viii. Require licensees to formula plans and schemes for the promotion of generation, 
transmission, distribution, supply or utilization of electricity and quality of service 
and to device proper power purchase and procurement process, 
ix. Set standards for the electricity industry in the State including standards relating 
to quality, continuity and rehability or service. 
X. Promote competitiveness and make avenues for participation of private sector in 
the electricity industry in the State, and also to ensure a fair deal to the consumers, 
xi. Lay down and enforce safety standards. 
xii. Aid and advise the State Government in formulating power pohcy for the State, 
xiii. Collect and record information relating to generation, transmission, distribution or 
utilization of electricity, 
xiv. Collect and publish data and forecasts on the demand for, and use of electricity in 
the State and to require the licensees to collect and publish such data. 
XV. Regulate the assets, properties and interest in properties relating to the electricity 
industry in the State in such manner as to safeguard the public interest, 
xvi. Adjudicate upon the dispute and differences between a licensee and utility or to 
refer the same for arbitration. 
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xvii. Co-ordinate with environmental regulatory agencies for evolving policies & 
procedures for appropriate environmental regulation of Elec. Sector in the State & 
xviii. Aid and advise the State Government on any other matter referred by the State 
Government. 
In the second phase the different Generation and Distribution companies are being 
horizontally divided into number of companies. These Companies will ultimately be privatized. 
After the establishment of the distribution companies, supply of the bulk power to the 
distribution companies will be made under a Bulk Supply Agreement. Over a period of time, 
the distribution companies may also enter into a Power Purchase Agreement directly with the 
generators and other bulk suppliers. 
The tariff Revision, a step towards rationalization of tariff after reform, was made effective 
from 09th Aug 2000. Formation of Special Electricity Courts in all districts and State level 
Court was done with effect irom 22nd October, 2000. In order to make the metering systems 
transparent, electronic meter were installed at all sub stations and big consumers. Energy 
Auditing was planned down-up to consumer level. Process of strengthening the transmission 
and distribution system with the help of World Bank Loan was also started. 
Reforms in the energy sector were initiated to supplement the Government's efforts in the 
development of the sector and to make it more efficient with the help of Asian development 
bank and World Bank. The Government has been endeavoring to provide a policy environment 
that encourages tree and fair competition in each element of the energy value chain and attracts 
capital from all sources-public and private, domestic and foreign. Encouraging such capital 
formation is crucial for India to meet its energy needs. Significant progress has been made in 
establishing independent and transparent regulatory authorities in the power sector to facilitate 
the rationalization of electricity tariff as well as to encourage competition while protecting the 
interests of all stakeholders. 
The thrust of the reforms has been to deregulate the prices of commercial energy 
resources, increase competition through institutional, legislative and regulatory reforms and 
reduce subsidies. 
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The power sector offers a wide scope for private investment through change of ownership of 
existing assets or Greenfield investment in generation, transmission or distribution assets. 
Some of the major avenues for private participation in the sector are: 
i. Partial or foil divestiture of generation and distribution assets; 
ii. Greenfield generation or transmission assets on merchant, build own operate 
(BOOT), build operate transfer (BOT), or build lease transfer(BLT) basis; and 
iii. Rehabilitation of existing generation assets on build, rehabilitate, operate, and 
transfer. 
Divestiture of generation and distribution assets is expected to bring efficiency improvement 
and superior management skills in the sector. However, this does not translate to capacity 
expansion or increased access to electricity in the immediate future. The government gains in 
terais of divestment fonds, which can be utilized for temporarily bridging the fiscal gap. These 
fimds can also be ploughed back to the sector or utilized for budgetary support to other social 
sectors. 
With the upcoming reforms the Power sector ceases to be a burden to the state's budget 
and eventually becomes a net generator of fmancial resources. As per the Thermal Power 
generation and development policy (2008) of Government of Uttar Pradesh and in view of 
social uplift and economic development of the people of the India's most populous state, the 
government is committed to provide reliable and cost efficient power. The state has energized 
about 20,000 villages in 2007-08 and had plans to electrify all households by the year 
2012.The demand for power in the State of Uttar Pradesh is expected to increase significantly 
in the years to come and to meet this demand, there is an urgent need to augment the 
generation capacity in the State. There have been significant efforts for capacity addition 
through establishment of power generation units. However the State still needs substantial 
additional capacity to provide adequate power in all sectors. 
To meet this objective the Government of Uttar Pradesh envisages private participation in 
the power sector by having a policy conducive to investment by private power developers in 
the State. 
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The aims of the poHcy are as following. 
i. To encourage investment by the private companies in Uttar Pradesh to provide a 
common implementation irame-work. 
ii. To have a definite power sharing agreement between the State Distribution Utilities and 
the private power developer to augment power availability in the State by providing 
incentive for investment to facilitate shorter development period for Developers. 
Facilitation by the Government of Uttar Pradesh for project development activities. 
As regards the operative period, this policy will be applicable to the projects whose developer 
is identified after date of announcement of this policy that is 1st August, 2008 till 31st March, 
2018 and for power plants above 250 MW. This policy is applicable for all types of thermal 
power plants. On the basis of Thermal Power Generation Development Policy 2008 during the 
Operative Period or Additional unit(s) of Projects developed at the same location during the 
Operative Period, where the developer has been selected through the competitive bidding 
process. 
a) Fuel Linkages 
In all cases fuel linkage for additional capacity / installed capacity under this policy will be the 
responsibility of the developer i.e. the developer will be entirely responsible to make his own 
arrangements for sourcing the fuel for the project. 
As regards the Implementation Methodology, a developer desiring to establish power 
plant / plants under this policy will have to apply to the Energy Department of Government of 
Uttar Pradesh or its assignee along with a preliminary project report with details of proposed 
financing and fuel linkage. The Government of Uttar Pradesh shall provide its decision 
regarding the in-principle approval of the application within two months from the receipt of 
such application. 
The approval of the project by Government of Uttar Pradesh will be followed by a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Implementation Agreement (lA) as prescribed by 
the Government of Uttar Pradesh between the Developer & Government of Uttar Pradesh. The 
MoU would be signed within 30 days from the date of in-principle approval of the project by 
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the State Government. The Developer shall identify a suitable site (if not selected earlier by 
Government of Uttar Pradesh or its assignee) in the State of Uttar Pradesh and carry out 
necessary survey for availability of land for the Power Station and ash bund, source of coal, 
feasibility for movement of coal, water availability, power evacuation, etc. 
b) Project feasibility Report 
The Developer will prepare the Project Feasibility Report (PFR) within 120 days from the in-
principle approval of the project by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. On receipt of the PFR 
from the Developer, the Energy Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh will examine 
various requirements and provide its in-principle acceptance to the Company. 
The Implementation Agreement will include an implementation schedule proposed by 
the developer and accepted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and would be signed between 
Developer and Government of Uttar Pradesh or its assignee within 180 days from the date of 
in-principle approval. 
On signing the Implementation Agreement, the Developer would be permitted to 
proceed with the development of the Project including but not limited to land acquisition, water 
allocation, coal linkage, captive coal block allocation (subject to availability) and statutory and 
other clearances as required under the applicable Central and State laws for implementation of 
the Project. 
c) Time frame for implementation: 
The time frame for implementation, under this policy for Power plant developers is to achieve 
financial closure within 12 months from the date of signing of the MoU. In case of inability of 
the developer to meet this deadline, the developer shall seek an extension of time frame for 
financial closure in writing from Government of Uttar Pradesh with suitable reasons for the 
same. Government of Uttar Pradesh may permit or reject the same at its own discretion. In case 
of rejection, the power plants shall cease to be covered under this policy and will not be 
eligible for any support from the Government of Uttar Pradesh as appUcable under the policy. 
The developer has to commit a commissioning schedule of maximum 48 months from 
the date of signing of Implementation Agreement for the first unit of the proposed power plant 
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and commissionmg of each subsequent unit, if applicable, within three months from the 
commissioning of the preceding unit of the power plant. This commissioning schedule will be 
part of the Implementation Agreement. 
During the implementation of the project the developer shall submit progress status of 
the project development activities, including milestones achieved, as per Implementation 
Agreement, to the Energy Department Government of Uttar Pradesh on a monthly basis. 
All the power plants established under this policy shall be eligible to obtain following 
support / co-operation from the Government of Uttar Pradesh: 
d) Support from the State Government of Uttar Pradesh 
The Government of Uttar Pradesh will make efforts to facilitate all incentives to the 
Developer that are available to industrial projects in the State as per the applicable industrial 
policy of the Government of Uttar Pradesh or the incentives that are offered to similar projects 
announced in this regard from time to time. The Government of Uttar Pradesh will also 
facilitate expeditious grant of permissions, approvals, no-objection certificates, 
recommendations, etc. under the purview of the State Government. The Developer shall be 
responsible to obtain all the statutory clearances/approvals including approvals relating to 
Foreign Direct Investment, if any, as per law. 
The land requirements for the power plant under this policy would have to be 
identified by the developer and the Government of Uttar Pradesh shall facilitate the acquisition 
process of the land. However, the cost required for acquiring the land would be fully borne by 
the developer. 
The Government of Uttar Pradesh shall facilitate and provide needed water linkages 
expeditiously and will assist in obtaining clearances from Centre. 
The primary responsibility of development of the Project shall be of the Developer. 
The Energy Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh will facilitate the Project development 
activities by extending all possible support/co-operation to the Company. 
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The cost of the dedicated transmission line, if required, from the Generating Plant to the 
designated grid sub-station of the State utility/or inter State grid substation and the cost of 
interfacing at both ends (the Generating Plant and grid substation) including work at the grid 
Sub-Station, cost of bay, tie- line, if any, and replacement/ up gradation of existing equipment, 
if any, shall be borne by the developer. 
The State Government through the State transmission utility or other assignees will 
facilitate the clearances and approvals for connecting the power plant to the grid sub-station. 
However, the responsibility of application, clearances and approvals for the same would lie 
with the developei\ 
The Government, the State distribution utilities or their assignees will not guarantee 
purchase of power from additional units by the Developer. However in the case of a project 
selected under the competitive bidding process in which the coal linkage for the original 
number of units has been provided by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Government shall 
have the first right to purchase power up to 20% (Twenty percent) of the aggregate capacity of 
the additional generating units which may be set up by the developer on the basis of his own 
arrangement for sourcing the fuel, at the rate detemiined by the bidding process. This condition 
will be applicable to capacities added by the developer within a period of two years from the 
commissioning of the last unit of the project supported by the coal linkage provided by the 
State of Uttar Pradesh. 
In the case of additional capacity, for the project being setup by a developer which are 
commissioned more than two years after the date of commissioning of last unit of the project 
supported by coal linkage being provided by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the State Government 
or its assignee shall have the first right of refiisal to purchase power up to 30% (Thirty percent) 
of the aggregate additional capacity from such generation units at a rate to be decided by the 
Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
In the case of a project being setup by a developer outside the competitive bidding 
process on the basis of Joint Venture/ captive with his own arrangement for sourcing of fuel for 
the project, the State Government or its assignee or its nominated agency shall have the first 
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right of refusal toi purchase power up to 30% (Thirty percent) of aggregate capacity of such 
generating units at the rate to be decided by the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 
Commission. 
The right of refusal will be exercised by the Government each time the Developer is in 
the process of finalizing its Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). However, the Government 
would provide its concurrence or otherwise to the PPA to the Developer within three months of 
the receipt of the same. The PPA term shall be twenty-five years. The PPA shall be approved 
by the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. The balance power or the total 
power, as the case may be, may be sold to third party consumers, other licensees, traders, etc. 
Such sale to third party shall be guided by the applicable regulations such as Open Access 
Regulations, surcharge etc. issued by Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
The developers will also have to make their own arrangement for entering into a 
wheeling agreement with State distribution/ State transmission utilities, as may be applicable, 
as may be mutually agreed upon between the Developer and Licensee(s). 
The Government of Uttar Pradesh will be supporting implementation of the projects 
would be under a special task force. The provisions of Power Policy, 2003 (as amended in June 
2004) shall stand superseded in respect of Thermal Power Generation stations. 
a) For attaining the goal of 'Energy for all' the following points are required to be 
addressed within a specified frame work and time frame 
b) Improving operational efficiency of utilities 
c) Enhancing financial viability of the State owned Utility/ Corporation 
d) Creating adequate generation and transmission capacity 
e) Increasing access to electricity and promoting the correct energy mix. 
f) Creating and enabling environment investment in generation 
g) Enabling efficient subsidization, both quantum and targeting. 
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e) Assured Returns: 
Also it is worth considering that, while cost recovery is essential for the sustainable 
growth of the power sector (irrespective of whether investment is from private or public 
sources), it is important also to look at the affordability of tariffs to the population served. 
Countries with low per capita incomes (say below $1000) will likely have greater difficulty in 
raising cost recovery than those with higher per capita incomes. This poses important policy 
questions such as whether or not the desired level of cost recovery should vary according to per 
capita incomes. And also, where cost recovery has to be less than adequate, what options 
should be considered to ensure sustainable growth of the power sector. 
Being a state-owned monopoly or a state-approved private monopoly, the power sector 
has traditionally harbored several inefficiencies, such as: overstaffing, lack of commercial 
orientation, poor availability and utiUzation of plant, excessive system losses and leakages. 
However, closer scrutiny of cost structures has not usually received serious attention even after 
private investors having entered the sector. 
A look at the power scenario in Uttar Pradesh shows that the base load deficit has improved 
from 20 per cent in 2004-05 to 16 per cent in 2006-07.witliin the category wise consumption, 
industry holds a major share at 34 per cent, but the corresponding usage.of captive power is not 
high as only 9 per cent of the total captive capacity is present in Uttar Pradesh. Assuming these 
circles to be privatized through the franchisee route, it the domestic demand potential was 
estimated in these few circles. 
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Table -1.8 Domestic potential of top circles in Uttar Pradesh 
Districts Dom total Units Dom Potential Per cent of Total 
Domestic 
(mn) Revenues (Rs mn) consumption in the 
state 
First 10 circles 
Kanpur urban 
Agra 
Muzzaffarnagar 
Bijnor 
Bulandshahar 
Meemt 
Firozabad 
Etah 
Aligarh 
Mainpuri 
1015.1 
759.1 
720.9 
645.4 
530.8 
499.1 
434.6 
421.5 
300.3 
319.9 
1370.4 
1024.8 
1622.0 
1452.1 
1194.3 
1123.1 
586.7 
569.1 
405.4 
431.9 
6.7 
5.0 
4.7 
4.2 
3.5 
3.3 
2.9 
2.8 
2.0 
2.1 
5646.8 9779.7 37.1 
Next 10 circles 
Allahabad 890.0 
Gorakhpur 761.0 
Varanasi 443.1 
Deoria 371.3 
Basti 322.5 
Chandauli 310.9 
Banda 248.8 
Mathura 231.6 
Lalitpur 203.6 
Etawah 186.5 
2705.5 
2323.5 
1347.0 
1128.9 
980.4 
945.1 
335.8 
312.7 
274.9 
251.7 
5.8 
5.0 
2.9 
2.4 
2.1 
2.0 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.2 
3969.3 10595.5 26.1 
Source: CRISIL report (Research Outlook 2007-08 to 2011-12): Sector : Power 
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The districts shown in the above table together total for Rs.20 billion of the potential domestic 
revenues. These districts contribute to around 63 per cent of the total domestic consumption. 
Though power reforms are the most important item on the government's agenda, it often 
leads to face-offs between the Centre and states. Electricity is the common denominator for all 
technologically advanced societies. Correlation between per capita income and per capita 
power consumption is very strong. If the power industry is below-par, overall growth is 
hobbled. 
Efficient and quality power supply is key to inclusive socio-economic development. With 
growing population and demand, it is imperative that well-defined plans and policies are laid 
down for proper and time-bound improvement in power scenario of the State. The Government 
of Uttar Pradesh has declared new Energy Policy 2009, which envisages that the per capita 
consumption of power would increase from the meager 370 units at present to 1,000 units by 
2017. It gives renewed thrust to power generation, transmission and distribution along with 
simplified procedures and incentives for active private participation. The salient features of the 
Policy are: 
The Amendment of Dec. 24, 2009: State's share in power has been scaled down from existing 
90 per cent to just 50 per cent in power generated by private player if state Government made a 
recommendation for ftiel to Union Government. 
a) Industry status: all new projects will be treated as "Industry" in terms of industrial 
policy of the State and all the incentives available to new projects will be applicable as 
per the Industrial Policy of the State. 
b) State shall facilitate land assembly, water linkage and necessary clearances for the 
project as per policy of State Govt. The land cost shall be borne by the developer. 
c) Sale of power to third party: Fifty percent of additional power will be allowed for third 
party sale in the case of optimized capacity of existing plants or the plants under 
commissioning. 
d) Private participation in renovation, modernization and Management of existing power 
plants through Lease, Rehabilitate, Operate and Transfer 
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e) Sale of existing plants to private sector or to any joint sector ventures for new capacity 
installation at old site. 
f) Encouragement to setting up of Co-generation plants based on bagasse / bio-mass or 
any other non-conventional fuel. These plants will be able to use conventional fuel 
during off season. Of which 50 % would be allowed to be sold under open access 
system. While plants based on bagasse or bio-mass will be allowed to sell 10% of their 
total generation. 
g) Encouragement to private participation in Transmission to attract the necessary 
investments for strengthening and expansion of the Transmission system, 
h) Transmission licensees in the private sector would be encouraged and grant right of 
way on conditions similar to being granted for state owned Transmission Company 
i) Private sector participation in both rural and urban area distribution business through a 
transparent competitive process, 
j) Transition period support to the distribution entities to ensure a successful turnaround 
of the State power sector, 
k) Grant of open access on the existing State owned transmission network. 
1) Encouragement to renewable energy projects based on bio-mass, solar energy, 
municipal sewage, sohd waste and industrial waste as well as mini, micro and small 
hydro power projects. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) route: 
To encourage private participation, generation projects of 250 MW and above shall 
be allowed to be set up through Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) route by Independent 
Power Producer (IPP) besides already available routes of Case-1 * and Case-2** methods. 
The economic development of Uttar Pradesh has been seriously hampered by 
inadequate availability of power. In view of the fact that the conventional sources of power are 
fast depleting and pose threat of environment pollution too, the challenge before the State 
Government is not only to meet the ever growing demand for power but also to progressively 
increase the share of renewable sources in the power-mix so as to achieve overall energy 
security. 
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As regards the hydropower generation policy after the creation of Uttarakhand State. U.P. is 
left with the hmited scope of development of Hydro Electric Power due to its topography. 
However, the state of U.P. is endowed with rich water resources in the form of major rivers as 
well as extensive irrigation canal network, and it thus becomes imperative to harness available 
Hydro Power potential to the maximum extent possible. 
The state has an estimated over all identified hydro power potential of 568MW out of 
which 167MW capacity comprises to small hydro power sector up to 25MW capacity which 
have so far been identified at 60 locations in U.P. The identification of small hydropower 
project (SHP) sites is in progress and more sites are expected to be identified in fiature by the 
nodal agencies NEDA/UPJVNL as well as private developers and also by any company 
designated by U.P. Govt. 
Hydropower policy (2003) of U.P. 
U.P. has considerable potential in small hydro power sector which is yet to be harnessed. With 
a view to maximize the utilization of small hydro power potential, a policy has been 
formulated to achieve following broad objectives. 
a. To enhance the power availability in the state grid tlirough the contribution of pollution 
free renewable energy for socio economic development. 
b. To supplement minimum rural energy needs through sustainable small hydro power 
schemes. 
c. To provide power for industrial development in areas contiguous to small hydro power 
sites. 
d. To create conditions conducive for proactive involvement of private investor in 
development of small hydro power to create direct and indirect employment 
opportunities for the youth in state. 
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e. To frame guidelines for allotment of new SHP sites to be set-up in Private Sector and to 
enumerate various incentives and procedural facilities to attract, encourage and 
facilitate private sector participation in this area. 
In a recent announcement (Aug 2012) four hydropower projects with a combined capacity of 
3,400 KW would be set up in Uttar Pradesh in three years, the state government of Uttar 
Pradesh has said. 
An empowered committee headed by Infrastructure & Industrial Development Commissioner 
approved the successful bidders for setting up the new small hydropower projects (SHPs).The 
projects will be constructed through the pubHc-private partnership mode. The SHPs will be in 
Kutubpur (550 KW) and Dhakauli (300 KW) in Meerut, Betwa-1 (1800 KW) in Jhansi and 
Akbarpur (750 KW) in Bulandshahar. AMR Power has won the bid for the Akbaipur and 
Kutubpur SHPs and Oasis Contractors & Consultants for the Betwa-1 and Dhakauli SHPs.As 
per Infrastructure & Industrial Development Commissioner "The government is keen to 
augment power availability from all resources available, including hydropower," The Energy 
Task Force and state cabinet will give the final nod to the projects. Then, the lowest tariffs 
quoted will be referred to the Uttar Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission for adoption 
and permission to issue Letters of Intent to the project developers. 
Solar Power policy (2012) of U.P. 
The State of Uttar Pradesh is endowed with vast potential of solar power and the 
Government is keen to tap this resource to improve the availability of power in the State by 
promoting the establishment of solar energy based power projects, both grid- connected and 
off-grid type. For the attainment of this goal, a comprehensive policy framework is an 
imperative requirement. 
Therefore, the Government of Uttar Pradesh adopts and announces the Solar Power Policy 
(2012) with the policy aims at achieving the following objectives: 
a To promote generation and use of clean and green power in the State by 
harnessing solar energy. 
57 
b To put in place an appropriate investment climate which could stimulate private 
sector participation in development of solar power 
c To spread environmental awareness among the general public, 
d To contribute to productive use of wastelands 
e To enhance skills and create employment opportunities, 
f To promote estabHshment of local manufacturing facilities, 
g To build capacity in the State to initiate and sustain, use and effective 
management of newer teclino logics. 
This policy comes into effect fi-om the date of issuance and shall remain in operation up to 
31st March 2017. Solar power plants approved, installed and commissioned during this period 
alone shall be eligible for benefits of this policy. 
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Chapter - 2 
Survey of literature 
The Government of India announced the poUcy of liberaUzation in 1991 and consequent 
amendments in Electricity (Supply) Act, have opened new vistas to involve private efforts and 
investments in Power generation industry. Considerable emphasis has been placed on attracting 
private investment and the major policy changes have been announced by the Government in 
this regard and State Electricity Boards (SEBs) were subsequently unbundled in most of the 
states making them state corporations. 
The literature review conducted here has been taken in the above perspective and thus the 
papers relating to that are mostly of post 1991 era for Indian context, however the case of other 
developing countries have been accordingly taken as per their respective years of sectoral 
reforms and private sector participation in those countries. The literature review focuses upon 
the following aspects in the context of the Research work. 
a. Need of private sector participation in power generation 
b. Drivers of private sector participation in power generation 
c. Sustainability of private sector power projects 
d. Availability of resources for capacity addition 
e. Privatization in various developed and developing countries 
f Research Gap 
2.1 Need for Private Sector Participation in Power Generation 
Tongia Rahul (2003) has described the political aspects of the Indian economy with special 
reference to power sector. After independence the Indian economy followed a socialist path, 
with the state assuming an ever-larger role in economic activity. In the power sector, the 
central government created State Electricity Boards (SEBs) that gradually assumed 
responsibility for nearly all power activities in the country. A handful of power companies 
continue today as private electricity suppliers for several major cities including Ahmedabad, 
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Kolkata and Mumbai. However, the vast majority of the private entities were amalgamated 
after independence into state-owned enterprises. 
Balachandra (2006) has discussed the imphcations of such private sector participation 
in power generation on various stakeholders, viz., public utilities, consumers and private 
sector. The study attempts to analyze issues like planned rationing, guarantees to private sector, 
backing down of existing capacity. Using the State of Karnataka (in Southern India) as a case 
study, the paper has developed multiple scenarios using an integrated mixed integer-
programming model. The results show the advantage of marginal non-supply (rationing) of 
electricity in terms of achieving overall effective supply demand matching as well as providing 
economic benefits to the state that could be generated through cost savings. 
Puneet Chitkara, et.al. , (2001) have stated that there is a general opinion that the 
reforms should start with privatization of Power generation. Others believe that the government 
has started at the wrong end by not beginning the reform process with privatization of 
distribution. This has to be seen from a view that this should not form a vicious circle. If the 
government privatizes generation without improving revenue collection, the generators have to 
take into account highly risky cash inflows, and would typically insist upon ESCROW/state 
guarantees. If distribution is privatized it will have to bear significant supply risk because of 
the current poor state power generation in various states. A possible solution is to let the same 
entity own power generation as well as power distribution, 
Waquar Ahmed (2007) has examined the evolution of electric-power policy in India 
adopting a political-economy approach by drawing linkages between global and locaFnational 
discourses, of development. The study focuses on the objectives and goals of the post-colonial 
developmental state of India, and examines the transition of India's electricity policy regime 
from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. He has argued that the historically dynamic nature of 
state-society coalition in India, representing varying social and spatial interests, has impacted 
India's power policy. In addition, he further adds that even as neoliberalism at the global level 
is pushed forth under the rhetoric of free market, global corporations, in collaboration with 
Global Governance Institutions, demand guarantee of profits and incentives from local/national 
governments that violate the principle of free competition. 
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DubashNavroz K. and Sudhir Chella Rajan (2001), have provided an analysis of the 
social and political context in which power sector reforms have taken place in India. They have 
focused on the character and effects of those reforms and the roles and responses of different 
players. The authors have tried to place these issues within their institutional context and 
examine the extent to which the political interests shaping the reform agenda have addressed 
public benefits that includes pricing of electricity, expanding services to rural areas and 
environmental dimensions of providing electricity. They have also placed emphasis on the 
governance processes necessary to achieve these objectives. 
Woods Laura (2011) has highlighted the Major Opportunities Present in Power Sector 
.The Indian Power Sector is undergoing a rapid growth phase with a vision to provide reliable, 
affordable and quality power for all by 2012. The demand for power is growing exponentially 
in accordance with the high level of developments in the infrastructure sector pertaining to 
progress in telecommunication, roads, airports and ports. However, in the past few years' 
policy makers and regulators have taken their stand in order to accelerate the growth of power 
sector leading to capacity additions in generation, transmission and distribution, stable 
regulatory environment coupled with focus on rural electrification, nuclear and renewable 
sources of energy. There is immense scope for further investment in the sector, both from 
domestic and international. 
T L Shankar (2004) writes that in subsidizing power to agricultural machinery (such as 
pump sets etc.), the correct procedure would be to separate out small and marginal farmers and 
supply them with least expensive power. But the data is not available to do so. 
As per the article 'Indian Power Sector in Transition Mode' P.P.Basistha revealed 
(published by Athena Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd) that it needs to be reinstated that the 
government, the power project developers and the other stakeholders in the Indian power 
sector will have to address numerous issues through concerted efforts both for mid and long-
term, if India will have to attain its mammoth power capacity addition of 85,000 MW during 
the twelfth plan period (2012-17) so as to realize GDP growth of over 7 percent during the 
period. According to industry insiders, given the ongoing intention of the government to 
materialize higher GDP growth, shortages in slippage are likely to happen due to persisting 
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multiple issues, requiring intervention by the government and also by the private project 
developers by putting its act together. 
The Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India (2009) has summarized the 
policy initiatives to encourage private participation. To attract large scale private investment, 
the Central Government has taken a number of steps including the private sector to set up coal, 
gas or liquid based thermal, hydel, wind or solar projects with foreign equity participation up to 
100% under the automatic route. The bulwarks of the new policy framework are the Electricity 
Act, 2003, National Electricity Policy 2006, Tariff Policy 2006, Rural Electrification Policy 
2006, New Hydro policy 2008 and Mega Power Projects 2008. In addition, the Central 
Government has notified the National Load Dispatch Centre Rules, 2004. Further, the Central 
Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has notified several important regulations 
including the regulations on tariff, open access in transmission and licensing of transmission 
service providers and traders and the Indian Electricity Grid Code, 2006. The Appellate 
Tribunal for Electricity was set up in 2004 to hear appeals from Central and State Electricity 
Regulatory Commissions. 
In line with the schemes formulated by the Government of India for attracting private 
developers towards Non-Conventional Energy Sources, the various state governments have 
formulated the policy guidelines for promotional and fiscal incentives to encourage private 
developers and entrepreneurs for developing non-conventional energy sources. 
The Indian power sector is characterized by a shortage of power supply. Northern 
region remains the most potential area for installed power with maximum shortfalls followed 
by Southern region. This provides an opportunity to bridge demand-supply gap in the Indian 
power sector, the demand driven power sector will boost private investment especially 
merchant power plants. In addition, renewable power will remain a favorite investment avenue 
as more than 80% renewable power is generated by private players. 
As per report of Department of Energy , Government of Assam the state has a 
hydropower potential of the order of 541 MW (2007) against which only about 2.00 MW has 
been harnessed so far from the Bordikharu Small Hydropower Project (that remained 
inoperative since April' 1999 due to technical snag). The Government of Assam has decided to 
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encourage generation of power through small hydropower (SHP) sources of energy and has 
framed a policy so that the development of this sector serves as an engine to achieve the 
objective of promoting the all-round development of the region by inducting private 
participation. 
The Government of Gujarat is keen on development of renewable energy sector as well, 
given the dwindling resources of fossil fuels, increased threat of global warming and the 
concern on environmental protection. The state is blessed with long coast line and good wind 
speeds for harnessing of the Wind Energy. The State of Gujarat is committed to have 
investment in Clean and Green Energy to reduce Carbon Dioxide emissions. 
The Government of Bihar has a policy for active promotion of private entrepreneurs in 
the areas of power generation and distribution. Therefore, with a view to encouraging private 
sector participation in decentralized generation of grid grade level power, through utilization of 
the available inputs of renewable and non-conventional sources of energy like solar, wind, 
water, biomass and other wastes. 
The Jharkhand Government has a poHcy to encourage private sector participation in 
generation and distribution of power. The distribution of power in industrial areas and major 
cities of the State like Ranchi, Jamshedpur and Dhanbad are being contemplated for 
privatization. 
Chhattishgarh government in its policy directives (2002) have announced that every 
unit, organization or private agency desirous of installing power generating unit based on non-
conventional resources (like Mini/ Micro, Hydel Projects, Wind Energy, Bio Energy, Solar 
Energy etc.) in Chhattisgarh shall be eligible for incentives' 
The State Government of Haryana has taken strong steps for creating conditions 
conducive for the involvement of private sector or public -private sector participation in 
Renewable Energy Sources based power projects in the State. The State Govt, aims to achieve 
a minimum of 10% (i.e. 500 MW) of the total capacity addition of 5000 MW of conventional 
power to be generated through Renewable Energy Power Projects by 2012 as per Ministry of 
Non-conventional Energy Sources, Govt, of India's policy. 
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The Government of Himachal Pradesh has been laying the desired thrust for 
encouraging generation of power through renewable energy sources as well as the SHPs 
including and up to a capacity of 5 MW through an agency called "HIMURJA". Government 
of Himachal Pradesh to harness and effectively utilize the other renewable sources of energy 
has encouraged conducive conditions for involvement of private investors in the small hydro 
and renewable energy Projects 
According to a report by Indian Chambers of Commerce (2010) regarding the North 
eastern states , going forward the eastern and north eastern belt of the country would certainly 
become the major supplier of power to rest of the country as these regions has abandon coal 
reserves and huge hydro potential. The region also has the geographical advantage to make up 
any deficit through imports form the neighboring countries. 
According to a report (2003) of Govt, of Rajasthan the state there has been encouraging 
growth in development of wind power projects in the State in the recent past, primarily due to 
prevailing incentives and benefits offered in the afore-mentioned Policies. 
The Government of Rajasthan has enforced the Pohcy for Promotion of Private Sector 
Investment for setting up of Power Generation to meet the growing demand for electricity and 
for rapid economic development of the state (2005). Various concessions and assistance will be 
provided to the private entrepreneurs setting up thermal projects of 125 MW and above 
capacity within the State (except captive power plants) such as Land ,water stamp duty ,taxes 
besides making systems simple such as single window clearance ,generation tariff and state 
government guarantee. 
The private sector power plant would be able to sell power to the State Electricity Board 
or to supply directly to bulk consumers and units in their designated load areas. It shall also be 
able to sell power to any grid or export power outside the state with the concurrence of the 
State Electricity Board. Thus, it is intended to provide wheeling and banking of power through 
the transmission and distribution system of the State Electricity Board. 
According to a report by the Government of Uttar Pradesh (2009) the State Government 
has declared the Energy Policy, which envisages that the per capita consumption of power 
would increase from the meager 370 units at present to 1,000 units by 2017. Efficient and 
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quality power supply is key to inclusive socio-economic development. With burgeoning 
population and demand, it is imperative that well-defined plans and policies are laid down for 
proper and time-bound improvement in power scenario of the State. It gives renewed thrust to 
power generation, transmission and distribution along with simplified procedures and 
incentives for active private participation. 
In view of the above authors the main role of the government is to form policies and 
appoint regulators to provide a level playing field for all the player of power sector who are 
involved in the value chain of power generation upto distribution to end consumers. The key 
concept of economic viability and open market competition should be there to promote private 
sector participation. It is emphasized that the beginning of the reform process should start with 
privatization of distribution. It has also been advocated by many authors to integrate the 
concept of free market, market driven price mechanism and assured returns to investor to make 
it viable to have encouraging private sector participation. In view of the Indian Power Sector 
undergoing a rapid growth phase with a vision to provide reliable, affordable and quality power 
for all the participation of private sector can significantly improve the condition of the power 
sector infrastructure and can help achieving overall objective of effective power supply as well 
as providing economic benefits to the state that could be generated through cost 
competitiveness in the free market dynamics. 
2.2 Drivers of Private Sector Participation in Power Generation 
Desai Vishvanath V. (2004) has reviewed the obstacles to private sector participation in India 
in power generation Industry. Desai has identified that there are several factors that have acted 
upon as obstacles to private investment in the power sector. For example, the various reforms 
as discussed were not introduced all at one time, but in bits and pieces over a period of time, 
which may have diluted their impact on investors. Improvement in administrative and 
bureaucratic structures has not been commensurate with the spirit and pace of reforms. 
Improvements such as, simphfication of procedures, reduction in administrative delays, 
elimination of multiplicity of clearances and approvals, adoption of a business-orientation, 
have been slow to develop and may have dragged down the impact of reforms. The 
controversy surrounding the Enron project may have also adversely affected investor 
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sentiment. Besides these factors, it is important to recognize that perhaps the most severe 
obstacle to private investment in the power sector has been its laclc of fmancial viability. 
Niranjan Swain, et al. (2004), have discussed the various inhibitors to growth in power 
sector but the major roadblock in the growth path, which made it difficult or rather impossible 
for a private player to enter is the Government Policy. Further the lack of knowledge and 
experience of Indian entrepreneurs as they didn't have enough knowledge and experience in 
developing power projects flirther aggravated the situation and made the things worse. The 
SEBs and other Government Agencies became fmancially weak and could not propel any 
future expansion or growth in the sector. Electricity Act, 2003 was a major step in solving the 
above underlying problems of the power sector. A whole new system was evolved where 
private players were invited to be an active participant. The system primarily demanded 
fmancial, political and other infrastructural growth (particularly in roads and communication). 
Some of the bold steps taken in the Act were separating power generation and distribution out 
of 'License Raj' regime, opening access to national grid and demolishing the 'Single Buyer' 
model. 
Niranjan Swain (2004) flirther stated that the primary lesson in keeping the power 
sector under tight government regime was to have proper access, equity and distribution of 
power to various sections of society. The socialist dream did not materialize as the above 
benefits have not reached the general population (A significant fraction of the population 
particularly the rural India does not have access to electricity). At the same time, some 
consumer categories, not necessarily the poorest, are given subsidized electricity. Benefits are 
skewed in favor of certain categories of consumers (e.g., in agriculture the consumption is 
almost one third of total power consumption in India, yet agriculture provides less than 5% of 
the total revenues. 
Antonette D'Sa, et. al. (1999) have critically examined the various aspects of private 
sector participation in India's Power Sector .They report that Independent power producers 
(IPPs) claim that their progress has been hindered by problems such as litigation, financial 
arrangements, and obtaining clearances and fiiel supply agreements. On the other hand they 
found that, the State Electricity Boards have been burdened by power purchase agreements 
(PPAs) that favor the IPPs with such clauses as availability payment irrespective of plant 
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utilization, tariffs reflecting high capital costs and returns on equity, etc. The process of 
inviting private participation in the power sector and the problems experienced seem to have 
spurred on the restructuring of the power sector, including the formation of Central and State 
Electricity Re,gulatory Commissions. 
As reported by Antonette D'Sa, et. al, additions to the generation capacity without 
corresponding improvement of the transmission and distribution facilities are likely to further 
undermine the system efficiency. The problems of private producers are various, which 
includes Litigation/renegotiation leading to delays, financing problems, risk sharing 
(construction risk, market risk, fuel-supply risk, exchange fluctuation risk) obtaining clearances 
& environmental problems. 
Ernst &Young (2012) undertook a survey of various sectors to determine the overall 
outlook for India which turned out to be remains positive. However, it was found through the 
survey that inadequate infrastructure and a lack of governance and transparency were the 
major obstacles to investment in power sector. The report concludes that by iinproving upon 
these obstacles will result in an improvement in India's attractiveness for investment. The 
Government, though sensitive to the challenges, has to hasten policy-making and 
implementation, so that India continues to remain attractive. 
The Shunglu committee appointed by the Prime Minister submitted a report to the 
Planning Commission on July 25* 2011 and highHghted the fact that all is not well in the 
appointment and fiinctioning of the State regulators. The fiinctioning of state regulators has 
come under a lot of criticism lately because of the mounting discom losses and inability to 
supply power to the consumers who are ready to pay the price for it. It is noteworthy that the 
independence of the regulator (CERC / SERCs) is one of the pillars of Electricity Act which 
lays the foundation of power sector reforms in India. This independence and autonomy is 
reportedly being diluted by the State Governments for various political reasons. 
Nakul Korrea ( 1999) in Unbundling and Deregulating Electric Power in Tamil Nadu 
India writes Unbundling combined with deregulation has been very successful in significantly 
improving the efficiency of the power sector in those countries that have done it. The primary 
advantage of this method is that by deregulating to open competition, the industry functions at 
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much higher levels of efficiency. This is particularly important in a developing country like 
India with severe demands on its capital. Efficiency gains in the power sector result in lower 
prices for consumers and, because electricity is a core input to all sectors, significant gains for 
the economy as a whole. 
Pillai N. Vijayamohanan (2008) in a review of Kerala has emphasized the adoption of 
reform steps undertaken by other states which may be helpful in organizing power sector 
reforms in Kerala. Radical policy changes were legislated in India and so far 13 States have 
reorganized their power sector. In Orissa, Delhi and Noida in Uttar Pradesh the power 
distribution was entirely privatized. Kerala with a militant trade union presence has so far been 
dragging her feet, even in the face of the stem legislative requirement, portending an ultimate 
surrender. 
In a report of Asian Development Bank (ADB) Institute (2007) it has been inferred 
that the basket of choice available to private investors depends on the privatization / investment 
liberalization process adopted by the respective governments. There is wide variation in the 
mode of private privatization among various countries. Divestiture of generation and 
distribution assets is expected to bring efficiency improvement and superior management skills 
in the sector. However, this does not translate to capacity expansion or increased access to 
electricity in the immediate fiiture. The government gains in terms of divestment funds, which 
can be utilized for temporarily bridging the fiscal gap. These funds can also be ploughed back 
to the sector or utilized for budgetary support to other social sectors. 
According to. Research and Markets Adds Report (2012) Power generation costs are 
the key to determining the best generation mix for a reliable supply of electricity while making 
it available for use economically. With an increasing demand for power for economic 
development, countries around the world need to evaluate the present and future costs of 
generating electricity using the presently available and fijture power generation technologies. 
Evaluating the cost of power generation depends on various factors that are responsible for 
driving the prices of electricity. The most important factors driving the power generation costs 
are government policies and incentives, capital (investment cost), fuel costs, operations and 
maintenance cost. 
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According to a Report by FICCI (2002), the Indian private sector has already acquired 
capabilities for participating in nuclear power projects' Private sector investors should be 
allowed to have majority ownership in power projects, the industry forum said. This will boost 
private investment in nuclear power sector. The country has the potential to generate 60,000 
MW of nuclear power over the next 25 years, which needs an investment of over $100 billion. 
The government is already vetting 10 nuclear power projects. Companies like National 
Thermal Power Corp (NTPC), ReUance Energy, Tata Power, Larsen and Toubro, and Bharat 
Heavy Electricals Ltd can now look forward to working as partners with international 
companies like General Electric, Westinghouse, Areva and Atomstroy in the field of nuclear 
energy generation. 
The most important aspect of sectoral reform is that, the various reforms as mentioned were 
not introduced all at one time, but in bits and pieces over a period of time, which should have 
been introduced in a single ambit to get the desired results. Although the Electricity Act, 2003 
was a major step in solving the above underlying problems of the power sector and an entire 
new system was developed where private players were requested to be an active participant. 
Some of the bold steps taken in the Act were separating power generation and distribution. It is 
also being advocated that additions to the generation capacity without corresponding 
improvement of the transmission and distribution facilities are likely to flirther undermine the 
system efficiency and therefore a holistic approach has to be there regarding the reforms being 
taken in power generation. It is also worth mentioning that the problems of private producers 
are various, which includes Litigation/renegotiation leading to delays, financing problems, risk 
sharing (construction risk, market risk, fuel-supply risk, exchange fluctuation risk) obtaining 
clearances & environmental problems and hence the rules and laws should take into 
consideration all these aspect before enforcement. . As regards the improvements such as 
simplification of procedures, reduction in administrative delays, elimination of multiplicity of 
clearances and approvals, adoption of a business-orientation, have to be fast to progress the 
change and should not drag down the impact of reforms. 
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2.3 Sustainability of Private Sector Power Projects 
Saraswata Mohapatra (2010) has discussed as to how the private sector can contribute to 
reahzing the purpose of these reform initiatives. The common thread across all the people-
centric solutions is a strong understanding of the root cause of the troubles and challenges 
faced by Indians, as the momentum for sustainability is derived from people. The solutions 
proposed are not limited to the provision of products and services to cater to the unmet needs 
of Indians firom the viewpoint of consumers but to think of them as partners and allies in our 
fight for sustainability.The emphasis is not only on meeting the uninet needs of Indians but 
also to develop the market and inculcate a culture of fostering 'sustainability'. In many of the 
areas proposed, the government initiatives and programmes have been mentioned in order to 
convey the commitment of the government in the said area, for in a country like India, given its 
socio-economic realities, government's role becomes important. It acts as a booster for the 
private sector and acts as a catalyst to make a success out of their investment. 
According to Desai Vishvanath V. (2004) the dominant sector entities, namely the 
SEBs, are technically insolvent. They are unable to recover the costs of power supphed and 
remain burdened with ever-growing commercial losses. The power market in India is 
essentially a single-buyer market and the SEBs are the single buyer. Private power producers 
are therefore required to sell power to SEBs, who lack financial resources to pay for it. 
Initially, private investors sought comfort by asking SEBs to create ESCROW accounts so as 
to 'ring fence' the revenues payable to them. However, such arrangements did not address the 
basic issue of inadequate cost recovery and turned out to be unsustainable. Private investors 
also sought comfort in guarantees from state governments, but these too proved to be of limited 
value given the precarious finances of the state governments themselves. This meant that 
private investors, most of who were interested to invest in Power generation, did not have 
credible counterparts to sell their output. Faced with uncertain prospects of getting paid for 
their supplies, private investors held back from investing in the sector, despite substantial 
reforms and incentives. 
In view of the above it is possible that few modest sized investments may be attracted 
under such conditions. However, it appears unlikely that major investments would be 
committed by private investors when the sustainability of the power sector as a whole is far 
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from assured. This is so because the issue of inadequate cost recovery from subsidized 
consumers would remain unaddressed and as long as that continues to be the case, SEBs, who 
are likely to retain responsibility for the bulk of power distribution for the next several years, 
would continue to be fmancially unviable. In fact, in the absence of increased cost recovery by 
SEBs, accelerated liberalization of the sector could result in further deterioration of SEB 
finances, and in the sustainability of sector operations. 
CRISIL Research in its report (2009) states that in order to enable a seamless flow of 
power across various regions the transmission segment needs a revamp with regards to 
transinission pricing method, greater private sector participation and open access in 
transmission and distribution (T & D). 
Chandrajit Banerjee (2012) in a recent report of the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII) states that that unless the issues plaguing the power sector are urgently addressed, the 
aspiration for 9% growth in the 12th Plan may not materialize. Even as the Indian government 
draws-up ambitious plans envisaging 100 GW capacity addition in the 12' five year plan 
period (2012-17), the country's power sector faced with multidimensional challenges. These 
issues are constraining growth in the power sector and may have adverse impact on the 
economic growth in the long run. He has further revealed that critical obstacles including fuel 
supply bottlenecks, distribution losses and lack of funding are essential for achieving double 
digit GDP growth. 
The planning commission in its annual report has reviewed the working of state power utilities 
and Electricity Departments. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the World Bank lending had been influenced by 
what is known as the 'Washington consensuses'. According to this, the development processes 
were hindered less by capital shortages, and more by economic policies that hindered market 
forces. The Bank, therefore, began approaching privatization as a serious policy option. The 
World Bank, incidentally, had assisted various power sector projects, especially at the time the 
NTPC was set up in 1974. It is felt that the World Bank was interested in the creation of the 
NTPC because the Bank felt that their loans were better assured as the NTPC projects were 
expected to be better managed as compared to SEB projects. Over time, however, the World 
Bank was desirous of moving away from generation because of environmental issues. Since 
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coal was the primary fuel for power generation which gave rise to environmental de-gradation, 
the Bank wanted to support projects which envisaged restructuring of the sector, in terms of 
reforms. 
A R Sihag et al (2002) , have observed that the focus of Indian reform legislation has 
been more on improving fmancial viability of the ailing power sector than on improving access 
to electricity. The legislation does not expUcitly spell out the provisions for the extension of 
electricity services to the poor and the need and mechanism for subsidizing marginalized 
consumers. In contrast, the Philippines legislation has provision of lifeline rates for the poor 
and the approach to cross-subsidy, subsidy and the expansion of network. The Act stipulates a 
definite time frame for the elimination of cross-subsidy and at the same time it ensures 
subsidized rates for the identified poor. 
These authors emphasize upon the need to have a proactive legislation that addresses 
issues luiked to access to rehable and affordable sources of electricity. To effectively meet the 
electricity needs of the poor, legislative and policy support for mechanisms like the provision 
of lifeline rates and special functions like missionary electrification needs to be put in place. 
According to Santhakumar et. al. (2003) the costs and benefits of power sector reform 
include (a) The subsidy the households currently receive for the consumption of electricity, 
which may be reduced as part of the reform, and this is a likely cost of the reform and (b) The 
losses due to the poor quality of electricity supply, which can be improved as an outcome of 
reform, and hence it can be taken as a likely benefit of reform. In addition, households might 
also perceive the indirect losses on account of the non-viability and inefficiency of the power 
sector (due to their impact on industrial, economic and employment growth, and also the 
consequent fiscal problems of the State) in the pre-reform stage. Avoiding or reducing such 
indirect losses can also be reckoned as another benefit of power sector reforms for the 
households. 
Santhakumar V. et. al. (2003) have concluded that factors that facilitate/discourage 
power sector reforms, are very important also in the context of assessing Indian economic 
reforms. The public utilities in power sector are the single largest contributor of fiscal deficits 
in the country and the efforts to change the situation have not been very successfial so far. 
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Reducing fiscal deficits and reforming power sector are major items of the unfinislied agenda 
of Indian economic reforms. Thus there is a need to analyze the reasons that make power sector 
reforms a politically intractable issue in the country. Their study attempts to analyze how social 
support for reforms depends on the variables that have a bearing on the costs and benefits for 
different households due to power sector reforms. 
ICRA in its report (2011) has mentioned that the risk profile of private IPPs have 
increased appreciably over the last few years. These include , vastly increased fuel supply 
risks, exposure to volatility in merchant tariffs, preference to Case-I bidding by distribution 
companies (discoms). Upward pressure on tariffs that would impact the viability of 
competitively bid projects, exposure to execution, regulatory and geo-political risks in case of 
coal assets acquired abroad, Financial position of state distribution companies (discoms) 
remains weak resulting in high counterparty credit risks and high leveraging levels for many of 
private IPPs to remain high due to phase wise investment. 
D & B (2010) in its report on India's Energy Sector has discussed the regulatory 
requirements of the sector. The regulatory system was not effective in the power sector in India 
before 1997. The SEBs performance was not satisfactory; they were suffering from huge 
financial and commercial losses; there was no regulatory body to regulate the functioning of 
SEBs and regulations were not addressing core issues like consumer interest, supply of 
reasonable power, and quality of power. The sector was facing an urgent need of regulatory 
bodies, which would regulate the sector efficiently. Therefore, in order to make competitive, 
transparent, and consumer-friendly environment, an independent Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (CERC) at the Centre and independent State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(SERC) at the state level were considered as the need of the hour for regulating the power 
sector. 
Dharmadhikari Sripad (2009) has critically discussed the reforms relating to 
hydropower projects and their implications focused on the privatization of water supply and 
irrigation, the creation of independent regulatory authorities in the water sector, measures like 
elimination of subsidies and tariffs based on foil cost recovery. One important aspect that is 
often missed in these discussions is the privatization of hydropower projects and the changes in 
the legal and policy regimes enabling it. This privatization of hydropower has implications that 
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are as serious as privatization and commercialization of water supply. In the case of the public 
sector hydropower companies, when cost of generation falls during the later years of the 
project, this benefit will go towards lowering the average cost of production of electricity and 
will be passed on to the consumers. However, in case of a private developer, this benefit will 
go towards increasing the profits of the shareholders. In other words, a common property 
natural resource (water and river) is being diverted for profits of private interests. 
In a compiled report of selected papers on power sector reforms (2000) Prayas group*" 
described the impact of reforms in the compendium that which states that the situation requires 
intense and urgent efforts on the part of the public-interest organizations to take up challenges 
tlirown up by the reform process in general and the regulatory processes in particular. 
McKinsey & Company in its report (2007), suggests that if India continues to grow at 
an average rate of 8 percent for the next 10 years, the country's demand for power is likely to 
soar from around to 315-335 GW by 2017. Four key factors will drive this demand: a) India's 
manufacturing sector growing faster than in past, b) residential consumption growing at 14 
percent over last ten years c) the connection of 125000 villages , the grid through several 
programs that aspires to provide power to all by 2012 and d) the realization of demand 
suppressed due to load shedding. 
In a report by Public Private Infrastructure advisory facility (2002) the power sector 
restructuring in Orissa has been critically examined , the features of which are summarized as 
below. 
i) Industry restructuring model: 
The sector structure adopted in Orissa (and chosen for implementation in other states) is based 
on the smgle-buyer model. Reform in Orissa continues to focus on noncompetitive solutions, to 
protect the cross-subsidies necessary (in the absence of government support) to ensure the 
viability of the industry. In the next stage of reform the state is expected to implement a multi-
buyer model, reallocating the contracts between the generators and the Grid Corporation of 
Orissa to the four distribution companies. 
'^  Prayas (Energy Group) based in Pune has been working in Electricity Sector on activities including Research , 
information dissemination .policy activism and regulatory interventions. 
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ii) Privatization strategy: 
Orissa privatized distribution through the sale of assets. Its experience shows the importance of 
undertaking financial restructuring at the beginning of reform, which may require using 
privatization revenues to pay down debt. Possible options for this financial restructuring 
include transfen-ing debt to the private sector, transferring debt to the public sector, and writing 
off debt. 
iii) Regulatory framework: 
Orissa's experience has shown that price setting can be undertaken by an independent 
regulator. It has also shown the importance in India of adopting a transparent regulatory 
process for price setting. But there are major concerns relating to the qualifications of the 
members of the electricity regulatory commission and the lack of an explicit obligation for the 
regulator to ensure fmancial viability of regulated companies. 
H.K Ahuja (2010) has emphasized the need of policy making process capable of 
balancing both local and global aims in light of the drawbacks faced by various states in 
India's niulti governance system. States have found several difficulties in implementing power 
sector reform policies designed at higher levels of governance. Such reforms can only be 
successful if democratic means are involved in implementing them. In this paper the author 
offers a 
democratic solution after justifying its applicability and reliability for initiating implementing 
and governing power sector reforms through advanced participative techniques like social 
multi-criteria evaluation. This can become a true and legitimate basis for carrying out 
governance reforms in the power sector. This initiative of Government of India towards power 
reforms would remain a wishful thinking unless the issues relating to these reforms, mainly 
concerned with the distribution sector are not conclusively settled. 
According to an analysis of the Union Budget 2012-13 undertaken by Grand Thornton 
it has been found that there are various problems and potentials associated with private sector 
participation in power generation. The expectations of the power sector relating to reforms and 
taxation have been emphasized in view of the terminal date of availing deduction for the 
undertaking generation and transmission and distribution of power such as, distribution of 
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power by laying network of transnoission and distribution lines, undertaking renovation or 
modernization of existing distribution lines etc. which expired on 31 March 2012. Considering 
the importance of this sector, there hps been lobbying for extension of the date for availing tax 
benefits. In view of the pressurized margins, the sector had been expecting some avenues to 
access low cost fiinds. The sector also expected speedy and swift approvals for power projects 
as well as favorable implementation policies. Facing the challenges of high capital investment 
and interest cost, the sector expected indirect tax benefits along with concessions and 
exemptions for plant and equipment required to set-up solar and wind power projects as well. 
The industry also expected relaxation in import duty to bring down the input cost involved in 
buying equipment, which are mainly available in the western countries. 
Sonal Patel (2012) has described that the patterns of coal trade have been shifting in 
recent years as demand surges in Asian countries. Whereas Japan and the European Union 
(EU) have long been the world's largest hard coal importers, China and India are now 
emerging as top importers. This surge has shifted the center of gravity in international coal 
trade to the Pacific Basin market, as estimates from the International Energy Agency (lEA) 
show. All projections are per the lEA's New Policies Scenario, which assumes cautious 
implementation of policy commitments and plans announced by countries around the world. 
As the momentum for sustainability is derived from people, the common thread across 
all the people-centric solutions is a strong understanding of the root cause of the troubles and 
challenges faced by people of the country. The power market in India is essentially a single-
buyer market and the SEBs are the single buyer. Private power producers are therefore required 
to sell power to SEBs, who lack financial resources to pay for it.Thus there has to be ways and 
means to ensure proper returns to the private sector players. In case the private sector players 
face uncertain prospects of getting paid for their supplies, they may held back from investing in 
the sector, despite substantial reforms and incentives. However it is also emphasized that the 
proposed solutions are not limited to the provision of making products and services to cater to 
the unmet needs of Indians from the viewpoint of consumers but to think of them as partners 
and allies in the fight for sustainability. 
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2.4 Availability of Resources for Capacity Addition 
Ravi Krishnan et. al., (2012) have stated that' India's long-term annual economic growth 
rate is projected at over 7%, and the country is investing in its hydroelectric, nuclear, and 
renewable resources. However, the primary fuel used to produce electricity remains coal, and 
the government has ambitious plans to significantly increase coal-fired capacity. Those plans 
have been challenged by a number of unexpected factors that threaten to stifle India's 
economic growth. Though the projected capacity additions are an impressive objective, in 
reality there have been and will continue to be shortfalls in capacity additions due to a variety 
of factors, including fuel constraints, regulatory and tariff issues, shortages of skilled 
manpower and construction equipment, infrastructure issues, and bureaucratic delays in 
obtaining clearances and permits. Contributing to the capacity addition shortfall is a shortage in 
domestic coal production, price volatility for higher-quality imported coals, and limited 
domestic sources of natural gas. Bureaucratic and government delays associated with obtaining 
permits and clearances for pre-bid activities such as land acquisitions, water allocation, 
environmental clearances, and commercially viable power purchase agreements also contribute 
to power generation capacity commissioning delays and shortfalls. 
Ghosh Sukanya, et al. (2001), have reviewed the future prospects of Indian thermal 
power sector in the perspective of the depleting coal reserves of India and the deteriorating 
quality of the coal. As an alternative to the critical demand for power, country plarmers have 
concentrated more on commissioning of thermal power plants. Coal happens to be the basic 
fuel of any thermal power plant and India had a plentiful supply of this basic raw material until 
recently. Unfortunately, the stock of coal in India is not unlimited. The share of coal in 
electricity generation declined from 98% in 1950-51 to 62.3% in 2009-10. Even then, it 
accounts for more than one-half of the electricity generation of the country. Coal mining in 
India commenced in the 18th century when much of the stock was exported to the UK due to 
limited requirement for thermal power in industries and in the domestic household sector. The 
coal industry was in the hands of private entrepreneurs. In 1923, the India Government 
developed a regulatory framework and in 1972-73 nationalized the coal industry. 
India is the third largest coal producing country. Unfortunately, Indian coal is of poor 
quality with high ash content and low caloric value (i.e. gross heat of combustion). High ash 
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content of Indian coal (which aggravates the difficulty of removing ash before combustion) and 
inefficient combustion technology contribute to emission of suspendable air particles and other 
trace gases which are responsible for the greenhouse effect. Thus, the vicinity of thermal power 
house in India are highly polluted causing health hazards and damage to agriculture. In 
consideration of depleting stocks of quality coal, India has started importing coal from 
countries like Indonesia, Australia and South Africa. However, cost of imported coal is high. 
Moreover, the ability to continue importing coal from these countries is uncertain, as there is 
likely to be worldwide shortage of coal in the near ftiture. 
CRISIL (2010) in its customized research bulletin has made an overview with sector 
focus on Power wherein it has described the scenario that India has been a high power deficit 
country with the deficit rising continuously over the last few years. This rise has been due to 
limited capacity addition while demand continues to grow in line with economic growth. 
However, this scenario is likely to change in fiiture with huge capacities expected to be 
commissioned especially by private sector. As it is expected that about 82 GW capacity shall 
be added over the period of 2010-11 to 2014-15 as compared to 33 GW of last five year. Most 
of these capacities will use coal as fliel. An investment of Rs 8.5 trillion is expected over the 
next five years. Additionally a new trend is emerging in the sector where a number of players 
(public and private) are focusing on backward integration to secure fuel supply. 
KPMG (2010) has presented a report on Power Sector in India, which identifies few 
other problems of the private sector participation. While the power sector in India has 
witnessed a few success stories in the last few years, the road that lies ahead is dotted with 
innumerable challenges that result from the gaps that exist between what's planned versus what 
the power sector has been able to deliver. While there may be heavy dependencies on 
equipment suppliers and challenges around logistics and work-front availability - with the 
right and timely application of project management principles along the lifecycle of the project, 
one can strive to achieve increased project completion against baselines. Certain best practices 
around stakeholder management, integrated project and asset development and 
interdependency mapping across various entities can help improve overall project planning. 
Once the practical implementation challenges are recognized, various teams and people get 
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aligned to the overall strategy and then the delivery on the estimated plans becomes more of a 
reality. 
In view of the total availability of natural gas in the country which is not very 
encouraging, the pubUc and private sector entities have embarked upon imported coal as a 
means to bridge the deficit. Coal is the mainstay of the power production in India and is 
expected to remain so in the fiature. Additional power generation is likely to require 
incremental amount of coal transportation by Indian Railways within the country and 
increasing unloading at ports in India for imported coal. In both cases, India currently faces 
capacity shortage. Hence, a project developer has to account for and manage its logistics chain 
in a manner that minimizes disruption to its fliel supply. 
ICRA in its report (2011) has indicated that with a strategy of providing long-term fiiel 
security and control over coal costs, many Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have been 
looking at acquisition of overseas coal assets. Some of the leading private sector IPPs has 
acquired substantial coal assets predominantly in three countries namely, Indonesia, Australia 
and South Africa. The preference towards these countries has been on account of adequacy of 
deposits in these countries with surplus coal availability for exports, logistical advantages of 
proximity to India and availability of low ash coal (that is below 10%) with high calorific 
value' 
Sonal Patel (2012) has written that the country plans to fuel its current level of gross 
domestic product growth of between 8% and 9% with massive power capacity additions 
(mostly coal -fired) over the next decade. It has commissioned an 800-MW supercritical unit 
in March 2012 at the first of India's government-envisioned ultra-mega power plants (UMPP). 
Tata Power, the countiy's largest integrated private utility, put online Unit 1 of the five-unit 
4,000-MW Mundra UMPP in Gujarat State, just 48 months after construction began on the 
project. Only four projects have been awarded so far on a build, own, and operate basis. In 
addition to Tata's Mundra m Gujarat, tkee are being developed by Reliance Power: the Sasan 
UMPP in Madhya Pradesh, Krishnapatnam UMPP in Andhra Pradesh, and Tilaiya UMPP in 
Jharkhand. 
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The first 660-MW unit at Sasan is expected to come online in January 2013, just as the 
last Mundra units will be commissioned. At Krishnapatnam, however, where Reliance had 
planned to build six 660-MW units, work has been paused smce last June. The Tilaiya project, 
which would also comprise six 660-MW units and is expected to come online between May 
2015 and June 2017, is being built at a coal pithead (mine mouth) and has dedicated captive 
coal blocks—unlike the other three projects, which will rely on imported coal. 
Sonal Patel (2012) has further written that Future UMPP projects may be sited in this 
way, or closer to ports, as India battles chronic coal shortages. Though the country has large 
coal reserves, domestic mining companies are stmggling to keep up with demand needed to 
sustain its existing coal plants, which account for 55% of India's generation. 
Availability of the resources are the most vital and crucial issue when it comes to the 
execution of such mega size projects. It is understood that the shortfalls in capacity additions 
due to a variety of factors, including fuel constraints, regulatory and tariff issues, shortages of 
skilled manpower and construction equipment, infrastructure issue and bureaucratic delays in 
obtaining clearances can impose problems in translating these reforms to reality. Proper 
planning needs to be there for timely and properly addressing such issues so as to avoid any 
uncertainty in the project and to control the time and cost overrun. Backward integration for 
fliel supply is one of the key measures for sustainability and cost competitiveness. Fuel security 
and backup arrangement should be in place especially for those projects where the promoters 
have tried to have fuel security by acquiring overseas assets. With the advent of new 
technology there remains always a dearth of skilled manpower which needs to be properly 
engaged for efficiently handling the project under the given timeline. With the increasing 
market size of power generating and allied equipment there seems to be a limitation in timely 
supply of such big size equipments which are now days being procured mostly through 
international competitive bidding (ICB). 
2.5 Privatization In Various Developed and Developing Countries 
Yin-Fang Zhang, David Parker and Colin Kirkpatrick (2008) liave reviewed the electricity 
sector reforms in developing countries. They have found that electricity sector reforms have 
altered significantly the sector's market structure and institutional framework. Over the last 
few decades' electricity sector in both developed and developing countries have been subject to 
restructuring to iiitroduce private capital and increase competition. Although the effects of such 
reforms in a number of the developed economies are now well documented, apart from a few 
case studies the experience of developing countries is less researched. 
Anoop Singh et al. (2005) in a review, of private investment in power sector in 
developing countries have emphasized that apart from macroeconomic stability, the pace and 
sequencing of reforms has a strong influence on private investment in the power sector. 
Distribution reforms and setting up of an independent regulatory institution reduces risk for 
investors. A peace-meal approach to reform keeps uncertainties alive for investors and does not 
translate in significant investment in the sector. 
Cropper Maureen L. etal. (2012) estimated the impact of restructuring on electricity 
generation efficiency in the Indian Thermal Power Sector. They have examined the impact of 
the unbundling of power generation from transmission and distribution on the operating 
efficiency of state-owned thermal power plants in India. Using information collected by India's 
Central Electricity Authority, they constructed a panel data set for thermal power plants for the 
years 1988-2009. They took the advantage of variation across states in the timing of reforms to 
examine the impact of restructuring on plant performance and thermal efficiency. The models 
suggest that unbundling significantly improved average annual plant availability by about 7.5 
percentage points and reduced forced outages by about 4.5 percentage points in states that 
unbundled before 2003. Restructuring has not, however, improved thermal efficiency. This 
may reflect the fact that unbundling has not yet attracted independent power producers into the 
market in India to the extent that it has in the United States. 
Philip Gray (2001), has reviewed the evidence on the extent to which private 
participation in developing countries have been achieved. First and foremost, private investors 
will only invest in infrastructure enterprises if the government gives a credible commitment to 
cost covering tariffs. Commitments of these kinds are far more durable than the same 
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undertakings given to managers of public enterprises, who have Hmited leverage to negotiate 
commitments and no effective sanction if governments succumb to populist pressures to 
renege. With appropriate regulatory or contractual commitments, private investors have 
incentives to expand services and the ability to finance the investments that expansion requires. 
Second, private investors face stronger incentives to ensure effective billing and collection, to 
control costs, and to stem technical losses, which contributes to greater resources for network 
expansion. Finally, unlike their public sector counterparts, private operators have stronger 
incentives to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, as failure to do so 
is more likely to result in fmes or other penalties. 
A report on unbundling of utilities like electricity submitted by European Commission 
(2010) has detailed the method of unbundling with clarity on issues related to legal unbundling, 
functional unbundling and accounting unbundling. Within functional the report detailed the 
way-out based on management separation, effective decision-making rights, compliance 
programme and few additional measures to ensure effective functional unbundling. 
Das Rasmi Ranjan (2010) writes that since inception, the electricity industry in the 
USA was treated as a natural monopoly and accordingly was subject to regulation primarily by 
individual states. The sector was characterized by vertically integrated private investor owned 
utilities (lOUs) owning the entire generation, transmission and distribution assets in the area of 
their operation. The federal involvement was limited to oversight of interstate transmission and 
wholesale trading tlirough the Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
Bacon R. W. et.al. (2002) have revealed that the sequencing of reforms is crucial to the 
long-term sustainability of electric power industry in developing countries. They recommended 
that first; the legal and regulatory framework should be in place before privatization of the 
restructured power supplier. Second, major restructuring should precede the creation of private 
ownership rights to avoid problems with stranded assets. Third, the scope for introducmg 
competition to the wholesale power market should be incorporated into the initial structural 
reforms to the power market, rather than relying only on later regulatory interventions to 
reduce the market power of the largest power generating companies. Fourth, the incumbent 
utility should not sign many long-term power off-take agreements with IPPs before it is 
restractured and the regulatoiy framework for a liberalized power market is in place. Fifth, 
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where cash collections fall far short of the revenues that should be collected by the incumbent 
power utility from power consumers—regrettably, a situation that exists in many developing 
countries—^the priority for the privatization strategy should be to iniprove this performance by 
privatizing the distribution and supply functions first. This would help attract potential bidders 
for the upstream generation facilities by signaling that the distributors and suppliers would 
become creditworthy buyers of power from the generators. 
The timing of reform is also critical, particularly relative to the electoral cycle, for the 
privatization of electricity generators and distributors, and for an unpopular increase in 
electricity tariffs needed to remove major subsidies. The success of a privatization program 
often depends on divesting most of the state's ownership before the government faces the next 
election, and this can force a compromise with long-term efficiency objectives for the sector. 
Paton Celine (2012) has emphasized greater private sector participation and renewable 
energy development to back Moroccan Electricity Industry growth. Due to its advantageous 
geographic location and relatively low labor costs, Morocco has built close ties with Europe, 
its main trading partner. Since 1993, a privatization policy has been implemented in certain 
sectors, including electricity. Morocco began to privatize state-owned firms before most other 
Arab and African states. In critical sectors, such as electricity, the government's strategy has 
been to enforce public-private partnerships. Economic policies pursued, since 2003, have 
brought macroeconomic stability with generally low inflation, improved financial performance, 
and steady progress in developing the service and industrial sectors. 
Harris Clive (2003) has reviewed private Participation in Infrastructure in developing 
countries, about the trends. Impacts and policy lessons. Many of the problems as seen relate to 
difficulties in sustaining cost-covering user fees for these sectors, which have a tradition of 
pricing below costs. They have also highlighted the challenges involved in the regulation of 
these sectors. Critics of the private provision of infrastructure argue that it has made services 
less affordable and adversely affected access by the poor to modem infrastructure services. The 
decline in public opinions of private provision is matched by the reduced enthusiasm of many 
investors in developing country infrastructure, driven in part by some disappointing 
experiences. 
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Victor David G. and Thomas C. Heller (2006) evaluates the experiences of five 
countries- Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa - as they have shifted from state-
dominated systems to schemes allowing for a larger private sector role. Having the largest 
power systems in their regions and among the most rapidly rising consumption of electricity in 
the world, these countries are the locus of massive financial investment and the effects of their 
power systems are increasingly felt in world fijel markets 
Kintanar Noel Eli B., et.al. (2003) have described how the Government of the 
Philippines continues to pursue its policy of encouraging the private sector to participate in the 
financing, construction, management and operation of infrastructure services and facilities in 
the country. Thi-ough the BOT Law, the Government has put together a portfolio of 
approximately US$ 25 billion in infrastructure projects involving private sector investments. A 
number of these are big- ticket transport projects which could not be ftinded solely from 
government coffers in view of the magnitude of the capital investments required. To ensure the 
steady promotion of infrastructure projects that are ready for private sector investments, the 
Government established the Build-Operate- Transfer Center (BOT Center), whose mandate is 
to find technical, legal, financial, economic and institutional solutions to help government 
implementing agencies to make BOT projects work. 
Izaguirre Ada Kannza (1997) writes that, over the past decade a growing number of 
developing countries have opened their electricity industries to the private sector. The new 
wave of policy reforms designed to promote private participation has been driven by three 
main forces: the need to expand the capacity or increase the reliability of systems, or both; 
public sector budget constraints; and the positive results of the early experiments with private 
sector participation in Chile and the United Kingdom. Between 1990 and 1997 sixty-two 
developing countries introduced private participation in the electricity sector to varying 
degrees-ranging from management contracts for the state-owned utility in Mali to the 
privatization of most sector operations in Argentina, Bolivia, and Hungary. 
The Frost & Sullivan research service titled Private Power Generation Opportunities in 
South Africa provides a comprehensive overview of the dynamics driving market growth, the 
industry challenges and the current and anticipated projects. In this study, Frost & Sullivan's 
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expert analysts have thoroughly examined the various application areas such as Wind, Solar, 
Small Hydro, Coal, Gas, Diesel and Oil. 
GBI Research, a leading business intelligence provider, has released its latest research, 
Power Market in SAARC Countries to 2020 - FDI Driven by Private Sector Participation is 
key to flature growth. The report gives an in-depth analysis of power markets in seven SAARC 
countries namely India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, with 
forecasts through to 2020. 
hidian reform legislation has been more on improving fmancial viability of power 
sector than on improving access to electricity. These attempts are not addressing core issues 
like consumer interest, reliability, supply of reasonable power and quality of power. Therefore 
the situation requires intense and urgent efforts on the part of the public-interest organizations 
to take up challenges thrown up by the reform process in general and the regulatory processes 
in particular. 
Uncertain prospects of getting paid for their supplies, private investors held back from 
investing in the sector, despite substantial reforms and incentives. In view of inadequate cost 
recovery and the reforms turned out to be unsustainable, the limiting factors one of which is 
essentially a single-buyer market. It may further be seen that momentum for sustainability is 
derived from people. The solutions proposed are not limited to the provision of products and 
services to cater the unmet needs of Indians from the viewpoint of consumers but to think of 
them as partners and allies in the fight for sustainability. In this perspective of its socio-
economic realities, government's role becomes important. 
In study of developing countries it has been witnessed that apart from macroeconomic 
stability, the pace and sequencing of reforms has a strong influence on private investment in 
the power sector. It is observed that the study of variation across states in the timing of reforms 
to examine the impact of restructuring on plant performance and thermal efficiency reveals that 
unbundling significantly improved average annual plant availability. It is also concluded that 
Private investors have incentives to expand services and the ability to finance the investments 
that expansion requires if provided with appropriate regulatory or contractual commitments. In 
view of the above it has also been advocated that unbundling of utilities like electricity with 
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clarity on issues related to legal unbundling, functional unbundling and accounting unbundling 
can make it more effective and efficient. 
Research Gap: 
On completion of the literature review, it is observed that sector wise classification 
such as private sector's contribution to power generation in Uttar Pradesh is not very well 
addressed in view of its potential for significant contribution in changing scenario of power 
generation and open access to private sector participation. With the given background of 
lowest per capita power consumption, population increase, infrastructure growth and 
industrialization, it appears that these factors may influence the growth of power sector in Uttar 
Pradesh provided the sectoral reforms are proper and adequate for facilitating fliel supply, 
realization of revenue and reduction in various losses. Besides these, conducive government 
policy, workforce & political stability and encouragement of market driven mechanism, are 
few other important influencing factors which pave the growth of private sector participation. 
Therefore the gap identified for the study is mainly focused on identifying the factors affecting 
sustainability of private sector participation in power generation. It has also been attempted to 
determine the problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in Power 
generation in Uttar Pradesh. Since these factors are greatly influenced by the policies of the 
Government, therefore it has been an earnest need to assess the role and impact of Government 
policies relating to private sector participation in Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
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Chapter-3 
Research Methodology 
The proposed Research Methodology aims to solve the research problem with extensive 
use of primary data. However, secondary data is collected to assess the market potential where 
the probable demand pattern is likely to grow and the factors affecting the same may it be 
techno commercial, consumer behavior, regulatory or environmental. The related primary data 
may be backed up by secondary data from reliable sources and published data from 
government agencies. 
3.1 Statement of the problem: 
Based on the outcome of the literature review it has been noted that there are factors which 
influence sustainability and there are problems and challenges being faced in the above 
perspective. The role of the government thus becomes facilitator and not the service provider 
and therefore the role of government relates more to policy making and ensuring 
implementation of the same in open market mechanism. 
The study has been conducted with the background of following problems & prospects of 
private sector participation in the state of Uttar Pradesh with the domestic consumers in focus. 
1 What are the factors influencing the sustainability of private sector participation in 
power generation in the geographical region of Uttar Pradesh. 
2 What are the problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
Power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
3 Wliat is the role and impact of Govenmient policies relating to private sector 
participation in Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
4 What are the measures by which private sector participation in power generation in 
Uttar Pradesh could be increased. 
5 What is the probable impact of private sector power generation on consumers in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
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3.2 Research Objectives: 
In the common parlance Research refers to a search for knowledge and is a process of 
exhaustive investigation. Also it is an investigation or experimentation aimed at the discovery 
and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted theories or laws in the light of new facts, or 
practical application of such new or revised theories or laws. 
The objective behind the entire endeavor is to understand the business potential of power 
sector with special reference to the possibility of private sector participation in power 
generation ,its economic viability in terms of market driven mechanism for tariff structure and 
the effect of energy and power sector reform on tliis and the related ancillary industries. 
The proposed study is aimed to fmd out, how the sustainable market can be established by 
the participation of private sector players in the field of power generation and distribution and 
the long term viability for the same. The objective is to analyze the pace of growth of power 
market in Uttar Pradesh within the limitations of Techno-Commercial aspects in the context of 
the factors of the neighboring states and within the framework of Indian power sector related 
policies. 
Thus the objectives of the study lie within the frame of the following points. 
1) To identify the factors affecting the sustainability of private sector participation in 
power generation in the geographical region of Uttar Pradesh. 
2) To detennine the problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
Power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
3) To assess the role and impact of Government policies relating to private sector 
participation in Power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
4) To devise measures by which private sector participation in power generation in Uttar 
Pradesh could be increased. 
5) To determine the probable impact of private sector power generation on consumers in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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3.3 Scope of Study: 
The scope of study include the factors affecting sustainabihty in terms of implementation of 
Government policy , capital investment cost , fiiel cost ,operation & maintenance cost and 
modernization of transmission and distribution network. In view of the state government being 
the single buyer there had been problems relating to revenue collection and proper recoveries. 
The fiature prospects of increasing demand due to population growth and economic 
development are of vital importance. Adoption of alternate source of power generation which 
includes wind and solar power etc. have also been touched upon to seek view of private power 
generation companies in the perspective of rising demand for power in both the aspects 
quantity and quality. 
After the setup of a power generation project the fuel supply remains a critical issue for 
sustainabihty for which backward integration of fliel supply may be done for fiiel security and 
gas based power projects can be set up for sustainabihty cost benefit solution. 
Other problems and challenges have also been considered for the opinion of power 
generation companies such as land acquisition problem, risk of timely payment, inadequate 
cost recovery, and impact of load shedding and geographical risk of fuel security wherein coal 
assets are acquired abroad by the power generating company. 
The various aspects related to policies of the government of Uttar Pradesh and issues of 
administration and beaurocratic functioning, simplification of procedure and license raj have 
also been discussed. 
As it is expected that private sector industrial consumers prefer to install a captive 
power plant in case the option of subsidized power provided by the state government is 
eliminated the above study is limited to domestic consumers. 
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3.4 Testing of Survey questionnaire & Hypothesis testing 
The survey questionnaire was administered in two categories, one addressed to the private 
power generation companies and other addressed to the end consumers. While the first 
questionnaire was meant to assess the impact of various factors affecting sustainability , 
problems and challenges that confront private sector participation , impact of government 
policies and measures by which private sector participation could be increased , the second 
questionnaire was meant for the response of end consumers for which hypothesis testing 
shall be done. 
3.4.1 Testing of statements on the survey administered to power generation 
companies 
1) Related to sustainability of private sector participation in power generation in 
Uttar Pradesh 
1 a) Implementation of Govt, policy would significantly impact the 
sustainability of private sector power generation. 
1 b) Investment cost would have significant impact on the sustainability of 
private sector participation in power generation. 
1 c) Fuel cost would have significant impact on the sustainability of private 
sector power generation. 
1 d) Operation & Maintenance cost would have significant impact on the 
sustainability of private sector power generation. 
1 e) Modernization of transmission & distribution would have a significant 
impact on the sustainability of private sector power generation. 
1 f) Govt, being single buyer is impacting conversely on the sustainability of 
private sector power generation. 
1 g) An increasing trend of population growth in U.P. would significantly 
impact consumption of Electricity (power). 
1 h) A rising trend of economic growth in U.P. would significantly impact 
consumption of Electricity (power). 
1 i) Private companies have a significant cost benefit if they undertake gas 
based power projects. 
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2) Related to problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
2 a) Risk of timely payment by distribution companies in U.P. would 
significantly impact privatization. 
2 b) Lack of knowledge and experience by private entrepreneurs would 
significantly hinder the privatization process. 
2 c) Land acquisition problems would significantly hinder the privatization 
process. 
2 d) Fuel supply problems would significantly hinder the privatization process. 
2 e) Inadequate infrastructure is one of the reasons that would significantly 
hinder the privatization process. 
2 f) Inefficient transmission and distribution capacity would significantly 
hinder the privatization process. 
2 g) Inadequate cost recovery would significantly hinder the privatization 
process. 
2 h) Bias of state regulators for public sector corporations or against private 
sector companies would significantly hinder the privatization process. 
2 i) Non payment of power generation bill would significantly hinder the 
privatization process. 
2j) Load shedding would significantly impact the potential of growth of 
private sector power companies. 
2 k) Geopolitical risk in case of coal asset acquired abroad would have 
significant impact on privatization process. 
2 1) Intervention by NGO s would have significant impact on privatization 
process. 
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3) Related to role and impact of Government policies relating to private sector 
participation in power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
3 a) Financial promotional and fiscal incentives can support the growth of private 
sector participation in power generation in U.P. 
3 b) Improvement in administrative and beaurocratic functioning of the growth could 
significantly increase the pace of privatization in U.P. 
3 c) Simplification of procedure would have a significant impact on the private 
sector participation in power supply and generation in U.P. 
3 d) Reduction in administrative delays would have a significant impact on boosting 
private sector participation in U.P. 
3 e) End of License Raj regime would have a significant impact on boosting private 
sector participation in U.P. 
3 f) Improvement in overall policies of the Government would have a significant 
impact on privatization in power generation in UP. 
4) Related to measures by which private sector participation in power generation can 
be improved in Uttar Pradesh 
4 a) Backward integration of fuel supply by private companies would have 
significant impact on security. 
4 b) Private companies have significant prospects relating to producing electricity 
through renewable energy sources in U.P. 
3.4 .2 Hypothesis Testing: 
Based on the objectives and the problem statements relating to end consumers of Uttar 
Pradesh, following are the hypothesis made which are required to be tested with the help of 
primary data based on the survey questionnaire meant for end consumers of power on the 
basis of various demographic parameters such as area/district, age occupation & income 
group. 
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HI: Hypothesis related to Impact of Market driven (non-subsidized) price 
mechanism to improve the availabiUty and reliabihty of power in U.P. 
Hypothesis HI a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Marlcet driven (non- subsidized) price mechanism can be an option 
to improve upon the availability and reliability of power in U.P. across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis Hlb: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Market driven (non- subsidized) price mechanism can be an option 
to improve upon the availability and reliability of power in U.P. across various age 
groups. 
Hypothesis Hlc: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Market driven (non- subsidized) price mechanism can be an option 
to improve upon the availability and reliability of power in U.P. across various 
occupation. 
Hypothesis Hid: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Market driven (non- subsidized) price mechanism can be an option 
to improve upon the availability and reliability of power in U.P. across various 
income groups. 
H2; Hypothesis related to immediate privatization of power generation and 
distribution to improve power generation & distribution in U.P. 
Hypothesis H2a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H2b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H2c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H2d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value across various income 
groups. 
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H3: Hypothesis related to environmental impacts on large size plants/capacity 
addition of power plants in U.P. 
Hypothesis H3a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that large size plants/flirther capacity addition of power plants will have 
enviromnental impacts across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H3b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H3c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that large size plants/fiirther capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H3d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various income groups. 
H4: Hypothesis related to high capital investment and Ukely of increased tariff in 
open market of power generation in U.P, 
Hypothesis H4a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non-subsidized pricing) system across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H4b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non-subsidized pricing) system across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H4c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non-subsidized pricing) system across various occupation groups. 
Hypothesis H4d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non-subsidized pricing) system across various income groups. 
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H5: Hypothesis related to privatization which may not have any effect on subsidies 
provided for household consumers in U.P. 
Hypothesis H5a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed 
consumption) to households even after privatization, across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H5b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed 
consumption) to households even after privatization, across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H5c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed 
consumption) to households even after privatization across various occupation. 
Hypothesis H5d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed 
consumption) to households even after privatization, across various income groups. 
H6: Hypothesis related to privatization which may result on pricing of power based 
on price band method for the amount of power consumed initially subsidized upto a 
certain level and subsequently on actual market price (non-subsidized) mechanism. 
Hypothesis H6a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual 
market price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option, across various 
areas/districts . 
Hypothesis H6b: : There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual 
market price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option , across various age 
groups . 
Hypothesis H6c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual 
market price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option, across various 
occupations. 
Hypothesis H6d; There is no significant difference m the mean value in the 
expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
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power consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual 
market price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option, across various income 
groups. 
H7: Hypothesis related to private companies in power generation that may have 
stronger incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations. 
Hypothesis H7a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations , across 
various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H7b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, across 
various age groups. 
Hypothesis H7c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, across 
various occupations. 
Hypothesis H7d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, across 
various income groups. 
H8: Hypothesis related to the need of privatization of transmission / distribution to 
be done before privatization of power generation in Uttar Pradesh. 
Hypothesis H8a There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H8b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H8c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P across various occupations. 
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Hypothesis H8d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P. across various income group. 
H9: Hypothesis related to privatization which may have the impact of reducing 
power deficit through the addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies 
Hypothesis H9a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H9b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies, across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H9c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies, across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H9d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the 
expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies across various income groups. 
3.5. Type of Research 
The study is mainly descriptive and partially exploratory in nature, however extensive 
use of primary data along with the secondary data processing and opinion poll of customers is 
incorporated to assess the situation close to practicality. The emphasis is to analyze the present 
situation and the likelihood of the movement of the trend based on the data collected in view of 
the present Techno-Commercial viabilities under the given set of conditions and 
known/estabhshed facts. 
The use of both Primary and Secondary data has been done taking into account the 
secondary data as well, however in view of the limitations and disadvantaged of secondary data 
(as that have aheady been collected for purpose other than the problem at hand) primary data 
generation has done based on the outcome of secondary data available . Information is sourced 
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from books, newspapers, trade journals, industry portals, government agencies, trade 
associations, monitoring industry news and developments and through access to unpaid/paid 
databases (such as EBSCO) for secondary data collection. 
A Summary of research design used for this study is presented in the following 
exhibit. 
1 ' 
Exploratory 
Research Design 
Research Design 
•' 
' 
' 
Conclusive 
Research Design 
' 
Descriptive 
Research 
' 
'' 
Causal 
Research 
' 
1 ' 
Cross - Sectional 
Design 
1 
' 
Single Cross 
Sectional Design 
r 
'' 
'' 
' ' 
Longitudinal 
Design 
Multiple Cross 
Sectional Design 
Conclusive Research: Information needed is clearly defined and the research process is 
formal and structured. Sample is representative and data analysis is quantitative. 
Descriptive Research: It describes the relation between independent and dependent 
variable. It has a structured research design conducted normally through surveys. 
Cross Sectional Design: Involves the collection of information from any given simple of 
population elements only once 
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3.6. Population/Universe 
The primary data which is the survey output is exhaustively analyzed to understand 
the situation from various angles such as from and under the government policy, power 
deficit, tariff plans & changing market conditions across various age groups , income 
groups, occupation and areas. 
The population universe is the Power market comprising of six of major cities under 
discussion. The criteria for selection of samples is based on the secondary source report 
of CRISIL (Research Outlook 2007-08 to 2011-12: Sector: Power) regarding top 20 
major potential cities/districts of Uttar Pradesh. Tkee each of two groups namely 
Muzzafamagar, Kanpur , Agra & Allahabad , Varanasi ,Goraklipur have been considered 
for the survey administered personally during Oct 2012 to Nov 2012 taking 60 samples 
from each city/district totaling 360 samples. 
In another survey targeted to get response from the prospective private sector power 
generation companies of India willing to set up new power projects the sample size was 
about 25 power generation companies (67 respondents). 
3.7. Sampling procedure 
The primary data which is the survey output samples is exhaustively analyzed to 
understand the situation from various angles such as from factors affecting the market and 
under the controlled market conditions. An average of 60 number of samples from six 
cities /districts/area of Uttar Pradesh totaling to 360 samples. 
The survey was done tlirough a detailed questionnaire to 'End consumers of power' 
(Electricity) who were contacted at the office of the electricity bill collection center. 
Among the persons available there every fifth person was requested to fill the 
questionnaire. In case of unwillingness of any such the next person available was 
contacted. 
Another questionnaire was made for responses from the 'Private sector power 
generating companies' of India who can be prospective companies for setting up of new 
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plants in Uttar Pradesh was administered electronically. Snow ball technique was used for 
getting the details of various key personnel of private power generation companies which 
aggregated to 67 respondents from about 25 companies. Follow up was done 
telephonically for the sent questionnaire over email to power generating companies. 
Few of the people who were not available through electronic survey were sent the 
questioimaire directly in word file attachment and view were incorporated. For validation 
of the hypothesis a structured technique of data collection in the form of questionnaire is 
used for different purposes. The questionnaire is designed accordingly so as to specify the 
information needed. 
Based on the survey method classified by mode of administration the questionnaire is 
designed / based on the Mall intercept personal interview method the feedback of which is 
collected to make samples of the same. 
In the sampling process potential sources of error can be Random sampling error & 
response errors (in non-sampling error) as there is no inclusion of non-response error. 
3.8. Questionnaire Development and Administration 
Development of research instrument involved identification of constructs, method of 
survey to be employed, questionnaire design, pretesting of questionnaire and administration 
of final questionnaire. The broad methodology adopted in developing the survey instrument 
used in the study is illustrated as following exhibit. The same is followed by a discussion 
on the steps involved in the design. 
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Develop Questionnaire 
> Measurement Scales 
> Question content & Wording 
> Response Format 
> Sequence of questions. 
> Physical Layout 
Pilot Test (32 end consumers) 
Finalization of Questionnaire 
Questionnaire Distribution and Administration 
> Population 
> Sampling Frame 
> Sampling Method 
> Sample Size 
> Final Sample 
Assessment, Refinement and Validation of 
Measurement Scales 
Fig 3.1 Questionnaire Development 
Source : Adapted from Naresh K Malhotra (2007) 
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3.9. Selection of Survey Method 
The decision to choose a survey method may be based on number of factors which 
include sampling, type of population, question form, question content, response rate, 
and duration of data collection (Aakar, Kumar & Day, 2002). In view of the nature of 
the study it was decided to personally administer the structured research instrument 
developed for the study. The language used in the questionnaire was mainly Hindi as 
the target population of Uttar Pradesh is well versed in Hindi. Otherwise too, Hindi is 
widely spoken and understood in Uttar Pradesh. The main benefits of the method 
adopted are listed below. 
a. The questions can be answered by ticking the proper response ibmiat and with 
an interviewer present respondents could seek clarity on any questions (Aaker et 
al., 2002 Boyd, Westfall & Stasch, 2003) 
b. The respondents are more motivated to respond as they are not obliged to admit 
their confusion or ignorance to the interviewer (hays, 1998; Boyd et al, 2003) 
c. A higher response rate can be assured since the questionnaire are collected 
immediately once they are completed (Malhotra, 2007) 
d. This method offered highest degree of control over sample selection (Malhotra, 
2007) 
However, it was time consuming as wide geographic region was to be covered 
comprising six districts of Uttar Pradesh. 
Since the domain was covering six major cities of Uttar Pradesh which were 
selected on the basis of being high potential area of eastern and western circles of 
Uttar Pradesh, 3 each cities of the two circles were chosen (CRISIL rejTOrt basis). 
In other survey questionnaire meant for power generation companies the views 
were taken electronically submitted to 67 respondents (about three top management 
level executives of about 25 companies) and follow up was done telephonically. The 
details of these executives were taken through snow ball techniques so as to collect the 
respondents from the top private power generation companies. 
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As only one respondent was taken to be adequate from one power Generation 
Company, the 16 responses received from different companies were considered for 
analysis taking the mean values. 
3.9.1 Measurement Scales 
As this study aims to measure consumer perception towards the electric power supply 
quality, Likert scale was supposed to be the best suited on a five point scale. 
Two type of questions were posed to end consumer 1) one Likert scale 2) along 
with few multiple choice (with open ended options) to assess the market potential. 
Similar questionnaire was made for survey of power generating companies. 
These scales were then assumed to be interval scales, (Likert) as is commonly 
practiced in social science research (Perry, 1998; Hayes 1998) frirther interval scales 
were used to measure the subjective characteristics of respondents. For example, in this 
study, respondents were asked about their expectations and perception in relation 
private sector participation in power generation. This scale was used due to its strength 
in arranging the objects in specified order as well as being able to measure the distance 
between the differences in response rating (Malhotra 2007). 
3.9.2 Question content and wording 
The questions were designed to be short, simple and comprehensible. Care was taken to 
avoid ambiguous, vague, estimation based, generalization type, and leading, double 
barreled and presumptuous questions (Boyd et al. 2003) 
3.9.3 Response format 
Two types of response format were chosen: labeled & open ended multiple chance 
answer, so as to obtain respondents, perception towards private sector power generation 
companies. Apart from the simplicity in administration, it was easy to code for 
statistical analysis (Bums & Bush, 2002; Luck & Rubin, 1999). Labeled scale response 
format is appropriate in marketing research as it allows the respondents to respond to 
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attitudinal questions in varying degrees tliat describes the dimension being studied 
(Aaker et. al., 2002 Boyd et al. 2003). The other advantages of this scale are listed 
below. 
a It yields higher reliability coefficients with fewer items that the scales 
developed using other methods (Hayes 1998) 
b The scale is widely used in market research and has been extensively tested 
in both marketing and social science (Garland, 1991) 
c It offers a high likelihood of responses that accurately reflect respondent 
opinion uder study (Burns et al. 2002, Wong, 1999, Zikmund, 2000) 
d It helps to increase the spread of variance of responses which in turn provide 
stronger measures of association (Aaker et al. 2002, Wong, 1999) 
e In relation to the number of scale points, there is no clear rule indication and 
ideal number. However, many research acknowledge that opinions can be 
captured best with five to seven point scale (aaker et al., 2002 Malhotra, 
2007) Keeping the same in mind, five point Likert scale was used in this 
research. 
3.9.4 Sequence of Questions 
The questionnaire was short having eleven question to the end consumers & thirty four 
questions to the private power generation companies. The questions were framed based 
on the outcome of the literature review and making comprehensive question based on 
that. 
3.9.5 Pilot Study 
The preliminary questionnaire was pre tested. The aim was to ensure that the questions 
were eliciting the required responses, identify ambiguous wording or eiTors before the 
survey was carried out on a large scale (Zikmund, 2000, Bums et al. 2002, Malhotra, 
2007). It should be noted that prior to pre testing, three management professors and two 
peer scholars were asked to review the questions and give their opinions in the quest for 
content validity. Some overlapping questions were detected and hence were dropped 
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from the list. After the review process, the questionnaire was ready to be pre tested in 
and exploratory survey. 
The survey of end consumer started off in October 2012 with the selection of group of 
respondents based on convenience sample which is common for pilot tests (Zikmund, 
2002, Boyd et al. 2003) in all 32 questionnaires were distributed to consumers to power 
to check for clarity of the measurement items. Consumers were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and also give open ended answers of their in few questions. A total 30 
usable responses were obtained and based on the feedbacks of pilot study the 
questionnaire was slightly revised and reliability was established. The pilot scale study 
has shown a Chronbach alpha value of 0.82576739 which is quite an acceptable value. 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases Valid 
Excluded' 
Total 
N 
30 
0 
30 
% 
100.0 
.0 
100.0 
a, Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
0.82576739 
N of Items 
11 
Content validity of the scales used in the current research is established by their 
origins from the extant literature. The new items that are used for the first time have 
been developed through a careflil review of the extant literature on the practical 
manifestations of the respective construct. Extensive discussions were held among 
Management Professors & peer Research Scholars who reviewed the questionnaire and 
confirmed that it (with minor change in words of few items) had face validity. After 
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evaluation of the questions, it was judged that all of these were appropriate for 
measuring consumer's attitude about service quality of power supply in Uttar Pradesh. 
3.10 Administration of Final Questionnaire 
The sampling process included several steps: defmition of the population, establishment 
of the sampling frame, specification of the sampling method, determination of the 
sample size and selection of the sample (Malhotra 2007) 
Step 1: Population. The target population for this study was defmed as individuals of 
the select cities who are the end consumer of electricity (power) in the given city. A 
separate survey was conducted to private power generation companies with respondents 
from the top executives of private power generation companies. 
Step 2: Sampling frame. The sample frame comprised of people of domestic 
household (about 360 from six districts) who are end consumer of power and are 
willing to participate in the survey. For power generation companies the views were 
taken electronically submitted to 67 respondents (about three top management level 
executives of about 25 companies) 
Step 3: Sampling method. The sampling method used was convenience sampling and 
the requii-ed data was obtained using intercept technique of having personal interview 
of the random identified consumers (who were willing to participate) to fill & complete 
the survey questionnaire. 
Step 4: Sample Size. Next step involved determining the sample size of this study. The 
required sample size depends on factor such as the proposed data analysis techniques, 
fmancial support and access to sampling frame (Malhotra, 2007) the data analysis are 
very sensitive to sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell ,2001, Garson 2007) As a general 
rule of thumb. Data from at least 300 cases is deemed comfortable, 500 considered as 
very good and 1000 as excellent (Comrey & Lee, 1992 Tabachnick et al, 2001, Garson 
2007) since this survey was required to be done by personally the end were contacted 
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at the office of electricity bill collection by taking alternate persons and a sample size 
of 60 each totaUng 360 was targeted for the questionnaire meant for end consumers. 
In a separate questionnaire a target of 25 private sector power generation companies 
were made for views of the private sector power companies to get their view 
electronically by submitted it to 67 respondents of about 25 companies. 
Step 5: Final sample. In all 377 consumers were randomly approached during the 
months of Oct 2012 - Nov. 2012, who were willing to participate in the study. 
Convenience sampling approach was used to collect the data from end consumers who 
were approached individually during the said periods at local electricity billing stations. 
Out of the 377 questionnaire distributed 375 were returned a total of 15 questionnaires 
were rejected as they were incomplete in various respects. This resulted in 360 usable 
responses. 
In another survey targeted to get response from the prospective private sector power 
generation companies of India willing to set up new power projects the sample size was 
25 power generation companies was administered key personnel of these companies 
electronically with follow up done over telephone. 
3.11. Analysis Techniques 
The fmal step was to select the appropriate statistical tools for analyzing the data. It 
involved steps such as coding the responses, cleaning, screening the data and selecting 
the appropriate data analysis strategy (Hau, 2005, Malhotra, 2007) for systematic 
approach, research elements namely the research problem, objectives, characteristics of 
data and the underlying properties of the statistical techniques need to be understood 
(Malhotra, 2007) to meet the objectives of the study, the following types of analysis 
were performed. 
Descriptive analysis refers to the transformation of raw data into a form that would 
provide information to describe a set of factors in a situation that will make them easy 
to understand and interpret (Hau, 2005) this analysis gives a meaning to data through 
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frequency distribution, mean and standard deviation, which are useful to identify 
differences among groups. 
Inferential analysis refers to the cause effect relationships between variables 
inferential statistics used for this research were Analysis of variance (ANOVA), Chi 
square test / Kruskal Wallis test. ANOVA has its strength over other multivariate 
analysis because it maximizes the differences among group membership of variables as 
a whole and helps to understand groups dimension differences (Hair et al, 1998) 
The data were analyzed using MS Excel 2000 spreadsheet program & SPSS Statistical 
analysis Software. Appropriate statistical tools like Chi Square test / Kruskal wallis test 
and one way ANOVA have been applied on the collected data, to analyze the 
respondents with their perception of power supply in Uttar Pradesh (Boyd et al. 2003). 
The analysis includes the following: Chi Square test, Kruskal wallis test and 
ANOVA, using software tools (SPSS, Excel etc.). 
The outcome of the Survey Questionnaire based on the hyjiothesis is being 
analyzed using Chi Square test & Kruskal Wallis test for the given set of observed 
frequencies (n) which are subject to (k) independent restrictions (constraints) for an 
expected growth rate of the market per year while taking a given level of significance 
(say 0.05). 
2 
To test the hypothesis Chi Square (A ) shall be calculated and if the calculated 
value is equal to zero, there is perfect agreement between observed and expected 
frequencies. For a given null hypothesis if the significance value is > 0.05 then null 
hypothesis is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. 
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3.12 Limitations of the Study 
Although efforts were made to carry on research that was theoretically and empirically 
sound, the study suffers from several limitations: 
a. A general lack of reliable independent statistics regarding the satisfaction of end 
consumer of electricity (power) was observed. In view of the ever continuing 
monopoly and the sector being a state government entity no substantial 
secondary source of data was available nor does any survey exist by the service 
providers. 
b. The study is restricted to specific cities of Uttar Pradesh. As only select areas of 
U.P. were taken from the select potential areas/ cities based on the CRISIL 
report, the study covers about 60 representative samples from the given places 
however their market size may vary. 
c. The study assumed that the respondents were all individual customers whose 
individual perception and expectations relating to service quality controlled the 
decision regarding the available service and not taking into account possible 
impact of Govt policy or family influence. 
d. The identified variables may have been influenced by the interest and the 
knowledge hmitations of the customers, regardless of the attention & effort, and 
thus may not be considered to be exhaustive. Additionally collecting 
respondent's data on expectation and perceptions of the availability and quality 
at the same time could have compromised the reliability of the data. 
e. The privatization of power generation is in early stage of growth in Uttar 
Pradesh and distribution of few areas are being privatized under government 
policies therefore the study may have got influenced in view of the policies of 
Government of Uttar Pradesh. 
Although this study had a number of constraints, the research was successfully 
conducted. This success may be attributed to the development and application of a 
robust and flexible research design supported by valid and reliable research instrument 
that enable the researcher to minimize the effects of the aforementioned limitations. 
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Chapter-4 
Analysis & Findings 
The first set of questionnaire addressed to private sector power generation companies was 
meant to assess the impact of various factors affecting sustainability, problems and challenges 
that confront private sector participation, impact of government poUcies and measures by 
which private sector participation could be increased has been analyzed based on the mean 
value of the response on Likert scale for all the above categories. 
The Second set of questionnaire was meant for the response of end consumers for which 
hypothesis testing has been done. The outcome of the survey conducted based on the 
hypothesis have been analyzed using Chi Square test & Kjuskal Wallis test for the given set of 
observed frequencies (n) which are subject to (k) independent restrictions (constraints) for an 
expected growth rate of the market per year while taking a given level of significance (say 
0.05). 
2 
To test the hypothesis Chi Square (X ) has been calculated and if the calculated value is 
equal to zero, there is perfect agreement between observed and expected frequencies. For a 
given null hypothesis if the significance value is > 0.05 then null hypothesis is accepted, 
otherwise it is rejected. 
The data were analyzed using MS Excel 2000 spreadsheet program & SPSS Statistical 
analysis Software. Appropriate statistical tools hke Chi Square test / Kjuskal wallis test and 
one way ANOVA have been applied on the collected data to analyze the respondents with their 
perception of power supply in Uttar Pradesh are as following. 
The following factors which affect the sustainability of private sector participation in 
power, on survey have revealed results as appended. It is inferred from the table that almost all 
mean values are higher than 3.5 which indicates that these have got significant impact on the 
factors affecting sustainability. It can also be inferred that many of the mean values higher that 
4 .0 which indicates a much higher impact on the given factors. 
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Table 4.1 Analysis of Factors affecting sustainability 
Factors affecting sustainability (on 
Likert scale) 
Implementation of Govt, policy 
Investment cost 
Fuel Cost 
Operation cost 
Maintenance Cost 
Modernization of transmission & 
distribution 
Govt, being single buyer 
Future demand for electricity (power) 
due to population growth in U.P. 
Future demand for electricity (power) 
due to economic development in U.P. 
Cost benefit solution through Gas based 
power projects 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
3 
0 
4 
3 
7 
7 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
7 
9 
6 
6 
4 
5 
9 
6 
8 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
Mean 
value 
4.25 
3.81 
4.00 
3.75 
3.50 
4.19 
4,13 
4.00 
3.69 
3.56 
The following factors which asses the Problems & Challenges that confront private sector 
participation, on survey have revealed as appended. It is inferred from the table that almost all 
mean values are higher than 3.5 (except one as discussed below the table) and many of which 
are approaching 4.0 which indicates that these have got significant impact on the factors which 
confront pvt sector participation. It can also be inferred that many factors with mean values 
higher that 4 .0 have a much higher impact on the given factors. 
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Table 4.2 Analysis of problems & challenges that confront private sector participation 
Problems & Challenges that confront 
private sector participation 
Risk of timely payment by distribution 
companies in U.P. 
Lack of knowledge & experience by 
private entrepreneurs 
Land acquisition problems 
Fuel supply problems 
Inadequate infrastructure 
Bias of state regulator against private 
sector 
Inefficient transmission & distribution 
system 
Inadequate cost recovery 
Non payment of power generation bill 
by the Govt, of U.P. 
Load shedding effect on potential of 
growth 
Longer breakeven point (duration) 
Geopolitical risk in case of coal assets 
acquired abroad by the power 
generating company 
Intervention byNGO's 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
6 
1 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
3 
0 
6 
1 
1 
0 
2 
3 
2 
0 
4 
2 
2 
6 
4 
2 
3 
5 
7 
7 
8 
7 
6 
4 
8 
6 
8 
8 
5 
12 
1 
8 
6 
7 
5 
6 
7 
10 
4 
6 
4 
2 
Mean 
value 
4.75 
2.94 
4.13 
4.00 
4.19 
4.06 
4.19 
4.13 
4.31 
4.00 
3.94 
3.81 
3.75 
.15 
The statement ''Lack of hiowledge and experience by private entrepreneurs would 
significantly hinder the privatization process" with a mean value of 2.94 (less than 3.0) and 
therefore inferred that it has not been accepted by the private power generating companies 
concluding thereby that "Private Power generating companies have the competency of their 
domain and therefore this factor would not hinder the privatization process ". 
The following factors which are related to policies of the government, on survey have 
revealed results as appended. It is inferred from the table that all mean values are higher than 
4.0 which indicates that these have got a much higher impact on the given factors. 
Table 4.3 Analysis of aspects related to policies of the Government 
Aspects related to Policies of the 
Government 
Financial, Promotional & fiscal 
incentives 
Improvement in administration & 
beaurocratic frmctioning 
Simphfication of procedure 
Reduction in Administrative Delays 
End of License Raj 
Overall policies of the Govt, of UP 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
5 
5 
7 
10 
7 
10 
8 
8 
Mean 
value 
4.06 
4.31 
4.00 
4.31 
4.25 
4.25 
The following factors which are related to measures by which pvt sector participation 
could be increased, on survey have revealed results as appended. It is inferred from the table 
that for the mean value higher than 3.5 indicates that, by backward integration of fuel supply 
significant contribution can be done in private sector participation which is a measure by 
which private sector participation could be increased. It can also be inferred that for the mean 
values higher that 4 .0 regarding adoption of alternate source of power has a high impact as 
a measure by which private sector participation could be increased. 
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Table 4.4 Analysis of measures by which pvt sector participation could be increased 
Measures by which private sector 
participation could be increased 
Backward integration of fliel supply 
for fuel security 
Adoption of alternate source of Power 
generation (wind, solar etc.) 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
7 
6 
5 
4 
4 
Mean 
value 
3.69 
4.19 
The hypothesis testing, relating to end consumers which focus on the response of the 
end consumers on privatization has been discussed as following. 
Hypothesis H 1 a : There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Market driven (non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to improve upon 
the availability and reliabiUty of power in U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Ql 
Area / District 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3.80 
3.12 
4.52 
3.90 
3.40 
3.28 
3.67 
Std. Deviation 
1.054 
1.277 
.854 
.706 
1.554 
1.462 
1.273 
F 
11.113 
Sig. 
0.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Allahabad are on 
higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various districts/cities in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that market 
driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the availability and reliability of 
power in Uttar Pradesh have varied opinion on the basis of area. 
Hypothesis H 1 b : There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Market driven (non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to improve upon 
the avaUability and reliability of power in U.P. across various age groups. 
Qi 
Age groups 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.86 
3.38 
3.79 
3.72 
3.70 
3.67 
Std. Deviation 
1.332 
1.472 
1.147 
1.195 
1.193 
1.273 
F 
1.681 
Sig. 
0.154 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age groups of upto 30 & 41 -50 
are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various age groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
/// the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that market 
driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the availability and reliability of 
power in Uttar Pradesh stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 1 c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Market driven (non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to improve upon 
the availability and reliability of power in U.P. across various occupation. 
Qi 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teacliing-std 
Housewife 
Rtd irom service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.68 
3.79 
3.25 
3.83 
3.68 
3.67 
Std. Deviation 
1.323 
1.105 
1.481 
.937 
1.180 
1.273 
F 
1.099 
Sig. 
0.357 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the housewives & business persomiel 
are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupations in tire 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
market driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the availability and 
reliability of power in Uttar Pradesh stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H i d : There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Market driven (non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to improve upon 
the availability and reUability of power in U.P. across various income groups. 
Ql 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.78 
3.33 
3.58 
3.83 
4.02 
3.67 
Std. Deviation 
1.298 
1.498 
1.148 
1.146 
1.016 
1.273 
F 
3.468 
Sig. 
0.009 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups More than Rs 
50000 & Rs 35000-50000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various income group in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
market driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the availability and 
reliability of power in Uttar Pradesh has varied opinion on the basis of income group. 
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Hypothesis H 2 a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed 
by immediate privatization in U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Q2 
Area/District 
Muzzafamagai' 
Kan pur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
4.00 
3.77 
4.13 
3.78 
3.13 
3.42 
3.71 
Std. Deviation 
.974 
1.198 
.676 
.783 
1.535 
1.293 
1.160 
F 
6.645 
Sig. 
0.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Muzaffarnagar 
are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various districts/cities in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is conchided that in the expectation that 
expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be 
addressed by immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh have varied opinion on the basis of 
area. 
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Hypothesis H 2 b: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed 
by immediate privatization in U.P. value across various age groups. 
Q2 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.77 
3.61 
3.81 
3.45 
4.07 
3.71 
Std. Deviation 
1.190 
1.159 
1.001 
1.411 
.818 
1.160 
Std. EiTor 
.201 
.124 
.097 
.152 
.123 
.061 
F 
2.530 
Sig. 
0.040 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group more than 60 & 41 -50 
are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is infeired that significant difference exists across various age groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be 
addressed by immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh have varied opinion on the basis of 
age. 
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Hypothesis H 2 c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed 
by immediate privatization in U.P. across various occupations. 
Q2 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teaching-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.60 
3.84 
3.78 
3.83 
3.92 
3.71 
Std. Deviation 
1.212 
1.041 
1.211 
1.115 
1.038 
1.160 
F 
1.025 
Sig. 
0.394 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of retired persons, business 
persons housewives are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed by 
immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 2 d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed 
by immediate privatization in U.P. value across various income groups. 
Q2 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.78 
3.62 
3.29 
3.90 
4.03 
3.71 
Std. Deviation 
1.093 
1.315 
1.305 
.973 
.796 
1.160 
F 
4.423 
Sig. 
0.002 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups More than Rs 
50000 & upto Rs 35000-5000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted tlie significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various income group in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
poor power generation and distribution by existing companies should be addressed by 
immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh have varied opinion on the basis of income group. 
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Hypothesis H 3 a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental 
impacts across various areas/districts. 
Q3 
Area/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kan pur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3,58 
3.20 
3.48 
3.43 
3.53 
3.13 
3.39 
Std. Deviation 
1.124 
1.147 
1.097 
.810 
1.186 
1.081 
1.087 
F 
1.749 
Sig. 
0.123 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Muzzafamagar ,Varanasi 
& Agra are on higher side tlian others which indicates that the population of the above 
areas is better aware of the environmental aspects. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various areas /districts in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental impacts 
stands valid by all areas/districts. 
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Hypothesis H 3 b. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental 
impacts across various age groups. 
Q3 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.77 
3.40 
3.35 
3.34 
3.32 
3.39 
Std. Deviation 
1.114 
.989 
1.056 
1.174 
1.137 
1.087 
F 
1.224 
Sig. 
0.300 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group up to 30 are on higher 
side which says that the majority of the young population is aware of the environmental 
aspects of capacity addition of power generating plants. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various age groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental impacts, 
stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 3 c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental 
impacts across various occupation. 
Q3 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teacliing-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.44 
3.33 
3.28 
3.50 
3.32 
3.39 
Std. Deviation 
1.106 
.958 
1.170 
1.168 
1.156 
1.087 
F 
.315 
Sig. 
0.868 
From the above data it is inferred tliat the mean value for the group of housewives and service 
class are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is conchided that in the expectation that 
large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental impacts, 
stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 3 d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have environmental 
impacts across various income groups. 
Q3 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.19 
3.52 
3.47 
3.24 
3.47 
3.39 
Std. Deviation 
1.150 
1.128 
1.074 
.948 
1.112 
1.087 
F 
1.339 
Sig. 
0.255 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups Rs 10000-20000 , 
20000-35000 & More than 50000 are on higher side tlian others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across income groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is conchided that in the expectation that 
expectation that large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts stands valid by all income groups. 
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Hypothesis H 4 a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non 
subsidized pricing) system across various areas/districts. 
Q4 
Area/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Goraklipur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3.63 
3.73 
4.03 
3.88 
3.18 
3.32 
3.63 
Std. Deviation 
.901 
.880 
.610 
.739 
1.334 
1.186 
1.012 
F 
6.772 
Sig. 
.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Allahabad are 
on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various districts/cities in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation due to 
high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized 
pricing) system in Uttar Pradesh have varied opinion on the basis of area. 
129 
Hypothesis H 4 b. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non 
subsidized pricing) system across various age groups. 
Q4 
Age groups 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.57 
3.73 
3.72 
3.47 
3.59 
3.63 
Std. Deviation 
1.008 
1.025 
1.007 
1.048 
.923 
1.012 
F 
1.029 
Sig. 
0.392 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group 31-40 & 41-50 are on 
higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various age groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized 
pricing) system stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 4 c; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non 
subsidized pricing) system across various occupation groups. 
Q4 
Occupations 
Service 
Business 
Teaching-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.62 
3.63 
3,81 
3.50 
3.59 
3.63 
Std. Deviation 
1.065 
1.021 
.693 
1.168 
.896 
1.012 
F 
.327 
Sig. 
0.859 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of teaching / studying and 
business groups are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized 
pricing) system, stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 4 d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non 
subsidized pricing) system across various income groups. 
Q4 
Income group 
UptoRs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3,56 
3.51 
3.53 
3.75 
3.88 
3.63 
Std. Deviation 
1.040 
1.119 
1.074 
.874 
.845 
1.012 
F 
1.822 
Sig. 
0.124 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups of more than Rs 
50000 & Rs 35000-50000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted tlie significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various income groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized 
pricing) system, stands valid by all income groups. 
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Hypothesis H 5 a. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization, across various areas/districts. 
Q5 
Areas/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpui-
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3.97 
4.10 
4.52 
4.07 
3.60 
3.92 
4.03 
Std. Deviation 
.938 
1.020 
.537 
.710 
1.380 
.619 
.947 
F 
6.405 
Sig. 
.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Kanpur/ 
Allahabad are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various districts/cities in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to households even 
after privatization have varied opinion on the basis of area. 
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Hypothesis H 5 b. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization, across various age groups. 
Q5 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
4.03 
4.15 
4.18 
3.80 
3.86 
4.03 
Std. Deviation 
.985 
.941 
.737 
1.146 
.878 
.947 
F 
2.620 
Sig. 
0.035 
From the above data it is infeired that the mean value for the age group 41 -50 & 31 -40 are on 
higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across age groups in the statement made 
and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to households even 
after privatization have varied opinion on the basis of age group. 
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Hypothesis H 5 c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization across various occupation. 
Q5 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teactiing-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
4.01 
4.16 
4.12 
3.92 
3.78 
4.03 
Std. Deviation 
.995 
.624 
1.100 
1.084 
1.004 
.947 
F 
1.132 
Sig. 
0.341 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the business groups and 
teaching/studying are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to households even 
after privatization, stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 5 d; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization, across various income groups. 
Q5 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
4.19 
3.74 
3.72 
4.35 
4.33 
4.03 
Std. Deviation 
.585 
1.157 
1.178 
.588 
.565 
.947 
F 
9.010 
Sig. 
.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups of 35000-50000 & 
more and upto Rs 10000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is infe;rred that significant difference exists across various income groups in the 
statement made and therefore tlie null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to households even 
after privatization have varied opinion on the basis of income group. 
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Hypothesis H 6 a: There is no significant difference in the mean value across various 
areas/districts in the expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for 
the amount of power consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently 
on actual market price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option. 
Q6 
Areas/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kail pur 
Agi-a 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3.82 
3.82 
4.10 
3.72 
3.65 
3.48 
3.76 
Std. Deviation 
.911 
1.157 
.681 
.922 
1.176 
1.384 
1,072 
F 
2.255 
Sig. 
0.049 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & 
Kanpur/Muzzafamagar are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted tlie significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various areas groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that Pricing 
of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed (initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option have varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
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Hypothesis H 6 b; There is no significant difference across various age groups in the 
expectation that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market 
price -non subsidized mechanism) is a better option. 
Q6 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.89 
3.51 
3.93 
3.65 
4.00 
3.76 
Std. Deviation 
.758 
1.184 
.959 
1.176 
1.012 
1.072 
F 
2.762 
Sig. 
0.028 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group more than 60 and 41-
50 years are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across various age groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation 
Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed (initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, have varied opinion on the basis of age group. 
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Hypothesis H 6 c: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed 
(initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non 
subsidized mechanism) is a better option, across various occupations . 
Q6 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teaciiing-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.77 
3.79 
3.50 
4.17 
3.78 
3.76 
Std. Deviation 
1.000 
1.142 
1.344 
.835 
1.134 
1.072 
F 
.925 
Sig. 
0.449 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of housewives and business 
groups are on higher side than otliers. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is iaferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed (initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 6d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed 
(initially subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non 
subsidized mechanism) is a better option, across various income groups. 
Q6 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.74 
3.59 
3.78 
4.00 
3.78 
3.76 
Std. Deviation 
1.049 
1.212 
1.064 
.956 
.967 
1.072 
F 
1.566 
Sig. 
0.183 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups Rs 35000-50000, 
Rs 20000-35000 & more than 50000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across income groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed (initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option stands valid by all income groups 
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Hypothesis H 7 a: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply 
with quality standards and other regulatory obligations , across various areas/districts. 
Q7 
Area/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
4.17 
3.40 
4.15 
3.95 
3.17 
3.22 
3.68 
Std. Deviation 
.905 
1.167 
.659 
.675 
1.330 
1.290 
1.118 
F 
12.034 
Sig. 
.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Muzzafamagar & Agra 
are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across areas in the statement made and 
therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply with quality 
standards and other regulatory obligations, have varied opinion on the basis of areas. 
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Hypothesis H 7 b; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply 
with quality standards and other regulatory obligations , across various age groups. 
Q7 
Age groups 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.60 
3.56 
3.83 
3.53 
3.86 
3.68 
Std. Deviation 
1.090 
1.081 
1.059 
1.205 
1.153 
1.118 
F 
1.469 
Sig. 
0.211 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group more than 60 & 41-50 
years are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across age groups in the statement 
made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply with quality 
standards and other regulatory obligations stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 7 c. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply 
with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, across various occupations. 
Q7 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teaching-std 
Housewife 
Rtd fi-om service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.62 
3.84 
3.34 
4.25 
3.76 
3.68 
Std. Deviation 
1.101 
1.000 
1.208 
1.138 
1.278 
1.118 
F 
2.064 
Sig. 
0.085 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of housewives and business 
groups are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupations in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is conchuled that in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply with quality 
standards and other regulatory obligations, stands valid by all occupations. 
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Hypothesis H 7 d. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply 
with quality standards and other regulatory obligations, across various income groups. 
Q7 
Income group 
Upto Rs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.61 
3.48 
3.72 
3.85 
3.78 
3.68 
Std. Deviation 
1.156 
1.232 
1.141 
1.064 
.899 
1.118 
F 
1.352 
Sig. 
0.250 
From the above data it is inferred tliat the mean value for the income groups Rs 35000-50000 
& more than 50000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across income groups the statement 
made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
/// the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger incentive to comply with quality 
standards and other regulatory obligations, stands valid all on the basis of income groups. 
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Hypothesis H 8 a: There is no significant difference in the mean in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before privatization of 
generation in U.P. value across various areas/districts. 
Q8 
Area/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
3.90 
3.45 
4.27 
4.17 
2.97 
4.08 
3.81 
Std. Deviation 
1.020 
1.080 
.841 
.615 
1.402 
.962 
1.108 
F 
14.662 
Sig. 
.000 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Allahabad are 
on higher side than others. 
.In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across areas in the statement made and 
therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before privatization of 
generation in U.P., have varied opinion on the basis of areas. 
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Hypothesis H 8 b; There is no significant difference across various age groups in the 
expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before 
privatization of generation in U.P. 
Q8 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
3.86 
3.85 
3.85 
3.64 
3.89 
3.81 
Std. Deviation 
.912 
1.189 
1.017 
1.197 
1.125 
1.108 
F 
0.641 
Sig. 
0.633 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group from upto 30 years till 
50 years are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across age groups in the statement 
made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
expectation titat Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before 
privatization of generation in U.P. stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 8 c; There is no significant difference in the mean value across various 
occupations in the expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / 
distribution before privatization of generation in U.P. 
Q8 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teaching-std 
Housewife 
Rtd fi'om service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
3.74 
4.04 
3.75 
3.83 
3.73 
3.81 
Std. Deviation 
1.163 
.889 
1.107 
1.193 
1.146 
1.108 
F 
1.057 
Sig. 
0.378 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of business groups & 
housewives are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before privatization of 
generation in U.P, stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 8 d; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before privatization 
of generation in U.P., across income groups. 
Q8 
Income group 
UptoRs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
3.96 
3.53 
3.78 
3.90 
4.03 
3.81 
Std. Deviation 
1.027 
1.280 
1.116 
1.002 
.908 
1.108 
F 
2.718 
Sig. 
0.030 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for tlie income groups more than 50000 
and upto Rs 10000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is < 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across income groups the statement 
made and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution before privatization of 
generation in U.P., have varied opinion on the basis of income groups. 
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Hypothesis H 9 a. There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies across various areas/districts . 
Q9 
Area/Districts 
Muzzafamagar 
Kanpur 
Agra 
Allahabad 
Varanasi 
Gorakhpur 
Total 
N 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
360 
Mean 
4.08 
3.97 
4.18 
4.07 
3.65 
4.12 
4.01 
Std. Deviation 
.926 
1.025 
.748 
.756 
1.582 
1.027 
1.056 
F 
1.981 
Sig. 
0.081 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the districts Agra & Gorakhpur are 
on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that significant difference exists across areas in the statement made and 
therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private companies 
in U.P., have stand valid on the basis of areas. 
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Hypothesis H 9 b; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies, across various age groups . 
Q9 
Age group 
Upto 30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
More than 60 
Total 
N 
35 
88 
107 
86 
44 
360 
Mean 
4.14 
3.85 
3.99 
4.06 
4.18 
4.01 
Std. Deviation 
1.033 
1.130 
.966 
1.202 
.786 
1.056 
F 
0.975 
Sig. 
0.421 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the age group more than 60 years & 
upto 30 years are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across age groups in the statement 
made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by 
private companies stands valid by all age groups. 
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Hypothesis H 9 c; There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies, across various occupations. 
Q9 
Occupation 
Service 
Business 
Teaching-std 
Housewife 
Rtd from service 
Total 
N 
206 
73 
32 
12 
37 
360 
Mean 
4.02 
4.03 
3.91 
3.67 
4.14 
4.01 
Std. Deviation 
1.152 
.799 
.995 
1.155 
.976 
1.056 
F 
0.531 
Sig. 
0.713 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the group of Rtd from service & 
business /service groups are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across various occupation groups in 
the statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private 
companiesJn U.P, stands valid by all occupation groups. 
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Hypothesis H 9 d: There is no significant difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies across various income groups. 
Q9 
Income group 
UptoRs 10000 
Rs 10000-20000 
Rs 20000-35000 
Rs 35000-50000 
More than Rs 50000 
Total 
N 
54 
99 
72 
71 
64 
360 
Mean 
4.02 
3.94 
4,01 
4,00 
4.12 
4,01 
Std. Deviation 
1.055 
1.260 
1,028 
1,014 
,766 
1,056 
F 
0.301 
Sig. 
0.877 
From the above data it is inferred that the mean value for the income groups more than Rs 
50000 & upto Rs 10000 are on higher side than others. 
In view of the ONE WAY ANOVA test conducted the significance value is > 0.05 and 
therefore it is inferred that no significant difference exists across income groups in the 
statement made and therefore the null hypothesis is accepted. 
In the perspective of the inference made it is concluded that in the expectation that 
Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation capacity by private companies 
in U.P., stands valid by all income groups. 
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The results of the above hypothesis are summarized in the following tables : 
Table 4.5 Summary of hypothesis testing H (1) 
Null Hypothesis statement 
Hypothesis HI a; There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis HI b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and rehabihty of power in 
U.P. across various age groups. 
Hypothesis HI c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliability of power in 
U.P. across various occupation. 
Hypothesis HI d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Market driven 
(non-subsidized) price mechanism can be an option to 
improve upon the availability and reliabihty of power in 
U.P. across various income groups. 
Significance 
value 
0.00 
0.154 
0.357 
0.009 
Condition 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Rejected 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that market driven price mechanism can be an option to improve upon the 
availability and reliability of power in Uttar Pradesh stands valid by age group and 
occupation however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and income group. 
Table 4.6 Summary of hypothesis testing H (2) 
Hypothesis H2 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across 
various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H2 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value 
across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H2 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. across 
various occupations. 
Hypothesis H2 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that poor power 
generation and distribution by existing companies should 
be addressed by immediate privatization in U.P. value 
across various income groups. 
0.00 
0.04 
0.394 
0.002 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed 
that in the expectation that Poor power generation and distribution by existing companies 
should be addressed by immediate privatization in Uttar Pradesh stands valid only by 
different occupation group, however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age 
group and income group. 
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Table 4.7 Summary of hypothesis testing H (3) 
Hypothesis H3 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/fiirther capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H3 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H3 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various occupation. 
Hypothesis H3 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Large size 
plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts across various income groups. 
0.123 
0.30 
0.868 
0.255 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Large size plants/further capacity addition of power plants will have 
environmental impacts stands valid by all the groups of respondents and do not have any 
difference of opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age group, occupation and income 
group. 
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Table 4.8 Summary of hypothesis testing H (4) 
Hypothesis H4 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H4 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various age 
groups. 
Hypothesis H4 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various 
occupation groups. 
Hypothesis H4 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that due to high capital 
investment there may be rise in tariff under open market 
(non- subsidized pricing) system across various income 
groups. 
0.00 
0.392 
0.859 
0.124 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that due to high capital investment there may be rise in tariff under open 
market (non- subsidized pricing) system in Uttar Pradesh, stands valid by occupation, age 
group and income group however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
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Table 4.9 Summary of hypothesis testing H (5) 
Hypothesis H5 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization, across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H5 b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization ,across various age 
groups. 
Hypothesis H5 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should 
be continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) 
to households even after privatization across various 
occupation. 
Hypothesis H5 d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Subsidy should be 
continued to be provided (upto a fixed consumption) to 
households even after privatization , across various 
income groups. 
0.00 
0.035 
0.341 
0.000 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Rejected 
In view of the analysis of results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is 
observed that in the expectation that Subsidy should be continued to be provided (upto a 
fixed consumption) to households even after privatization , stands valid by occupation, 
however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, age group and income group. 
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Table 4.10 Summary of hypothesis testing H (6) 
Hypothesis H 6 a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various 
areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H 6 b ; There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option , across various age groups 
Hypothesis H 6 c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various 
occupations. 
Hypothesis H 6 d:There is no significant difference in the 
mean value in the expectation that Pricing of power 
based on price band method for the amount of power 
consumed (initially subsidized upto a certain level and 
subsequently on actual market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option, across various income 
groups. 
0.049 
0.028 
0.449 
0.183 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that that Pricing of power based on price band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially subsidized up to a certain level and subsequently on actual market 
price, non- subsidized mechanism) is a better option stands valid by occupation and income 
group however has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts & age group. 
Table 4.11 Summary of hypothesis testing H (7) 
Hypothesis H7a: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations , across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H7b: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H7c: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H7d: There is no significant difference in 
the mean value in the expectation that Private 
companies in power generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations, across various income 
groups. 
0.000 
0.059 
0.085 
0.250 
Significance 
value is < 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Significance 
value is > 0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Private companies in power generation would have stronger incentive 
to comply with quality standards and other regulatory obligations stands valid by 
occupation, age group and income group however has varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts. 
Table 4.12 Summary of hypothesis testing H(8) 
Hypothesis H 8 a: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / 
distribution before privatization of generation in U.P. 
across various areas/districts . 
Hypothesis H 8 b: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / 
distribution before privatization of generation in U.P 
across various age groups . 
Hypothesis H 8 c: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that 
Privatization should be done first for transmission / 
distribution before privatization of generation in U.P 
across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H 8 d: There is no significant difference 
in the mean value in the expectation that Privatization 
should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P. across 
various income group. 
0.00 
0.633 
0.378 
0.030 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is < 
0.05 
Rejected 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Rejected 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Privatization should be done first for transmission / distribution 
before privatization of generation in U.P., stands valid by occupation, age group however 
has varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and income group. 
Table 4.13 Summary of hypothesis testing H (9) 
Hypothesis H 9 a: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies 
across various areas/districts. 
Hypothesis H 9 b: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies, 
across various age groups. 
Hypothesis H 9 c: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies, 
across various occupations. 
Hypothesis H 9 d: There is no significant 
difference in the mean value in the expectation 
that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of 
power generation capacity by private companies 
across various income groups. 
0.081 
0.421 
0.713 
0.877 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Significance 
value is > 
0.05 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
Accepted 
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In view of the results of the above hypothesis on demographic parameters it is observed that 
in the expectation that Power deficit can be reduced by addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies in U.P., stands valid all occupation, age group and income 
group and areas/districts. 
Consumer's behavior on increase of marginal price: 
Consumers are willing to pay a marginal increase in price if the quality and availability 
of power is ensured from moderately better to very good. 
Q) for very good quaUty power supply 
Q) for moderately good quality power supply 
N Parametric test for questions relating to end consumer's behavior on very 
good quality power supply 
Frequencies 
Q2 
Rsl 
Rs2 
Rs3 
Rs4 
Any other value 
Total 
Observed N 
161 
110 
53 
16 
20 
360 
Expected N 
72,0 
72.0 
72.0 
72.0 
72.0 
Residual 
89.0 
38.0 
-19.0 
-56.0 
-52.0 
From the frequencies it can be inferred that there is large number of consumers (94.4 %) who 
are willing to pay at least a marginal increase in price upto Rs 1 from the present charges for a 
very good quality power. There is a significant number of consumers (about 50 %) who are 
willing to pay an increase of at least Rs 2 for the same. 
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N Parametric test for questions relating to end consumer's behavior on 
moderately good quality power supply 
Frequencies 
Q3 
Rs1 
Rs2 
Rs3 
Rs4 
Any other value 
Total 
Observed N 
168 
81 
13 
6 
92 
360 
Expected N 
72.0 
72.0 
72.0 
72.0 
72.0 
Residual 
96.0 
9.0 
-59.0 
-66.0 
20.0 
From the frequencies it can be inferred that there is large number of consumers (74 %) who 
are willing to pay a marginal mcrease of at least Rs 1 from the present charges for a moderately 
good quality power. There is a significant number of consumers (27 % ) who are willing to pay 
an increase of at least Rs 2 for the same. 
For the Hypothesis first to four the questions the survey was conducted electronically to 
power generating companies the outcome was taken through the Google Docs and was 
analyzed taking the mean value for the questionnaire scaled from 1 to 5 for various aspects of 
private sector participation such as, factors affecting sustainability, Problems / Challenges & 
Aspects related to Policies of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 
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Chapter-5 
Conclusions, 
Recommendations & 
Directions for Future Research 
Chapter-5 
Conclusions , Recommendations & Directions for Future Research 
In view of the outcome of the survey administered to power generation companies and to the 
end consumers of power, the following are the conclusion, recommendation and direction for 
future research. 
5.1 Conclusions 
It is inferred that among the factors affecting sustainability the issues of implementation of 
government policies, modernization of transmission and distribution, adoption of alternate 
sources and future demand due to population growth are significant. Besides this, investment 
cost, fuel cost, operation & maintenance cost and modernization of transmission & distribution 
would have a significant impact on the sustainability of private sector power generation. 
Wliereas government being single buyer is impacting conversely on the sustainability of 
private sector power generation there are brighter prospects due to the fact that an increasing 
trend of population growth with rising trend of economic growth in U.P. would significantly 
increase consumption of Electricity (power). It is also expected that private companies have a 
significant cost benefit if they undertake gas based power projects. 
On the other side of the coin the problems relating to these prospects are also significant as 
is also evident from the survey. Risk of timely payment by distribution companies in U.P. 
would significantly impact privatization. Inadequate infrastructure is one of the reasons that 
would significantly hinder the privatization process particularly relating to Inefficient 
transmission and distribution capacity. Fuel supply problems, land acquisition problems, 
nonpayment of power generation, inadequate cost recovery and bias of state regulators for 
public sector corporations would significantly hinder the privatization process. Apart from 
these intervention by NGOs, load shedding & geopolitical risk in case of coal asset acquired 
abroad would significantly impact the potential of growth of private sector power companies. 
It is expected that Simplification of procedure, reduction in administrative delays, End of 
License Raj regime & Improvement in overall policies of the Government would have a 
significant positive impact on the private sector participation in power generation and supply in 
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U.P. It is also prudent for power generation companies to iiave backward integration of fiael 
supply & producing electricity through renewable energy sources for sustainable growth in 
U.P. 
5.1.1 Issues Relating to Power Generation Companies : 
1) Related to sustainability of private sector participation in power generation in 
Uttar Pradesh 
From the survey administered to the private sector power generation companies it is 
inferred that implementation of Govt, policy participation has very significant impact on 
sustainability of private sector. Though less impacting Investment cost would have significant 
impact on the sustainability of private sector participation in power generation. 
Fuel cost has been considered to be having very significant impact on the sustainability of 
private sector power generation, the operation & maintenance cost would have also have 
significant impact on the same. Modernization of transmission & distribution would have as 
significant impact on the sustainability of private sector power generation as Govt, being single 
buyer is impacting conversely on the sustainability of private sector power generation. 
An increasing trend of population growth in U.P. would more significantly on future 
demand for Electricity (power) compared to the rising trend of economic growth in U.P. It is 
also inferred that Private companies have a significant cost benefit if they undertake gas based 
power projects. 
2) Related to problems and challenges that confront private sector participation in 
power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
Risk of timely payment by distribution companies in U.P. would significantly impact 
privatization has been rated to be very high on the Likert scale (4.75) which seems to be the 
biggest problem among all problem and challenges . Whereas land acquisition problems, fuel 
supply problems, inadequate infrastructure & inadequate cost recovery are the few factors 
which would significantly hinder the privatization process it is inferred that lack of knowledge 
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and experience by private entrepreneurs would not significantly hinder the privatization 
process. 
. The statement "Lack of knowledge and experience by private entrepreneurs would 
significantly hinder the privatization process'' has a mean value of 2.94 (less than 3.0) and 
therefore inferred that it has not been accepted by the private power generating companies and 
concluding thereby "Private Power generating companies have the competency of their 
domain and therefore this factor would not hinder the privatization process ". 
hiefficient transmission and distribution capacity & nonpayment of power generation bill 
would significantly hinder the privatization process. Bias of state regulators for public sector 
corporations or against private sector companies & load shedding would seem to be equally 
and significantly impacting the privatization process the potential and growth of private sector 
power companies. Geopolitical risk in case of coal asset acquired abroad and the intervention 
by NGO s would also have significant impact on privatization process. 
3) Related to role and impact of Government policies relating to private sector 
participation in power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
The following factors have been observed to be very significant which are related to the 
role and impact of government policies (all have mean value at least 4.0 or above). 
Financial promotional and fiscal incentives, improvement in administrative & beaurocratic 
functioning, simplification of procedure, reduction in administrative delays, improvement in 
overall policies of the Government and end of License Raj regime. 
4) Related to measures by which private sector participation in power generation can 
be improved in Uttar Pradesh 
It has been observed that two major factors which have importance in improving the 
private sector participation have been considered to be significant are backward integration of 
fuel supply which would have significant impact on fiael security and prospects relating to 
producing electricity through renewable energy by private companies. 
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5.1.2 Issues Relating to End Consumers : The exclusive survey of end consumer(s) 
has concluded that 
1) For the hypothesis that Market driven (non -subsidized) price mechanism can improve 
the availability and reliability of power in U.P. when analyzed on the demographic 
parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by all 
age groups & occupation however there was varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts & income groups . 
2) The hypothesis based on the statement that Immediate privatization of power 
generation and distribution would improve power generation & distribution of power 
supply in U.P. when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on 
the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by all occupation however there was 
varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts, income groups and age groups. 
3) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Large size plants/capacity addition of 
power plants will have negative environmental impacts when analyzed on the 
demographic parameters revealed that based on the mean value was very well accepted 
and stands valid by all age groups , occupation , areas/districts & income groups .This 
also reveals that there is a general awareness among people of all groups on such vital 
issue of envirormiental concern. 
4) For the hypothesis based on the statement that, with high capital investment there is a 
likely of increase tariff in open market of power generation when analyzed on the 
demographic parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands 
valid by various occupation, income groups and age groups however there was varied 
opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
5) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would not have any effect 
on subsidies provided for household consumers when analyzed on the demographic 
parameters revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by 
various occupation however there was varied opinion on the basis of income groups 
areas/districts and age groups. 
6) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would result on pricing of 
power based on price band method for the amount of power consumed initially 
subsidized upto a certain level and subsequently on actual market price (non -
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subsidized) mechanism when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that 
based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various occupation & 
income groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts and age 
groups. 
7) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Private companies in power generation 
would have stronger incentive to comply with quality standards and other regulatory 
obligations when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on the 
mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various occupation, income groups and 
age groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of areas/districts. 
8) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization for transmission / 
distribution followed by before privatization of power generation in Uttar Pradesh 
would be beneficial for consumers when analyzed on the demographic parameters 
revealed that based on the mean value it is accepted and stands valid by various 
occupation & age groups however there was varied opinion on the basis of 
areas/districts and income groups. 
9) For the hypothesis based on the statement that Privatization would have the impact of 
reducing power deficit tlirough the addition of power generation capacity by private 
companies when analyzed on the demographic parameters revealed that based on the 
mean value it was very well accepted and stands valid by all age groups , occupation , 
areas/districts & income groups. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Many assume that reforms will cut costs and lead to lower tariffs which is not the case in 
reality. In fact, the fiindamentals are different at conclusion in the industry point of view and 
opposite to the perception for at least two reasons. First, the SEBs are increasingly purchasing 
power from non-SEB generators and these new power purchases are more costly than the 
incumbent SEB supply. Second and closely related, is that greater transparency and unbundling 
of the functions of the electric power system will reveal fiilly the need to lift tariffs so that each 
link in the power chain generation, transmission and distribution is viable. In view of the tariff 
fixation the policy would be required to support market driven price mechanism which may not 
be acceptable to the end consumers in large, however a middle way of moving ahead in this 
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direction can be the implementation of tariff plans as per price band method which is a more 
practical approach in moving towards the market driven price mechanism. Adoption of this 
methodology of tariff in which a fixed amount of power can be at a lower price band and as it 
goes high for any consumer the premium of that may go high for higher range of consumption. 
Following are the major thrust areas/issues for effective private sector participation and to 
achieve the bigger objective of reliable, cost effective and quality power to all. The following 
are the recommendations of the above study. 
5.2.1 Related to Problems & Challenges that confront Private Sector Participation 
Among the problems and challenges being faced are issues of risk of timely payment by 
distribution companies, inirastructure problem, inefficient transmission & distribution system 
and land acquisition problem. In the survey administered to the private sector power generation 
companies the issue of timely payment has been observed to be the most significant factor that 
impacts private sector participation. In view of this, it is recommended that the Government of 
Uttar Pradesh may take up such refomi process which ensures timely payment by distribution 
companies. In the other survey administered to the end consumers it has been observed that the 
hypothesis which relates to the privatization of transmission and distribution (even before that 
of generation) has been supported by various age group and occupation (though have varied 
opinion on the basis of area and income group). Fuel supply problem has also been considered 
significant among such issues. Bias of state regulator against private sector, land acquisition 
problems, inadequate cost recovery, nonpayment of power generation bill and load shedding 
are other such important issue which needs to be addressed by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh immediately in order to have successfiil reform process and to remain attractive for 
future investments by private sector companies. It may be noted that the private sector power 
producers do not significantly acknowledge the lack of knowledge & experience by private 
entrepreneurs which shows high confidence that the private producers can efficiently manage 
new power projects. Therefore the following factors should be immediately addressed by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh in view of the problems and challenges being faced by power 
generation companies to pave the way for their investment in power generation projects in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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a) Timely payment by distribution companies 
b) Ensuring ways and means of adequate cost recovery 
c) Addressing land acquisition problems 
d) Improving Infrastructure and modernization of Transmission and distribution 
e) Ensuring unbiased state regulator for power sector 
5.2.2 Related to Policies of the Government (Reform process) 
There has been a large variation in the performance of the states and reforms alone do not 
indicate success in terms of loss reduction or efficiency. This variation was observed due to the 
fact that some states were choosing to privatize distribution, some simply unbundling the 
SEBs, and others keeping the SEBs intact while adopting organizational reforms aimed at 
improving economic efficiency. The main factor in explaining outcomes is the ability of the 
state governments to implement reform (or operational improvement) plans and the strength of 
their institutions. Governments with weak institutions have performed poorly even when they 
had ambitious reform plans, as in Orissa. Governments with strong institutions and sustained 
commitment to reform (e.g., Andhra Pradesh and subsequently Delhi) have fared much better. 
In general, reforms have increased the average costs at the SEBs at a rate higher than the 
increase in revenues, primarily because reforms have forced a shift to greater reliance on non-
SEB generators whose costs include commercial rates of return. New generators have long-run 
marginal costs that are higher than the costs SEBs saw in the past and it is estimated that 
reforms in distribution and transmission will also force a rise in tariff to meet the statutory 
profitability. A fmancially sustainable system must have higher end tariffs, however there are 
expected improvements in operation due to better management and therefore a competitive and 
cost effective economically viable solution can be in place. 
The situation requires intense and urgent efforts on the part of the public-interest 
organizations to take up challenges thrown up by the reform process in general and the 
regulatory processes in particular. Hence, in response to the increased pace of the reform and 
regulatory processes, it is necessary that these individuals and organizations should come 
together, share experiences, and learn from each other. It must, however, be remembered that 
there is considerable diversity in the fiinctioning of the state regulatory commissions and even 
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in the techno-economic, political, institutional and historical contexts in different states. It is 
therefore required that following areas must be improved by the Government of Uttar Pradesh 
to encourage private sector participation and make the power sector viable and efficient. 
a) Simplification of procedures 
b) Reduction in administrative delays and decision making 
c) Elimination of multiplicity of clearance 
d) Recovery of revenue 
e) Other aspects of the reform process which need to be in place concurrently and 
consistently 
f) Restructuring of legal issues should be well before in place. 
5.2.3 Related to Factors Affecting Sustainability 
In view of the potential to grow and with the advent of new teclinologies and changing 
economic scenario across globe, the power sector may lead towards a market driven 
mechanism of tariff fixation. This will not only make the Government free from the burden of 
subsidy but explore the potentials of market driven economics in the country. In the survey 
administered to the end consumers of power the hypothesis 'Market driven (non-subsidized) 
price mechanism can be the option to improve upon the availability and rehability of power in 
U.P.' was accepted by all age group and occupation, however had varied opinion on the basis 
of area and income group. When considered on the basis of price band method (initially 
subsidized upto a certain units and subsequently on market price mechanism) , the statement 
was in agreement with various occupation and income group. It was also understood that for 
the hypothesis relating to privatization of transmission & distribution to be done before that of 
generation was in agreement with various age group and occupation however has varied 
opinion on the basis of area and income group, hi the same survey the hypothesis relating to 
rise in tariff under open market (non subsidized pricing) system due to high capital investment 
was acknowledged by all occupation, age group and income group however had varied opinion 
on the basis of area/districts. 
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Environmental considerations have not played a major part of Indian reforms, although 
the net effect of reforms has probably been positive for the environment. Reform is probably 
reducing losses in the power system, which will lower emissions per unit of energy actually 
delivered. In generation, reform is probably encouraging the construction of more efficient 
plants. A major improvement for the environment is found in the rise of natural gas, a trend 
that is due to many factors largely unrelated to reform, such as new gas fmds and 
improvements in gas-fired generation technologies. In response to the survey administered to 
the power generation companies it has emerged as one of the significant aspects of 
sustainability if the private power generation companies take up the gas based power plants. 
Also in the survey administered to the end consumer all the respondents have considered this 
aspect as an environmental consideration. It is recommended that all potential private sector 
players must ensure their fuel security by having own assets or long term agreements with 
suppliers to ensure fliel security and remain competitive in the market. 
The problems related to power sector which needs to be addressed immediately, especially 
with respect to sustainability and generation deficit are 
a) Economically viable price mechanism 
b) Issue of subsidy 
c) Cost of supply versus realization, 
d) Remedial for utilities which are bleeding money 
e) Wasteful consumption in irrigation and 
f) Capacity addition to overcome power deficit. 
In view of the above study it is inferred that large potential exists across the state of Uttar 
Pradesh which is in want of energy so as to cope up with the increase in population growth and 
industrial growth as has also emerged in the survey administered. Policy changes as are being 
notified by the Government of Uttar Pradesh from time to time which are welcome move and 
are the need of the hour. 
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5.2.4 Related to Measures by which Private Sector Participation could be increased 
The National Electricity policy 2005 has been made m view of making accelerated 
development of the power sector which should have an impact on economics of generation 
using different resources. The National Tariff PoUcy 2005 was aimed to devise a better tariff 
structuring system in place and therefore an attractive tariff for players As discussed in the 
literature review section, Ernst &Young (2012) undertook a survey of various sectors to 
determine the overall outlook for India which turned out to be remains positive. However, it 
was found through the survey that madequate infrastructure and a lack of governance and 
transparency were the major obstacles to investment in power sector. The report concludes that 
by improving upon these obstacles will result in an improvement in India's attractiveness for 
investment. The Government, though sensitive to the challenges, has to hasten policy-making 
and implementation, so that India continues to remain attractive. Kintanar Noel Eli B., et.al. 
(2003) have described how the Government of the Philippines continues to pursue its policy of 
encouraging the private sector to participate in the financing, construction, management and 
operation of mfrastructure services and facilities in the country. Besides key factor as discussed 
above the following are some important measures by which private sector participation can be 
increased. 
a) Tariff structure revision with 
b) Link to market driven price mechanism 
c) Mode of participation such as BOOT concept 
The tariff structure also needs to be designed in a more structured way depending on the time 
of tariff In any power system, especially in India, during the late night and early hours of the 
day, say from 10 pm to 5 am, the power supply is in excess of demand, while during the 
morning hours supply is inadequate to meet the demand. During certain hours like 6 pm to 9 
pm the demand is the highest due to the lighting needs of households and commercial 
establishments and these are called the peak hours. The tariff structure can be modified based 
on the peak hour and normal (non- peak) hour. In terms of the market driven price mechanism 
which may not be acceptable to the end consumers in large, a middle way of moving ahead in 
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this direction can be the price band method which is a more practical approach in moving 
towards the market driven price mechanism. 
5.2.5 Mode of Private Sector Participation 
It is also understood from the study that private sector participation would lead to better 
competition among the private players and public sector utilities would also be forced for 
adoption of such management to remain competitive. The concept of BOOT can work very 
well as these have been well experienced in other infrastructure sector. It is also advisable to 
the power sector players to have their fuel linkages and ftiel security plans in place before 
entering in power generation sector. Also the fuel opted would have their environmental 
concerns which needs to be separately addressed in view of MoEF guidelines. From the 
response of private sector power generating companies, it has also been inferred that 
a) Best Public - Private Partnership in case of a joint venture is 49-51 % which mean for 
such participation between public and private partnership the management control has 
to be in the hands of private sector. 
b) As regards the Equity participation between foreign & Indian company in power 
generation there are varied opinion on the composition of equity participation however 
it has been observed that 30-70% and 49-51 % composition has been preferred by 
private sector power generators. 
c) For the alternative mode of Private Sector of participation BOOT concept has been 
widely agreed. 
The role of the private sector remained quite limited in past years. Slowly but gradually the 
role of private sector in power generation is increasing and thus competition is being 
experienced by the existing players. The domineering of executing Power projects on time 
without cost escalation and operating the power plant at a superior performance level have 
forced the new generating organizations to identify areas of improvement to enter the field and 
remain competitive. 
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On the basis of extensive literature review, the following approach is being recommended for 
private sector participants /TVs for setting up of a new power plant, especially for new 
organizations/entrants. 
a) Location: The project should be planned near to the load center to avoid loading of 
transmission charges , however in case of proximity to fuel source the merit has to be 
seen in that perspective. 
b) Fuel Mix: In case of gas based power plant a fiiel mix with RLNG upto 20 % with 
domestic gas may work, however in case of high LNG prices the economics may not 
work and then alternative fuel such as coal may be considered. 
c) Scale of operation: For gas based plants it is advisable to set up power plants in 
Combined Cycle Power Plant (CCPP) which has higher efficiency and thus gives 
effective cost benefits. The plant size should be of medium scale upto 500 MW as an 
initial venture. 
d) Technology: It is recommended that for base load operations combined cycle gas 
turbines may be used, however for peak load operations gas engines may be used. 
Depending upon the cost of power generation and CERC guidelines a combination of 
these may be used. 
e) Development model & marketing: It is preferred to make joint ventures with strategic 
business partners who are already an established player in the field of power generation 
in any part of the globe; this gives the leverage of having core competency of 
promoter(s) besides having a project management consultant. For the marketing of the 
power thus produced, long term/ short term power purchase agreement has to be in 
place with some major utilities. 
In the above perspective it may be worth considering that the prospects of decentralized 
medium size power generation units may once again be seen and for upcoming projects the 
BOOT concept may work. 
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5.3 Directions for Future Research 
Based on the above research, following directions have been pointed out for future research 
1. Future researchers may expand the scope of study to other geographical region of India 
or other Indian states or other region of the world where it may deem suitable and 
worthy to conduct the research work. 
2. Further research may be carried to explore other / additional important factors or 
decision making variables. 
3. The present private sector power generation is in nascent stage in various Indian states, 
with the upcoming technology and globalization it may happen easily that private 
power producers may take competitive advantage and thereby bringing the private 
sector participation to a greater extent which may be studies in fiirther research. 
Bringing the cost of power to lower side is presently not viable in the current scenario 
however with the advent of new technologies it may happen in future. In view of that 
various other issues relating to private sector participation may crop up. 
4. Future research may treat this as a service industry wherein multiple service providers 
may be available and accordingly the service quality may also be studied for various 
regions or private power generation companies. 
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Appendix-A 
Questionnaire for Private Electricity (Power) generating companies 
Q. 1 Please rate the following factors that may have an impact on the sustainability of 
Private sector Power generation units in the State of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) on a five point scale. 
5= Most important or Significant impact & 
Please ^ mark in the table below. 
1= Least important or Least inpact. 
Sr.No. 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
J 
k 
1 
Factors affecting sustainability 
Implementation of Govt, policy 
Investment cost 
Fuel Cost 
Operation cost 
Maintenance Cost 
Modernization of transmission 
& distribution 
Govt, being single buyer 
Adoption of alternate source of 
Power generation (wind, solar 
etc.) 
Future demand for electricity 
(power) due to population 
growth in U.P. 
Future demand for electricity 
(power) due to economic 
development in U.P. 
Backward integration of foel 
supply for fuel security 
Cost benefit solution through 
Gas based power projects 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q.2 Please rate the impact of the following challenges & problems which private power 
generating companies may face (on a 5 point scale). 
5= Most important or Significant impact & 
1= Least important or Least impact. 
Please >^  mark in the table below. 
Sr.n 
0 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
i 
J 
k 
I 
m 
Problems / Challenges 
Risk of timely payment by 
distribution companies in U.P. 
Lack of knowledge & 
experience by private 
entrepreneurs 
Land acquisition problems 
Fuel supply problems 
Inadequate infrastructure 
Bias of state regulator against 
private sector 
Inefficient transmission & 
distribution system 
Inadequate cost recovery 
Non payment of power 
generation bill by the Govt, of 
U.P. 
Load shedding effect on 
potential of growth 
Longer breakeven point 
(duration) 
Geopolitical risk in case of coal 
assets acquired abroad by the 
power generating company 
Intervention by NGO's 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q.3 Please rate the following policies of the Government that may impact privatization of 
Power Generation in Uttar Pradesh on a 5 Point Scale similar to the above. 
5= Most important or Significant impact & 
1= Least important or Least impact. 
Please •^ mark in the table below. 
Sr.N 
0 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
Aspects related to Policies of 
the Government 
Financial, Promotional & fiscal 
incentives 
Improvement in administration 
& beaurocratic functioning 
SimpHfication of procedure 
Reduction in Administrative 
Delays 
End of License Raj 
Overall policies of the Govt, of 
UP 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q.4 What should be the best Public - Private Partnership in case of a joint venture, 
a. 20% -80% 
b. 30%-70% 
c.40%-60% 
d.49%-51% 
e. Any other (please specify) .... 
Q.5 What can be the equity participation between foreign & Indian company in power 
generation. 
a.20% -80% 
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b. 30%-70% 
c.40%-60% 
d.49%-51% 
e. Any other (please specify). 
Q.6 What should be the alternative mode of Private Sector of participation, 
a. BOOT (Built, Own, Operate ,Transfer) 
b. BOX (Built, Operate , Transfer) 
c. BLT (Built, Lease ,Transfer) 
d. Complete privatization 
e. Any other (please specify) 
For Company profile of respondents. 
1. Name of the Manager 
2. Designation 
3. Name & Address of the Company 
4. Origin of Company: Indian/Foreign 
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Appendix-B 
Questionnare for End consumers of Power (Electricity) 
In view of the power crisis in the State of Uttar Pradesh, power generation by private sector 
participation may be a solution to the problem. As there can be various issues related to this 
plan, your views are solicited to understand the subject in greater detail depending upon your 
responses. 
l=Strongly disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree 5=Strongly agree 
Please rate the following factors on a 5 point scale by marking [>^]. 
Sr.No 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
Aspects 
Market driven (non subsidized) 
price mechanism can be an 
option to improve upon the 
availability and reliability of 
power in U.P. 
Poor power generation and 
distribution by existing 
companies should be addressed 
by immediate privatization in 
U.P. 
Large size plants/farther 
capacity addition of power 
plants will have environmental 
impacts 
Due to high capital investment 
there may be rise in tariff under 
open market (non subsidized 
pricing) system. 
Subsidy should be continued to 
be provided (upto a fixed 
consumption) to households 
even after privatization 
Pricing of power based on price 
band method for the amount of 
power consumed (initially 
subsidized upto a certain level 
and subsequently on actual 
market price -non subsidized 
mechanism) is a better option 
Private companies in power 
generation would have stronger 
incentive to comply with 
1 2 3 4 5 
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h 
i 
quality standards and other 
regulatory obligations 
Privatization should be done 
first for transmission / 
distribution before 
privatization of generation in 
U.P. 
Power deficit can be reduced by 
addition of power generation 
capacity by private companies. 
Q2 Upto what extra price you can afford (in Rs per unit additional, on the present price of 
power supply) for a very good quality power on continuous basis. 
a) Rs 1, b) Rs 2 , c) Rs 3, d) Rs 4, e) Any other (pi specify).... 
Q3 Upto what extra price you can afford (in Rs per unit additional, on the present price of 
power supply) for a moderate quality power on continuous basis. 
a) Rs 1, b)Rs2, c)Rs3, d) Rs4, e) Anyother(plspecify).... 
Profile of Consumer 
a. Name 
b. Age 
c. Occupation 
d. Name of City / District 
e. Monthly Income upto Rs 10,000, 
10,000-20,000 
20,000-35,000 
35,000-50,000 
Above 50,000 
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Appendix-C 
Summary & Analysis of the data from power generation companies 
Factors affecting sustainability (On 
Likert Scale) 
Implementation of Govt, policy 
Investment cost 
Fuel Cost 
Operation cost 
Maintenance Cost 
Modernization of transmission & 
distribution 
Govt, being single buyer 
Future demand for electricity (power) 
due to population growth in U.P. 
Future demand for electricity (power) 
due to economic development in U.P. 
Cost benefit solution through Gas based 
power projects 
Problems & Challenges that confront 
private sector participation 
Risk of timely payment by distribution 
companies in U.P. 
Lack of knowledge & experience by 
private entrepreneurs 
Land acquisition problems 
Fuel supply problems 
Inadequate infrastructure 
Inefficient transmission & distribution 
system 
Inadequate cost recovery 
Bias of state regulator against private 
sector 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
6 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
3 
0 
4 
3 
7 
7 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
3 
0 
6 
] 
1 
0 
3 
2 
2 1 
4 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
7 
9 
6 
6 
4 
4 
2 
3 
5 
7 
7 
7 
6 
8 
5 
9 
6 
8 
5 
5 
6 
5 
6 
5 
5 
5 
12 
1 
8 
6 
7 
6 
7 
5 
Mean 
value 
4.25 
3.81 
4.00 
3.75 
3.50 
4.19 
4.13 
4.00 
3.69 
3.56 
Mean 
value 
4.75 
2.94 
4.13 
4,00 
4 19 
4.19 
4.13 
4.06 
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Non payment of power generation bill 
by the Govt, of U.P. 
Load shedding effect on potential of 
growth 
Longer breakeven point (duration) 
Geopolitical risk in case of coal assets 
acquired abroad by the power GENCO 
Intervention byNGO's 
Aspects related to Policies of the 
Government 
Financial, Promotional & fiscal 
incentives 
Improvement in administration & 
beaurocratic iunctioning 
Simplification of procedure 
Reduction in Administrative Delays 
End of License Raj 
Overall policies of the Govt, of UP 
Measures by which pvt sector 
participation could be increased 
Backward integration of fuel supply 
for fuel security 
Adoption of alternate source of Power 
generation (wind, solar etc.) 
Other survey questions 
Best Public - Private Partnership in 
case of a joint venture. 
Equity participation between foreign & 
Indian company in power generation. 
Alternative mode of Private Sector of 
participation. 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
I 
20-
80% 
4 
20-
80% 
3 
BOOT 
7 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
30-70 
% 
3 
30-70 
% 
5 
BOT 
2 
0 
4 
2 
2 
6 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
4 
40-60% 
1 
40-60%, 
1 
BLT 
1 
4 
8 
6 
8 
8 
4 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
5 
4 
7 
6 
49-51%. 
8 
49-51% 
5 
Complete 
pvt 
6 
10 
4 
6 
4 
2 
5 
7 
10 
7 
10 
8 
8 
5 
4 
4 
Other 
0 
Other 
2 
Other 
0 
4.31 
4.00 
3.94 
3,81 
3.75 
Mean 
value 
4.06 
4.31 
4.00 
4.31 
4.25 
4.25 
Mean 
value 
3.69 
4.19 
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v.ppcii 
Zf^ xr^ o- l f^Jld J-f^mj t Wt f^, t f ^ cb |4*^ vjqi))j| # ^ sRRfT 7P7T t I ? ^ ^ S F l " ^ 
3 T R ^ >H^i|Vl 3T^fa^ t I ^ o R ¥ ^ ^ f ^ 3 T T ^ ^ fMcT ^ ^ ^ f '? f ^ ^ ^ f ^ 
Tf 6f|cT ^ CTS2T 3fr? fclW^ ?t ^P f ^ t I ^ ^ S F T 3TT^ %fr?t ? M ? ^ f c h ^ cfjt Tjnf ^sii? ^ 
;r.1 PlHfeiRsId oqcWoljl' ^ 1 ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^m ^ ^#fcT ^5aR ^ ^ I 
1. Tjnf w r ^ 31^ T?TRT (Strongly disagree) 
2. 3T^ T?TfcT (Disagree) 
3. T^gTTcT ^ 3j>!H^Hd' (Neither agree nor disagree) ^ ' 
4. W ^ (Agree) 
5. ^ WT ^ W ^ (Strongly agree) 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
h. 
i. 
R^d ^:id^K^ 's'<^ ' (cldHiui cfTl ^^|sj R i^jcfl * ) 4>;cj^ ^ 
^(^ \iM. ^ d,^d Pi^45>;u| ^"iHI <HN i^Jc|7 1 1 
^ Q\*\\^ i) 4illc|x:u| qvJ ^-jlqi y^|c| q-^'j|| | 
M^d vJi^KH ^d, <s|^^ ^iyll Hc)^| v|-| <l^d slH|y! c^ ^ 
R^d < !^l ^ (Wd H R^d-^ Lj>i) ^<i ld^ 5?1 ^Hc^dl t l 
?^fTfr ^^-41 ^\{^y> 1 
f ^ ^ ^ ^ f^r^rW Ml^^^ 5i<^  Rfti (q^ef ^ 
iJ_He deb »( i ^^ aisilld >H6>!ll-^  ^cw y |^^ ; 6|K 4) 
MVJVI ^-A dp] R^d v3(^Kd cbMl^ill JJ_u|c)an H H * : 
R^d i^l^^ld * l *Jr) cbl M^d vJdJN-l iH^ ^ 
Plvjflcb^UI ^K l Lj^ l^ R,i|| ^\ >Hcbdl t 1 
1 2 3 4 5 
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1. ^ . 1 
2. ^ . 2 
3. ^ . 3 
4. ^ . 4 
5. ? ^ 3T^ TfT 
1. ^ . 1 
2. ^ . 2 
3. ^ . 3 
4. ^ . 4 
5. ? ^ 3T^ TiT 
^3¥ : 
^ZT -^fRT : 
YT^ / f ^ ^ •=TFf : 
Trf%^ 3TFT ^ . 10,000 cR? 
^ . 10,000 - 20,000 
^ . 20,000 - 35,000 
^ . 35,000 - 50,000 
^ . 50,000 ^ 3Tf£f^ 
( w ^ ^ f ^ sRraK) 
